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 ABSTRACT 
 
The electronics industry has seen strong innovation, severe price competition, and 
entry and exit of competitors. The fast changes within the industry can cause much 
uncertainty in the markets, making it more difficult to stay on top. The life cycle 
management assumes that what you focus on today will change and require different 
approaches to be successful in the future. The life cycle model can be used to describe 
the evolution of processes and of an industry. It is suggested that each phase of the life 
cycle would require different capabilities and focus from a company and its 
operations. 
 
The questions: “How do manufacturing capabilities and performance contribute to 
business performance?” and “Will certain competitive advantages be enough when 
business situations change fast?” have inspired this research. The main aspect of the 
study was to study the combination of the manufacturing capability development and 
theory of life cycles. The main longitudinal case was selected within the 
telecommunications industry. This particular case study provided an understanding of 
manufacturing capability development in three different phases of life cycle. The 
single longitudinal case was supported by three other well-known cases also from the 
electronics industry.  
 
The research results are summarized into propositions for capability development. The 
research confirmed that requirements for manufacturing capabilities change along the 
business life cycle. The business life cycle model can be used as a tool to predict 
needed change in capability development. It can provide a practical understanding as 
to how capabilities need to change along the business life cycle. Manufacturing can 
contribute to the competitive advantage of the company particularly during the 
transition phases. The operational innovation and ability to shape the future is needed 
especially prior to entering the growth phase or when looking for new growth. The 
strategic flexibility and ability to adapt are especially required prior to entering the 
maturity phase.  
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 TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Elektroniikkateollisuus on kokenut suuria muutoksia viime vuosina. Teollisuudenala 
on tuottanut useita mittavia innovaatioita, siellä on koettu kovaa hintakilpailua sekä 
erilaisten kilpailijoiden tuloa markkinoille ja poistumista markkinoilta. Nopeat 
muutokset aiheuttavat epävarmuutta ja tekevät menestymisen vaikeaksi. 
Elinkaarimallin mukaan tarvitset menestyäksesi erilaisen lähestymistavan 
tulevaisuudessa kuin tänään. Elinkaarimallia voidaan käyttää kuvaamaan prosessin tai 
teollisuudenalan kehittymistä. Elinkaarimallissa oletetaan, että eri vaiheet vaativat 
erilaisia kyvykkyyksiä yritykseltä ja sen tuotannolta. 
 
Kysymykset - “Kuinka tuotannon kyvykkyydet ja suorituskyky vaikuttavat yrityksen 
suorituskykyyn” ja ”Riittääkö yksi tietty kilpailuetu liiketoimintaympäristön 
muuttuessa nopeasti” - ovat inspiroineet tätä tutkimusta. Tutkimus keskittyy tuotannon 
kyvykkyyksien kehittämiseen elinkaarimallin avulla. Tutkimus koostuu yhdestä 
pitkittäisestä tapaustutkimuksesta, jonka avulla analysoidaan erään yrityksen 
tuotannon kyvykkyyksien kehittymistä kolmessa eri elinkaaren vaiheessa. Lisäksi 
kolme muuta hyvin tunnettua tapausta elektroniikkateollisuudesta tukivat saatuja 
tuloksia. 
 
Tutkimus vahvisti, että vaatimukset tuotannon kyvykkyyksille muuttuvat elinkaaren 
eri vaiheissa. Yrityksen elinkaarimallia voidaan käyttää työkaluna ennustettaessa 
vaadittavia muutoksia kyvykkyyksille. Malli tuo käytännön tietoa siihen, kuinka 
tuotannon kyvykkyydet muuttuvat eri elinkaaren vaiheissa. Tuotanto voi vaikuttaa 
yrityksen kilpailuetuun ja etenkin muutostilanteessa vaiheesta toiseen. Operatiivista 
innovaatioherkkyyttä ja kykyä muokata tulevaisuutta tarvitaan erityisesti juuri ennen 
nopean kasvun alkua. Strategista joustavuutta ja mukautumiskykyä puolestaan 
tarvitaan, kun teollisuudenala on siirtymässä maturiteettivaiheeseen. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 presents the background and motivation for this study. The research 
questions along with the focus and scope of the study are also presented in this 
Chapter.  
 
1.1 Time and life cycles 
 
The Chinese concept of time is not linear, but spiral-shaped. Following the laws of 
Yin and Yang, time repeats itself. Because time repeats, events are also likely to 
repeat. The definition for the cycle is “an interval of time during which a sequence of 
a recurring succession of events or phenomena is completed” (www.webster.com). 
The beauty of cyclic time is that it repeats: by looking at what is happening today, we 
can understand what will happen tomorrow. At the same time we then will have 
understood the past. 
 
A definition of a life cycle is “a series of stages through which something (as an 
individual, culture, or manufactured product) passes during its lifetime” 
(www.webster.com). Moreover the transition is “an alteration of a physical system 
from one state, or condition, to another” (www.webster.com). A business can go 
through stages of development similar to the life cycle of the human race. Parenting 
strategies that work for a toddler cannot be applied to a teenager. The same is true for 
a business. It will face different phases of life cycle throughout its life. What you 
focus on today will change and require different approaches to be successful in future.  
 
The technology adoption life cycle has been known since the 1950s in social research 
and serves to illustrate how communities respond to discontinuous innovations. The 
product life cycle model originated from product innovation studies (Abernathy and 
Utterback 1975, 1978), but the life cycle model can also be used to describe the 
evolution of processes and an industry or a branch of industry (Porter 1980). Moore 
(1998) combined the ideas of Tracey and Wiersema (1993) to the technology adoption 
life cycle model describing three different value disciplines: customer intimacy, 
operational excellence and product leadership. He implied that each phase would 
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 require different capabilities and focus from a company and its operations. These 
thoughts have inspired this study, particularly the idea of using the life cycle model as 
a tool to understand the dynamics involved in the capability development towards 
competitive advantage for the company.  
 
1.2 Background 
 
The electronics industry, especially the mobile communication industry, has 
experienced fast changes in the business environment. The forces of globalization, 
technology, and economic liberalization are combining to make life harder than ever 
for established companies (Huyett and Viguerie 2005). 
 
“Powerful supply-side forces - globalization, technology, and 
liberalization - are increasing the pace and altering the shape of 
competition across the world. Traditional players will be toppled if they 
don't respond by embracing the spirit of youth, by adopting a forward-
looking perspective, and by implementing radical solutions rapidly. 
Those that make the transition will find a world of bright new 
opportunities.” (Huyett and Viguerie 2005) 
 
Fine (1998) says that every industry has its own clockspeed – or rate of evolution – 
depending on its products, processes and customer requirements. Individual 
capabilities can lose value overnight, because of rapidly changing technologies, shifts 
in the larger economy or the new tactics of competitors.  
 
The fast changes within the industry can cause much uncertainty in the markets 
making it more difficult to stay on top. In a global and dynamic environment the 
development of new products and processes is more intense, demanding and rigorous, 
creating a less forgiving environment. In addition, availability and growing demands 
for differentiated products and product variety has expanded significantly. According 
to Beach et al. (2000) change is now a permanent feature of the business environment 
and companies that can adapt to new environment are likely to gain a significant 
 2 
 competitive advantage. The ability of manufacturing companies to adapt is referred as 
the strategic flexibility of a company (Beach et al. 2000). Courtney et al. (1997) 
divided strategic posture into shaping the future and adapting to the future. But being 
fast and efficient is not enough; the products and processes a firm introduces must also 
meet market demands for value, reliability, and distinctive performance (Wheelwright 
and Clark 1992). In other words, manufacturing strategy should be aligned with the 
company’s value proposition to customer (Moore 1998, Tracey and Wiersema 1993). 
Furthermore, effective strategy should steer companies toward where an industry is 
heading, not where it is today (Huyett and Viguerie 2005). In many companies, 
strategy means nothing more than a plan based largely on today's markets, today's 
product set, and today's competitors and emphasizing the financial forecast. Such a 
strategy may successfully identify opportunities to capture the upside of the current 
business over the next few years but can rarely anticipate extreme competition, much 
less show how to reposition a business to face it.  
 
The idea that manufacturing should be managed from a strategic point of view and 
used as a competitive force in the business was introduced by Wickham Skinner’s 
article “Manufacturing – Missing Link in Corporate Strategy” (Skinner 1969): 
 
“A company’s manufacturing function typically is either a competitive 
weapon or a corporate millstone. It is seldom neutral yet, the connection 
between manufacturing and corporate success is rarely seen as more 
than the achievement of high efficiency and low costs. 
… What appears to be routine manufacturing decisions frequently come 
to limit the corporation’s strategic options, binding it with facilities, 
equipment, personnel, and basic controls and policies to non-competitive 
posture which may take years to turn around.”  
 
The main aspect of this study is to study the combination of the manufacturing 
capability development and the theory of life cycles. Hayes and Wheelwright made 
the distinction between product and process life cycles in their 1979 article. Their 
studies indicate that different life cycle phases would require very different purposes 
 3
 and capabilities of operations. However their research focused more on process set-up 
rather than on overall manufacturing capabilities and did not present clear links with 
manufacturing performance and its competitive advantage. Although they did admit 
that there are several dynamic aspects of corporate competitiveness, where concept of 
matching the product life cycle with process life cycle can be applied. The special 
interest is given to capabilities developed in an environment described by D’Aveni 
(1994) as “hyper competition”, where demands for flexibility, delivery speed and 
innovation are ever-increasing. In order to maintain dynamic resource fit, 
manufacturing needs to alter competitive capabilities to enable quick time-to-market 
and “fast-cycle” businesses.  
 
1.3 Research objective, questions, scope and focus of the study 
 
The objective of this research is to enhance the understanding of the changing 
business environment’s effect on manufacturing capability development. The issues of 
how capabilities change in different phases of life cycle, how the choices made in 
manufacturing affect the manufacturing and business performance and how 
manufacturing can provide competitive advantage are addressed throughout the 
research.  
 
The research questions are formulated as follows:  
 
1. How do manufacturing capabilities and performance change in different 
phases of business life cycle? 
2. How can manufacturing provide a competitive advantage in different phases of 
business life cycle? 
 
This study focuses on the manufacturing capability development, specifically in the 
growth and maturity phases. The focus is on the capabilities and performances that the 
manufacturing unit must have in order for the firm to compete within its overall 
business – to create a competitive advantage and the dynamics involved within the 
changing business and industry environment. The main interest of the study is to 
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 understand the effects of life cycle dynamics and how the capabilities have changed 
accordingly along the business life cycle.  
 
Forrester (1964) modelled the dynamic process of corporate growth and indicated that 
there can be several different patterns for the individual company (figure 1). However, 
the scope of this study is to look at S-shaped curve illustrating introduction, growth 
and maturity phases, excluding decline. In this research this is understood as a 
business life cycle.  
 
A
D
C
B
 
Figure 1. Patterns of corporate growth (adopted from Forrester 1964) 
 
Due to the type of industry focus in electronics, the main interest lies especially in the 
S-curve where growth is particularly deep, as seen in figure 2 (Rogers 1995), 
describing the interactive diffusion of the adoption. The scope of this study is to look 
at the capabilities and their development over time in different phases of the business 
life cycle. This is done through a longitudinal case study in the growth company in a 
fast changing industry.  
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Figure 2. The rate of adoption for a usual innovation and for an interactive innovation, showing the 
critical mass (adopted from Rogers 1995) 
 
The scope of the study is within a single firm’s operations, while bearing in mind that 
achieving capabilities and performance is more than simply enhancing the existing 
technologies and competencies that a particular firm may possess. Instead, the whole 
supply chain may need to be reconfigured and, in doing so, greater responsibility 
might be placed on firms within the supply network (Brown and Bessant 2003). To 
succeed, a company must operate more effectively and innovate the business 
concurrently across the entire demand-supply chain (Eloranta et al. 2001). Lewis 
(2003) also discussed that a competitive advantage exists at the boundary between 
operations and its external environment and that shifting of both internal and external 
priorities should be accommodated. It should also not be forgotten that operational 
excellence may not come from the manufacturing of the product itself, but overall 
effectiveness or value can be created by a company’s supply network that it 
orchestrates (e.g. IKEA or Wal-Mart). 
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 1.4 Overview of the research methodology 
 
The research methodology for this research is a qualitative case study, based primarily 
on a single longitudinal case supported by three parallel cases. Qualitative research is 
fundamentally interpretive, meaning that the researcher makes an interpretation of the 
data. This includes developing a description of an individual or setting, analyzing data 
for themes or categories, and finally making an interpretation or drawing conclusions 
about what is learned, and offering further questions to be asked (Wolcott 1994, 
Creswell 2003). According to Creswell one cannot escape the personal interpretation 
brought to qualitative data analysis:  
 
“Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on 
distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or 
human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, 
analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the 
study in a natural setting.” (Creswell 1998)  
 
Qualitative inquiry requires an extensive commitment of time in the field, engagement 
in the complex, time-consuming process of data analysis, and capability of 
demonstrating multiple perspectives. The qualitative researcher strives for 
“understanding” and deep structure of knowledge that involves going out to the 
setting, gaining access, gathering material and probing to obtain detailed meanings 
(Creswell 1998). The research methodology and research design are discussed more in 
detail in Chapter 3.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 presented the background and the main research questions together with the 
motivation for the study, including a short overview of the research methodology.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the conducted literature review. The research questions were first 
divided into more detailed sub-questions, since without a research focus, it is easy to 
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 become overwhelmed by the volume of data. Then the theoretical backgrounds for the 
initial constructs were developed to guide the case analysis.  
 
Possible research approaches are introduced in Chapter 3.1. The research method is 
introduced in Chapter 3.2 and the criteria for choosing the case is presented in Chapter 
3.3. The research design is presented in Chapter 3.4, followed by the data collection 
and reliability in Chapters 3.5. Written case descriptions and analysis were structured 
according to the constructs used in the data collection.  
 
In Chapter 4 the case is presented along with the synchronic case analysis. Since there 
was one company used as the longitudinal case, three different life cycle phases were 
analysed diachronically as the cross-cases to understand if there were similar or 
dissimilar patterns in each phase. This improved the likelihood of accurate and reliable 
theory, that is, a theory that closely fits the data. The probability of capturing the novel 
findings was also enhanced. In Chapter 4.5.4 the manufacturing capability learnings 
are summarised as a table and in the format of a life cycle model for capability 
development.  
 
To support the findings of Chapter 4, well-known parallel cases (Cisco, Dell and 
SonyEricsson) are presented for comparison in Chapter 5.  
 
In Chapter 6 the research findings and existing comparison literature are presented. An 
essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or 
hypotheses with the extant literature. This involves asking what this is similar to, what 
it contradicts, and why. The literature, which conflicts with the emergent theory, is 
important for two reasons. First, if researchers ignore conflicting findings, then 
confidence in the findings is reduced. Second, conflicting literature represents an 
opportunity. In the literature discussion similar findings are important as well because 
it ties together underlying similarities in phenomena normally not associated with one 
another.  
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 In Chapter 7 the conclusion and discussion are presented. Chapter 7.1 includes the 
research findings and contribution of the study and in Chapter 7.2 managerial 
implications are discussed. The validity and reliability of the research are discussed in 
Chapter 7.3. Further research issues are presented in Chapter 7.4.  
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 2 THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS 
 
The theoretical background is presented through the literature review in Chapter 2. 
The theoretical framework and constructs are summarized in Chapter 2.4. According 
to Maxwell (2005) the theoretical framework’s purpose is to ground the study in 
previous work and indicate the theoretical approach to the phenomena being studied. 
The research questions were divided into sub-questions in order to understand the 
most relevant constructs to guide the literature review: 
 
1. How do manufacturing capabilities and performance change in different 
phases of business life cycle? 
A. What are manufacturing capabilities? 
B. How is manufacturing performance measured? 
C. What is the link between manufacturing performance and business 
performance? 
2. How can manufacturing provide a competitive advantage in different phases of 
business life cycle? 
A. Can manufacturing provide competitive advantage? 
B. If so, do manufacturing capabilities providing competitive advantage 
change along the business life cycle?  
 
Therefore the initial constructs were set as: manufacturing capabilities and 
performance, competitive advantage and life cycle. These are explored more in detail 
in Chapter 2. The theory in operations management research is particularly important 
as it shapes how the researcher interprets phenomena of interest. Actions to control the 
environment are shaped by the theories implicitly and explicitly used for observation. 
So whether one believes in trade-offs in manufacturing strategy, or in cumulative 
capabilities, one will arrive at different conclusions for a given situation and hence 
offer different recommendations for managers (Amundson 1998).  
 
 
 10
 2.1 Manufacturing capabilities and performance 
 
The first research question was how do manufacturing capabilities and performance 
change in different phases of business life cycle? Based on this question the defined 
initial constructs were manufacturing capabilities and performance, therefore Chapter 
2.1.1 will first asses the concept of manufacturing capability and then Chapter 2.1.2 
will assess the concept of manufacturing performance. Chapter 2.1.3 will discuss the 
link between manufacturing and business performance. The literature review 
conclusions on manufacturing capabilities and manufacturing performance are 
presented in Chapter 2.4 together with the conclusions on competitive advantage.  
 
2.1.1 Manufacturing capabilities 
 
Various authors in operations management literature have used mixed or overlapping 
terms to describe manufacturing capabilities and solid research paradigms have been 
lacking (Leong et al. 1990 and Ward et al. 1996). The terms resources, capabilities, 
competencies, practices, priorities and dimensions are not consistently defined and 
seem to be used in different ways and with different meanings. Furthermore, how 
researchers measure resources and capabilities also varies (Hoopes et al. 2003).  
 
Already Skinner (1969) argued that a close link should be established between 
corporate strategy and manufacturing practices, and proposed the concept of 
competitive priorities. The framework of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) 
introduced by Wernerfelt (1984) assumes that firms can be conceptualized as bundles 
of resources, that those resources heterogeneously are distributed across firms, and 
that resource differences persist over time. Competitive advantage is achieved by 
implementing fresh value-creating strategies that cannot easily be duplicated by 
competing firms. By a resource is meant anything that could be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm. According to Hill (1983) manufacturing tasks 
were defined as those capabilities that are critical to winning customer orders. Hill’s 
(2000) order-winning criteria included price, quality, delivery, product design and 
variety. A company should identify the criteria that will win orders against the 
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 competition (order winning criteria), but without excluding other criteria that will also 
be important (qualifying criteria). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) contend that firms 
should focus on building “core competencies” that could create competitive 
advantages in a variety of markets. Roth and van der Velde (1991) distinguish 
between intended and realized capabilities by referring to the former as competitive 
priorities and the latter as competitive capabilities. Kim and Arnold (1992) define 
manufacturing competence as a construct that measures the degree of fit between 
competitive priorities and manufacturing strength. A firm’s manufacturing function is 
competent, if it has strong capability on a variable (such as flexibility) that is also 
considered important.  
 
Makadok (2001) summarized that a company can develop capabilities by resource-
picking or capability building. The resource picking asserts that firms gain competitive 
advantage by being more effective than their rivals at selecting resources (Barney 
1986). On the other hand, capability building assumes that firms are more effective 
than their rivals at deploying resources (Teece et al. 1997). The ultimate goal is to 
develop a position (capability) on one or more of the market performance dimensions 
that is both highly valued by customers, and superior to that of competitors 
(Wheelwright and Bowen 1996, Pandza et al. 2003). Capabilities are also unique to 
each company, and may not even be easily recognized and categorized. Swink and 
Hegarty (1998) defined capability as organisationally specific and internally 
developed, not something a firm can buy or transfer as such. Capabilities are difficult 
to imitate or transfer, rendering them valuable. Capabilities derive less from specific 
technologies or manufacturing facilities and more from manufacturing infrastructure: 
people, management and information systems, learning and, organisational focus. 
Furthermore, the Meyer and Ferdows (1990) sand cone model proposes that lasting 
cost improvements can only be the result of cumulative improvements in all the 
capability areas. Competencies reinforce one another and are dynamic in time. Tunälv 
(1992) concludes that the order in which the priorities or capabilities should be 
handled is a matter of philosophy or strategy. On the other hand, others suggest that 
better performing firms are more likely to address multiple manufacturing capabilities 
simultaneously, which supports the rationale behind the cumulative model (Roth and 
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 Miller 1992, Noble 1997). The well-known Japanese experience indicates that 
organisations can shift the efficiency and flexibility trade-off to attain both superior 
efficiency and superior flexibility (Womack and Roos 1990, Adler et al. 1999). As an 
example, the study of the NUMMI plant demonstrated that by increasing the 
organisation’s capacity for flexibility at a given level of efficiency also created 
capabilities that served to improve efficiency (Adler et al. 1999).  
 
Makadok (2001) defined a resource as an observable asset that can be valued and 
traded – such as a brand, a patent, a parcel of land, or a license. A capability, on the 
other hand, is not observable, cannot be valued and changes as part of its entire unit. 
Also Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) propose that the manufacturing function should be 
viewed as a collection of resources, practices and structural factors (the manufacturing 
assets). They conclude that the key to manufacturing capabilities lies within a system 
of these manufacturing assets. Hayes and Upton (1998) divide capabilities into three 
types: process-based capabilities (e.g. the ability to provide advantages such as low 
cost and high quality), systems (coordination) based (e.g. the ability to create short 
lead times and to customize), and organisational based (e.g. the ability to master new 
technologies and introduce new products) operating capabilities. While Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003) similarly defined capability as the ability of an organisation to perform 
a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organisational resources, for the purpose of 
achieving a particular end result. They classify capabilities as either ‘operational’ or 
‘dynamic’. An operational capability generally involves performing an activity, such 
as manufacturing a particular product, using a collection of routines to execute and 
coordinate the variety of tasks required to perform the activity. Whereas dynamic 
capabilities, as defined by Teece et al. (1994, 1997), build, integrate, or reconfigure 
operational capabilities. Dynamic capabilities do not directly affect output for the firm 
in which they reside, but indirectly contribute to the output of the firm through an 
impact on operational capabilities. However it is emphasised that the capability 
building and change do not necessarily require dynamic capabilities (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003).  
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 Despite the differences in terminology and types of classification, several authors 
(Skinner 1985, Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Fine and Hax 1985, Hayes et al. 1988, 
Wheelwright and Bowen 1996, Berry et al. 1999, Kim and Arnold 1992, Ward et al. 
1995, Corbett and Wassenhove 1993) have identified candidate dimensions as 
cost/price, quality, dependability or delivery performance, flexibility and sometimes 
innovativeness (Leong et al. 1990, Sharma and Reddy 1999) and service (Kim and 
Arnold 1992) that represent the desired competitive advantage that manufacturing 
would be expected to support and enhance. Manufacturing function’s competitive role 
is to specify these priorities and pursue them through consistent structural and 
infrastructural decisions (Wheelwright 1984 and Kim and Arnold 1992). According to 
Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) the manufacturing infrastructure elements can be a more 
significant source of unique, long-term competitive advantage than the ‘hard’ 
structure. The classification of the manufacturing capability variables under the 
competitive priorities describe what the manufacturing function should achieve with 
regard to cost, quality, flexibility, delivery and services in order to support the business 
strategy effectively (Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Kim and Arnold 1992,1996) (see 
table 1). However, the after-sales services and support is beyond the scope of this 
study.  
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Table 1. Categorization of manufacturing capabilities based on competitive priorities (modified from 
Kim and Arnold 1992) 
 
Prize 
 
Price 
 
Examples: 
Ability to profit in price competitive markets (Low price) 
Flexibility 
 
Design change 
New products 
Volume change 
Mix change 
Broad line 
 
Examples: 
Ability to make rapid changes in design (Design change) 
Ability to introduce new products quickly (MPI) 
Ability to make rapid volume changes (Volume change) 
Ability to make rapid product mix changes (Mix change) 
Ability to offer a broad product line (Broad line) 
Quality 
 
Conformance 
Performance 
Reliable 
products 
 
Examples: 
Ability to offer consistently low defect rates (Conformance quality) 
Ability to provide high performance products or product amenities 
(Performance quality) 
Ability to provide reliable/durable products (Reliable/durable) 
Delivery 
 
Fast delivery 
On-time 
delivery 
 
Examples: 
Ability to provide fast deliveries (Fast delivery) 
Ability to make dependable delivery promises (On-time delivery) 
Services 
After-sales 
services 
Support 
Distribute 
Customize 
Examples: 
Ability to provide effective after-sales services 
 
Ability to provide product support effectively 
Ability to make product easily available 
Ability to customize product and services to customer needs 
 
 
2.1.2 Manufacturing performance 
 
The second initial construct to be studied was manufacturing performance in order to 
understand how manufacturing capabilities affect the manufacturing and business 
performance. 
 
The conclusion from the previous chapter was that manufacturing capabilities can be 
categorized by the competitive priorities of price, quality, delivery, flexibility and 
service. However, according to Swink and Hagerty (1998), the limitations of current 
conceptualisations of competitive priorities are that they do not discriminate between 
manufacturing capabilities and manufacturing outcomes (see also Corbett and Van 
Wassenhowe 1993, Coates and McDermott 2002). Swink and Hegarty (1998) defined 
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 manufacturing competence as distinct from capability, as a measure of the extent of 
alignment between manufacturing capabilities and the competitive needs of the firm. 
Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) also emphasise the distinction between external and 
internal measures, saying that operational measures are directly linked with 
manufacturing function and that operative management has at least some degree of 
control over them, whereas market measures are those metrics that are directly linked 
to customer satisfaction (e.g. cost vs. price). As Mills and Platts (2002) proposed, 
architecture exists in reflecting the collection of individual services, routines, and 
competencies into higher and higher level competencies, which at the highest level are 
recognized by customers as offering particular levels of performance on competitive 
factors. Therefore market and operational measures should not be mixed however 
similarly categorized by cost, quality, delivery and flexibility. Market performance 
measures, such as price, quality, delivery and flexibility, are external (Swink and 
Hegarty 1998, Ketokivi and Heikkilä 2003).  
 
However, flexibility could also be seen as a manufacturing capability, since it can be 
seen as referring to a means to an end (Hayes 1985), although some measures are 
presented in the literature (e.g. product customization ability, volume flexibility, mix 
flexibility and time to market) (Laugen et al. 2005). Innovation can also be seen as a 
contributing factor to the manufacturing performance measures of cost, time and 
quality and alone does not determine the outcome of manufacturing. As a matter of 
fact, time encompasses the role of dependability, flexibility, and rate of innovation 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996). Kaplan and Norton (1996) state that virtually all value 
propositions typically incorporate measures related to the response time, quality and 
price of customer-based processes. Some manufacturing objectives are closely related 
with cost (i.e. unit variable cost, materials cost and overhead costs), while others are 
more directly concerned with time (delivery lead time, procurement lead time, new 
product development cycle and equipment change over time), or quality (defect rates 
and vendor quality). In order to support the competitive priorities, manufacturing 
managers need to select a few objectives and concentrate their effort on achieving 
them (Kim and Arnold 1996). However, a direct linkage between individual 
competitive priorities and particular objectives may be difficult to establish, since 
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 greater emphasis on quality objectives does not necessary mean less emphasis on cost 
reduction (Kim and Arnold 1996). There is also no simple cause-effect relationship 
between single improvement programs and manufacturing performance - some action 
programs can have short-term negative results and may become effective only after a 
fairly long transition period (Meyer and Ferdows 1990).  
 
2.1.3 Cost  
 
According to Hill (2000), the external customer is interested in purchase price, which 
is the expenditure of resources required of the customer to acquire the product, 
including the costs of return or replacement. As the manufacturing outcome there is 
the development cost of production processes and the production cost to make and 
deliver the product. These costs are normally separated into two categories: direct 
costs and indirect costs (Atrill and McLaney 2001). Direct costs are those that can be 
identified with specific cost units. Indirect costs are all other costs that cannot be 
directly measured in respect of each particular unit of output. The cost of 
manufacturing includes several elements such as overhead cost, inventory cost (days 
of supply, cost of inventory holding, etc.), direct labour cost, procurement cost, 
capacity utilization, etc (Ward et al.1995, Neely et al. 1994, Laugen et al. 2005). For 
example, low work-in-process inventory (days-of-supply, DOS) reduces the cost of 
excess and obsolete inventories.  
 
2.1.4 Time  
 
The lead time is the time a customer must wait between order placement and receipt 
(New 1992). Reliability or dependability (on-time delivery, OTD) reflects on the 
company’s reliability in delivering a customer’s order on or before the quoted delivery 
date (New 1992). There is growing recognition of the importance of delivery 
reliability as a criterion in most markets. Its change toward being a qualifier is part of 
that competitive perspective (Hill 2000, 1983, Roth and Miller 1990, Meyer and 
Pycke 1996). Delivery lead time or speed (Order Fulfilment lead time, OFLT) is about 
short delivery lead times and involves decisions in production stability, investments in 
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 capacity and/or inventory and the control of workflow (Hill 1983, Roth & Miller 
1990, Neely et al. 1994, Laugen et al. 2005). Another measure could be Time-to-
Market for new products which manufacturing effects.  
 
2.1.5 Quality 
 
The quality of a product is a measure of its relative ‘usefulness’ to the customer. It 
includes product features, which might differentiate it from competitive products 
(New 1992). Two of the mentioned measures are consistent quality and high 
performance products (Roth and Miller 1990). Essential decisions need to be made in 
terms of cost/quality, product technology and process technology (Hill 1983). 
Measures for product and process quality can include, for example: 
 
• Manufacturing conformance, product quality and reliability, customer service 
and support, delivery reliability, environmental performance (Laugen et. al. 
2005) 
• Return rate, defective rate (Ward et al. 1995) 
• Vendor quality (Ward et al. 1995) 
• Quality control circles (Ward et al. 1995) 
• ISO 9000 certification (Ward et al. 1995) 
• Field failure under warranty (Neely et al. 1994) 
• In process quality (Neely et al. 1994) 
• Incoming parts quality (Neely et al. 1994) 
• Consistent quality with low defects (Meyer and Pycke 1996) 
 
2.1.6 Linking business and manufacturing performance 
 
The researchers have verified positive effects on performance resulting from 
consistency in operations and marketing (Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Swamidass 
and Newell 1987, Swink and Hegarty 1998, Hill 2000). Gupta and Lonial (1998) 
provided empirical evidence that the link between manufacturing and business 
strategy should lead to better business performance. Hill (2000) also suggests a 
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 framework for linking corporate objectives to manufacturing strategies through 
marketing strategies. The hierarchy of strategy has three levels: corporate-level 
strategy, business-level strategy, and functional-level strategy (Gupta and Lonial 1998, 
Fine and Hax 1985, Hofer and Schendel 1978). At the functional-level (e.g. marketing 
and manufacturing) the objectives are to support the desired business level strategy in 
a manner that will provide a competitive advantage and to determine how the 
functional-level strategies will complement each other. Financial business measures 
could include profitability, ROA, ROE, growth and market share, for example 
(Schroeder et al. 1989). However, this study does not address how a business strategy 
should be developed within a particular competitive environment, or whether a 
specific type of business strategy affects performance measures differently. 
 
White (1996) proposes that the most direct relationships between manufacturing 
capabilities and business performance are through decreased cost and, consequently, 
higher profitability. Kim and Arnold (1992) provide some indications that 
manufacturing does not appear to equally affect all the financial and market 
performance measures, having a greater effect on return on assets and profit ratio than 
on growth rate and market share. However, their study did indicate a strong 
relationship between manufacturing competence and business performance, especially 
in the electronics industry. On the other hand, according to Roth and Miller (1992), 
good manufacturing does not necessarily lead to positive business outcomes, and 
positive business outcomes are not always associated with effective manufacturing. It 
is possible for a firm to be successful with a bad manufacturing strategy, and fail with 
a good one. Manufacturing surely matters but not unconditionally. Superior 
manufacturing capabilities provide opportunity for business success, but it is up to the 
executive management to seize the opportunity (Roth and Miller 1992).  
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) introduced the idea of a Balanced Scorecard, which 
combines financial measures of past performance with measures of the drivers of 
future performance. The objectives and measures view organisational performance 
from four perspectives: financial, customer, internal business process, and learning 
and growth. The idea is to measure how business units create value for current and 
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 future customers and how they must enhance internal capabilities and the investment 
in people, systems, and procedures necessary to improve future performance. They 
also maintain that the chain and cause effect should pervade all four perspectives of a 
Balanced Scorecard. As an example, improved OTD is expected to lead to higher 
customer loyalty, which in turn, is expected to lead to higher financial performance. 
So both customer loyalty and OTD are incorporated into the customer perspective of 
the scorecard. Balanced Scorecard can therefore be used to connect the business and 
manufacturing performance measures. However, Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) 
comment in their article that Balanced Scorecard is somewhat limited in offering 
operational management an insight as to how goals can be met and represents, 
therefore, more of a top management tool.  
 
2.2 Manufacturing competitive advantage 
 
The second research question was how manufacturing can provide a competitive 
advantage in different phases of business life cycle. Chapter 2.2 reviews the concept 
of competitive advantage and the strategic role of manufacturing. 
 
2.2.1 Competitive advantage 
 
Following the initial work of Skinner (1969), many agree that the strategic choices in 
manufacturing need to be competitive, enabling manufacturing to do certain things 
better than competitors (Clark 1996, Fine and Hax 1985, Berry et al. 1999) and more 
so, if properly operated and achieving strong performance outcomes (Wheelwright 
and Hayes 1985, Hayes and Wheelwright 1984). Hayes and Pisano (1996) also 
suggested that capabilities are activities that a firm can do better than its competitors. 
However, if the policy is not consistent with the corporate strategy, a negative 
influence on the company’s performance may result (Skinner 1992, 1985). According 
to Porter (1998) competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of activities. To 
compete in any industry, companies must perform a wide array of discrete activities 
such as processing orders, calling on customers, assembling products, and training 
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 employees. Activities that generate cost and create value for buyers are the basic units 
of competitive advantage.  
 
Value denotes what customers are willing to pay, and superior value stems from 
offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits or providing unique 
benefits that more than offset a higher price. According to Porter (1998), the two basic 
types of competitive advantage (low cost or differentiation) combined with the scope 
of activities for which a firm seeks to achieve lead to three generic strategies for 
achieving above-average performance in an industry: cost leadership, differentiation, 
and focus. Mintzberg (1988) simplifies generic strategies as different means of 
achieving differentiation. His typology describes the strategies of differentiation by 
quality, design, support and image in addition to Porter’s differentiation by price. The 
study of Kotha and Vadlamani (1995) supports the Mintzberg’s typology and 
maintains that it also out-performs Porter’s typology in its conceptual clarity and 
descriptive power. Chiesa and Manzini (1998) define three different ways of creating 
competitive advantage: by performing better than competitors on an already existing 
dimension of competition, by establishing a new dimension on which to compete, and 
by creating a new product/market combination. The third approach addresses 
industries where the competitive arena is dynamic (Chiesa & Manzini 1998). The 
competitive advantage may manifest itself as a price advantage or an advantage along 
some other dimension of value to the customer such as delivery time, flexibility to 
changing customer needs or product quality (Banker and Khosla 1995, Lewis 2003). 
Brown (1996) also suggests that companies need to make basic strategic choices to 
compete, either on low cost or by offering perceived differentiated products, but other 
equally important competitive factors, such as delivery speed and reliability, 
flexibility, quality, etc., are needed to win in chosen markets. In addition, he states that 
it is vital to know where the product stands in terms of its position in the product life 
cycle. For him, focus simply means organising in a way that makes some sense of the 
rapid change that will be needed in order to satisfy various customer needs (Brown 
1996). Schlie and Goldhar (1995) propose to add a multiple niche competition to 
Porter’s generic strategies for competitive scope, which would allow the firms to 
simultaneously achieve both low-cost leadership and differentiation. In fact, Hill 
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 (1988) proposed that once differentiation becomes an industry norm, then failure to 
differentiate by a firm might result in a declining market share and the loss of scale 
economies. The simultaneous pursuit of both differentiation and low cost may be 
necessary to both establish and maintain a sustained competitive advantage, especially 
in mature industries where all experience curve economies have been exhausted and 
several firms have achieved a minimum-cost position. Actually, differentiation could 
be the path towards establishing a low-cost position with economies of scope, by 
sharing resources for a range of products (Hill 1988) or, in other words, providing 
value at the lowest cost. The recent studies of Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) indicate 
that manufacturing seems to contribute specifically to the differentiator’s strategy and 
not to the price competition. When competing with price vital elements include 
economies of scale and scope and learning curve effects. They comment that at the 
manufacturing level it is difficult to affect to scales benefits, since these are more 
company level decisions or environment driven issues. Already Schmenner (1976) and 
Wheelwright (1979) argued that “economies of scale” is among the most discussed, 
but least understood, concept in manufacturing management today. Being such a 
vague concept it can be used to justify just about any decision, right or wrong. The 
differentiation from competitors occurs by doing things differently (competence 
development, unique manufacturing technology, unique practices) or by doing things 
more efficiently (predicting new technologies, efficient implementation of new 
processes and practices, efficient execution and coordination) (Ketokivi and Heikkilä 
2003). As Holweg and Pil (2004) emphasise, profitability is obtained not by 
optimizing cost, but by building the right product at the right time.  
 
To develop a successful and sustainable strategy, alignment between an organisation’s 
internal activities and its customer’s value proposition is needed (Treacy and 
Wiersema 1993). According to Teece and Pisano (1994), in order to be strategic, a 
capability must be honed to a user need (so that there are customers), unique (so that 
the products/services produced can be priced without too much regard to competition), 
and difficult to replicate (so that profits will not be competed away). In wider terms, 
Barney (1991) explored four similar attributes for gaining competitive advantage: (a) 
it must be valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats 
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 in a firm’s environment, (b) it must be rare among a firm’s current and potential 
competition, (c) it must be imperfectly imitable, and (d) there cannot be strategically 
equivalent substitutes for this resource. The competitive advantage is achieved 
through a combination of unique resources and capabilities that allows firms to 
capture near monopoly positions in their market (Hamel and Prahalad 1994, Prahalad 
and Hamel 1990).  
 
2.2.2 Sustainability of competitive advantage 
 
Porter (1998) also defined five competitive forces that determine industry profitability: 
the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, 
the bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry among existing competitors. The 
aim of competitive strategy is to cope with and, ideally, change those rules in the 
firm’s favour. The firm’s relative position within the industry determines whether a 
firm’s profitability is above or below the industry average. In contrast to Porter’s five 
forces model based on understanding the external environment, the resource-based 
view highlights the need for a fit between the external market context and its internal 
capabilities. Additionally Hayes (1985) discusses that a generic strategy does not lead 
to above-average performance unless it is sustainable vis-à-vis competitors. The 
sustainability of a generic strategy requires that a firm possess some barriers that make 
imitation of the strategy difficult. This is especially true when a firm with a 
competitive advantage does not understand the source of its competitive advantage 
any better than firms without this advantage. This kind of competitive advantage may 
be sustained because it is not subject to imitation (Barney 1991, Lippman and Rumelt 
1982).  
 
However in a competitive context, there is always a time dimension to any 
performance advantage created. Stalk (1988) emphasises that the competitive 
advantage is a constantly moving target, when the best competitors, the most 
successful ones, know how to keep moving and always remain on the cutting edge. 
Anderson et al. (1989) also conclude in their literature survey that operations can give 
the firm a competitive advantage by turning operations outward toward the customers, 
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 competition and markets. This would also require a forward-looking and proactive 
role for operations. According to Collis (1994) some organisational capabilities can be 
very valuable sources of sustainable competitive advantage in some industries at 
certain periods of time, but they are not generically valuable in all industries at all 
periods of time, nor do firms necessarily know which capabilities they should invest 
in. The range of capabilities does not necessarily come about through “good fortune” 
or change, in spite of learning and operations competencies that the firm may 
accumulate over time (Brown 1996). Rather, the capabilities can only be achieved by 
combining skills, technologies, know-how, processes and alliances with other players, 
brought about by strategies in place. Moreover capabilities are characterized as unique 
and idiosyncratic processes that emerge from unique and path dependent histories of 
individual firms (Barney 1991, Pandza et al. 2003). The external environment does not 
simply influence the process of capability accumulation in terms of selection; it also 
influences the parallel process of generating knowledge about the capability (Pandza 
et al. 2003). As Hayes and Upton (1998) actually say, such capabilities take a long 
time to develop, and can “come together” quite suddenly, giving a company its 
competitive power. But how firms actually develop them is not very clear. It is 
accepted that the evolution of capabilities is influenced by market dynamics, while the 
question of how an external environment influences this and why, remains largely 
unanswered (Pandza et al. 2003). 
 
In his article Williams (2001) defines learning as the only sustainable source of 
advantage. The learning organisation, with a vision of, and a plan for, the future, 
would be leveraging capabilities by acquiring knowledge (Noble 1997). The 
absorptive capacity refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals, as they learn, 
increase their future ability to assimilate information. A firm’s investment in learning 
may facilitate the firm’s future ability to acquire knowledge, to develop technologies 
and search for new practices by increasing the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990, Schilling 1998, Hayes and Upton 1998). Therefore, manufacturing 
strategy is not just about aligning operations to current competitive priorities but also 
about selecting and creating the operating capabilities a company will need in the 
future and to be able to create a long term advantage (Hayes and Pisano 1994). As 
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 researchers (Hayes 1985, Hayes and Pisano 1994, Schroeder and Flynn 2001) claim, a 
truly sustainable competitive advantage - one that is difficult for its competitors to 
imitate – requires long term development, where a period of five to ten years is not 
sufficient to do so. On the other hand, in the “hyper-competitive” environment the 
performance advantage could only last a few months (Williams 1992). These markets 
are characterized by dynamic price and cost pressures, fast profit margin compression, 
and accelerated rates of capital depreciation. D’Aveni (1994) also used the term 
“hyper competition” to describe the condition of rapidly escalating competition 
characterizing many industries where demands for flexibility, delivery speed and 
innovation are ever increasing. To maintain a dynamic resource fit, these organisations 
must master competitive routines associated with quick time-to-market, “fast-cycle” 
businesses. Timing and know-how are the source of advantages, rather than simply 
competing on cost and quality. Therefore, sustainable competitive advantage is 
achieved by continuously developing existing and new capabilities in response to 
rapidly changing market conditions. However, Hill (2000) warns of the danger of 
manufacturing becoming so used to reacting that it becomes the norm and every crisis 
thereafter is viewed as a temporary situation in which the need to review strategies 
fundamentally is neglected and which could bring the business into serious 
competitive disadvantage.  
 
In addition to response it seems that competitive advantage is not sustainable unless 
companies are proactive in creating change in rapidly changing environments – 
innovating new products, new processes and new markets (Courtney 2001, Hammer 
2004). Success comes by creating the ability to respond quickly and effectively to 
current market demands, as well as by being proactive in developing or shaping future 
market opportunities – that are vital in the modern era (Teece and Pisano 1994, 
Courtney et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Shapers will play a leadership role 
in establishing how the industry operates (Courtney et al. 1997). Of course shaping 
strategies can fail, so the best companies supplement their shaping bets with options 
that let them change course quickly, i.e. strategic flexibility. Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
argue that while some capabilities may deal specifically with adaptation, learning, and 
change processes, all capabilities have the potential to accommodate change. The term 
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 ‘capabilities’ emphasises the key role of strategic management in appropriately 
adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal and external organisational skills, 
resources, and functional competences toward the changing environment (Teece et al. 
(1997). Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses, but also the engine 
for new business development (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Far-reaching 
transformation of manufacturing capabilities is possible when competencies are 
enhanced or changed; the mission of the business could be altered or refined 
(Swamidass et al. 2001). Eisenhardt concludes that long-term competitive advantage 
lies in the resource configurations, not in the dynamic capabilities themselves 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
 
2.2.3 Manufacturing’s strategic role 
 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) presented the four-stage progression of roles that 
range from a passive, non-contributing strategic role to one of driving strategy:  
 
1. INTERNALLY NEUTRAL 
 Minimizes the “negative effect” of manufacturing 
2. EXTERNALLY NEUTRAL 
 Achieves parity with competitors 
3. INTERNALLY SUPPORTIVE 
 Provides support to the business strategy 
4. EXTERNALLY SUPPORTIVE 
Manufacturing contributes significantly to competitive 
advantage 
 
This model provides a framework to evaluate the strategic role of manufacturing 
within a company and clearly states that manufacturing’s strategic role can vary from 
company to company. However, there has been little evidence to illustrate how firms 
actually line up within this four-stage process over time and how, precisely, 
manufacturing strategy links with the corporate strategy process (Hum and Leow 
1996, Brown and Bessant 2003, Spina 1998). Leong et al. (1990) suggest that the 
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 manufacturing strategy literature has not produced a well-organized paradigm due the 
three reasons: first, a lack of cohesive theory-building efforts on the part of 
manufacturing strategy researchers; second, a shortage of survey-based empirical 
work; and third, a lack of effort to integrate manufacturing strategy ideas with 
established concepts and theories developed in related disciplines. According to 
Brown and Bessant (2003), although manufacturing strategy lacks agreement about its 
specific linkages with business strategy, its influence on many important specific areas 
(e.g. to mass customization efforts within the firm) is considerable.  
 
Mintzberg’s (1978) definition of strategy as “a pattern in streams of decisions” is a 
view later used by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) in their definition of manufacturing 
strategy as the “patterns of decisions” in manufacturing’s decisions areas. From this 
viewpoint the strategy a firm “realized” (or implemented) could “emerge”, apparently 
informally, as well as being “indented” or formally planned in advance (Mintzberg 
1978). The purpose of thinking and managing strategically is to gain competitive 
advantage, implying an attempt to mobilize manufacturing capability to help to gain a 
competitive edge or even having significant contribution to the competitive success of 
the organisation. Hayes (1985) also argued that the ends should not always determine 
the means, as is commonly assumed, but that sometimes the means should determine 
the ends. Building operations competence, the means, as a basis for strategy is 
especially effective in environments that are changing or difficult to forecast. 
Manufacturing should, therefore, seek to influence corporate strategies and develop 
and exploit manufacturing capability proactively, as a competitive weapon 
(Wheelwright and Hayes 1985, Voss 1995).  
 
Manufacturing’s strategic role is to provide manufacturing processes that provide a 
company a distinct advantage in the market place. In the words of Voss (1995) it is 
competing through capabilities by aligning capabilities of manufacturing with the 
competitive requirements of the marketplace. The second way is to create a situation 
in which manufacturing is able to support, better than its competitors, the dominant 
performance criteria of the market place in order to win orders. Both order-qualifiers 
and order-winners are, however, essential if companies are to maintain existing shares 
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 and grow (Hill 2000). Voss (1995) uses the term contingency-based approach, based 
on internal and external consistency between the business and product context and the 
choices in the content of the manufacturing strategy. He also adds a third approach 
based on the need to adopt a “Best practice”, for example “World Class 
Manufacturing”. Voss (1995) concludes that each of these three paradigms has 
strengths and weaknesses and partially overlaps the other and none is, on its own, 
sufficient for the effective development of manufacturing strategy over the long term.  
 
2.3 Theory of life cycle 
 
Both research questions addressed the theory of life cycle; first how do manufacturing 
capabilities and performance change in different phases of business life cycle, and 
secondly, how can manufacturing provide a competitive advantage in different phases 
of business life cycle. Chapter 2.3 will assess how the life cycle and the company’s 
value propositions are linked. The theory of product-process matrix is investigated as 
well as innovation along the life cycle.  
 
2.3.1 Technology adoption life cycle 
  
The technology adoption life cycle has been known since the 1950s in social research 
and illustrates how communities respond to discontinuous innovations. Foster’s 
depiction of technological progression through a series of S-curves suggests that 
technological change follows a cyclical pattern, where ‘dematurity’ can in effect set 
back the clock and revert an industry from a specific to a fluid state. A series of S-
curves suggests that an industry evolves through a succession of technology cycles. 
Each cycle begins with technological discontinuity. Discontinuities are breakthrough 
innovations that “advance by an order of magnitude, the technological state-of-the-art 
which characterizes an industry” (Foster 1986, Anderson and Tushman 1991). Ranta 
(1993) also discusses a paradigm shift where within an industry sector the so-called 
mature industry evolves again and provides a basis for new growth and a renewal 
process. Both product and process innovations may either enhance or destroy existing 
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 competencies, but product innovations normally affect more links in the value chain 
than do process innovations.  
 
Rogers (1995) presented an S-shaped innovation diffusion curve for interactive 
adoption of innovation (figure 2). When the critical mass in the rate of adoption of an 
interactive innovation is reached, the percentage of all the individual network partners 
takes a sudden jump, triggering a much more rapid rate of adoption. Truly 
discontinuous innovations are new products or services that require a drastic change of 
past behaviour on the part of the end-user and the marketplace, with the promise of 
gaining equally dramatic new benefits (Moore 1998). The technology adoption rate 
hence determines the growth rate of the industry and the market.  
 
2.3.2 Product life cycle 
 
The life cycle model has had a central role in describing the evolution of a product 
from introduction through growth and maturity to decline. Wasson (1971) was among 
the earliest to suggest that firms should be using different marketing strategies at 
different stages in a product’s life cycle to obtain a competitive advantage. The 
product life cycle model was originally developed in order to understand the dynamic 
of the evolution of a single product and thus to also support innovation and product 
management (Abernathy and Utterback 1975, Hill 1983/2000, Ranta 1993). Buffa 
(1984) mentioned that as a product goes through its life cycle, the production system 
should follow with a process life cycle of its own. Ranta (1993) also claimed that it 
could be used as a framework to analyze production paradigm shifts as well and be 
extended to describe the evolution of an industry or a branch of industry. Moreover, it 
is necessary to widen the concept so that the influence of the social and economic (i.e. 
business environment) factors can be taken into account. Also, as Mensch et al. (1985, 
1986) pointed, real life is different from the model: product innovations dominate 
even in mature industries. As previously mentioned, in a fast changing industry the 
product life cycle is understood more as a product type life cycle that includes several 
individual product life cycles and not as a single product’s life cycle.  
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 Hill (1983) presented the product life cycle with phases of introduction, initial growth, 
maturity and eventual decline in sales (figure 3). These stages outline the phases 
through which a product or product type may pass as it moves into and out of the 
market. New products and services are required to replace those already in the cycle, 
no matter how extended the timescale may be. This emphasises the idea of shifting 
competitive priorities as a product or product type matures. The discontinuities usually 
come from outside the company and may be weak signals (Hayes and Wheelwright 
1979). Competitors may come out with product innovations or with new process 
innovations (e.g. Zara and IKEA). In the dominant design phase the production 
‘machine’ is efficient – but when radical innovation begins there will be a burden 
‘discontinuity’. Ranta (1997) also concluded that in the first phase of the product (or 
industry) evolution seems to obey the classical life cycle model, but after reaching the 
maturity phase both market and product innovations lead to market segmentation and 
product diversification, which in turn result in a highly dynamic interactive system. As 
an example he mentions the automobile industry and innovations in production by 
Japanese companies.  
 
Sales (€s)
Introduction Growth Maturity Saturation Decline
Sales
Time
 
Figure 3. The generalized product life cycle (Hill, T. Operations Management, 2000) 
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 2.3.3 Business life cycle 
 
The life cycle curve can typify any product, organism, company, or society from 
introduction through growth and maturity to decline (Forrester 1964), but life cycle 
concept alone does not furnish us with an easily read roadmap to profitable strategy. 
Rather, the life cycle model provides a framework of expectations – a set of patterns 
of the types of developments a company needs to be aware of and needs to plan in 
advance (Wasson 2000). 
 
In this study life cycle model is defined as business life cycle, because a product life 
cycle was thought to be too narrow in scope. The business life cycle is defined as the 
growth rate of the company in sales (Forrester 1964, figure 1) of a certain product or 
service (e.g. mobile phone). The business life cycle is linked to the market growth rate 
but it does not directly determine the company’s growth. For example, a company can 
have declining sales even though the overall market is growing, or vice versa. Market 
growth rate is determined by the diffusion of a certain technology, product or service. 
A company’s business life cycle development is rather complex as there are number of 
interacting forces that link different life cycles, such as product, product technology 
and process technology. As Prabhaker (2001) mentioned, the connection between the 
technology diffusion curve and the product life cycle has never been established in 
literature, conceptually or empirically. 
 
A business life cycle can contain several superimposed series of product and 
technology life cycles (see figure 4). These products have certain common 
technologies and functions (e.g. hand portable mobile phone), and share common 
capabilities required to produce them. This is especially true in fast changing 
industries where an individual product life cycle lasts only months or a few years and 
is frequently replaced by newer versions. Continuous technological development can 
lead to an S-curve type of sales growth because performance of a product or process is 
improved over time.  
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Introduction Growth Maturity
Several individual product  and 
technology life cycles
over the business life cycle
 
Figure 4. One business life cycle can contain several product and technology life cycles 
 
2.3.4 Capability life cycle 
 
Helfat and Peteraf argue that while some capabilities may deal specifically with 
adaptation, learning, and change processes, all capabilities have the potential to 
accommodate change (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). Like the product life cycle, the 
capability life cycle describes recognizable stages, such as introduction, growth, 
maturity, and decline. Along their evolutionary paths, capabilities may support a 
sequence of products or multiple products simultaneously (Helfat and Raubitschek 
2000). The entire capability life cycle provides an explanation for the emergence and 
sustained heterogeneity of capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).  
 
The capability life cycle identifies three initial stages of a capability life cycle: 
founding, development, maturity and followed by possible branching into six 
additional stages (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). The founding stage begins when a group 
of individuals organizes around an objective requiring or centrally involving the 
creation of a capability. During the development stage the capability develops through 
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 the team’s search for viable alternatives for capability development, combined with 
accumulation of experience over time. The maturity stage entails capability 
maintenance involving exercising the capability, which refreshes organisational 
memory. If exercised regularly, the capability becomes more deeply embedded in the 
memory structure of the organisation. The branches of the capability life cycle are as 
follows: retirement (death), retrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment, and 
recombination (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).  
 
2.3.5 Linking value propositions and life cycle 
 
The idea of value propositions is introduced here to understand the link between 
business strategy and manufacturing strategy, since to develop a successful and 
sustainable strategy alignment is needed between an organisation’s internal activities 
and its customers' value proposition (Treacy and Wiersema 1993). According to 
Treacy and Wiersema (1993, 1995) there are three ‘value disciplines’: product 
leadership, operational excellence and customer intimacy. 
 
Product leadership means offering customers leading-edge products and services that 
consistently enhance the customer’s use or application of the product. This strategy 
would require a leading-edge innovation process that creates new products with best-
in-class functionality and brings them rapidly to market (Treacy and Wiersema 1993, 
Kaplan and Norton 2000).  
 
Customer intimacy means segmenting and targeting markets precisely and tailoring 
the offering to exactly meet the demands of those niches. This strategy requires 
excellent customer management process such as relationship management and 
solution development. The innovation process would be motivated by the needs of 
targeted customers, focusing on those new product developments and service 
enhancements that contribute to better customer solutions (Treacy and Wiersema 
1993, Kaplan and Norton 2000). 
 
Operational excellence means providing customers with reliable products or services 
at competitive prices and delivered with minimal difficulty or inconvenience. This 
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 strategy emphasises measures of the cost, quality, and cycle time of the operating 
process, excellent supplier relationships, and speed and efficiency of supply and 
distribution processes (Treacy and Wiersema 1993, Kaplan and Norton 2000).  
 
 Achieving superiority in any one of these domains typically involves compromising 
the other two. Since no company can succeed by trying to be all things to all people it 
must choose a value discipline in which to excel. The selection of a value discipline is 
a central act that shapes every subsequent plan and decision a company makes, 
affecting the entire organisation. In Demand Supply Chain research Fisher (1997) 
argues that functional products should be delivered through an efficient supply chain 
“focusing almost exclusively on minimizing physical costs”, but for innovative 
products, the concern should be to “respond quickly to unpredictable demand in order 
to minimize stock outs and obsolete inventory”. According to Kaplan and Norton 
(2000) companies must excel in one process that has the maximum impact on its 
customer value proposition. The other two are supportive (see figure 5).  
 
? ?
??
? ?
Innovation
Processes
Customer
Management 
Processes
Operational
Processes
• Invention
• Product 
Development
• Exploitation (speed
to market)
• Solution
Development
• Customer Service
• Relationship
Management
• Advisory Services
• Supply Chain
Management
• Operations
Efficiency: Cost, 
Quality, Cycle Time
• Capacity
Management
Strategic Practices Meet Basic Requirements?  
Figure 5.  Identifying strategic internal business processes (adopted from Kaplan and Norton 2000) 
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 However, according to Moore, in the case of high-tech marketing, the dynamics of 
rapidly maturing life cycles forces one to take a more complex approach. The claim 
made is that the life cycle itself dictates which variables are critical at any given point. 
Moore (1998) combined the framework of Technology Adoption Life Cycle and the 
theory of value disciplines as presented by Treacy and Wiersema (1993). Moore’s 
framework (figure 6) was particularly focused on the fast changing high-tech industry. 
In his book Moore discussed how discontinuous innovations or paradigm shifts will 
affect marketing strategies. These shifts begin with the appearance of a new category 
of product that incorporates breakthrough technology, resulting in unprecedented 
benefits. Moore introduced the idea of the “chasm”, saying that whenever truly 
innovative high-tech products are first brought to market, they will initially enjoy a 
warm welcome in an early market made up of technology enthusiasts and visionaries 
but will then fall into a chasm, during which sales will falter and often plummet. If the 
products can successfully cross the chasm, they will gain acceptance in a mainstream 
market dominated by pragmatists and conservatives (Moore 1998).  
 
 
 
Early Market The Chasm
The Bowling
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The Tornado
Main Street
End of Life
Product 
Leadership
Only
Product Leadership + 
Operational Excellence
Product Leadership + 
Customer Intimacy
Operational Excellence + 
Customer Intimacy
 
Figure 6. The landscape of the technology adoption life cycle (Moore 1998) 
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 Moore’s framework divides up the landscape into six zones, which are characterized 
as follows (Moore 1998): 
 
1. The Early Market, a time of great excitement when customers are technology 
enthusiasts and visionaries looking to be first to enjoy the new paradigm.  
2. The Chasm, a time of great despair, when the early market’s interest wanes but 
the mainstream market is still not comfortable with the immaturity of the 
solutions available. 
3. The Bowling Alley, a period of niche-based adoption in advance of the general 
marketplace, driven by compelling customer needs and the willingness of 
vendors to craft niche-specific whole products. 
4. The Tornado, a period of mass-market adoption, when the general marketplace 
switches over to the new infrastructure paradigm.   
5. Main Street, a period of aftermarket development, when the base infrastructure 
has been deployed and the goal now is to flesh out its potential. 
6. End of Life, which can come all too soon in high tech because of the 
semiconductor engine driving price/performance to unheard of levels, enabling 
wholly new paradigms to come to market and supplant the leaders who 
themselves had only just arrived.  
 
2.3.6 Product-process matrix 
 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1979) point out that by matching stages of product and 
process life cycles, an organisation can choose from among its various manufacturing 
and marketing alternatives (product-process matrix) and they discuss the implications 
for corporate strategy (figure 7). However, they recognize that external forces are 
often set to change a company’s position on the product-process matrix, whether or 
not the company makes any changes to its own product or process structures. Ranta 
(1997) also proposes links between product, production and life cycle theory. 
Manufacturing can choose from a number of alternative processes in order to make the 
product. There are five conventional processes that can be adopted (project, job shop, 
batch, assembly line and continuous flow) together with a number of hybrids (Hayes 
and Wheelwright 1979, Hill 1987). Each option embodies a set of distinct trade-offs 
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 for a business, which need to be understood when considering the major investment 
decisions. As Buffa (1984) says, it is important to position the production system to 
match the market requirements. The way in which orders are won in the market place 
varies from product to product and is also different for a single product over its life 
cycle, therefore plants cannot be set up and then forgotten (Hill 1987, Anderson et al. 
1989).  
 
I
Jumbled flow
(job shop)
Process structure
Process life cycle stage
II
Disconnected line
Flow (batch)
III
Connected line
Flow (assembly line)
IV
Continuous flow
I
Low volume-low 
standardization, 
one of a kind
II
Multiple products
Low volume
III
Few major products
Higher volume
IV
High volume-high
Standardization
Commodity products
Commercial 
Printer
Heavy 
Equipment
Automobile 
assembly
Sugar 
refinery
None
None
Product structure
Product life cycle stage
 
Figure 7. Matching major stages of product and process life cycles (Hayes and Wheelwright 1979) 
 
Corbett and Wassenhowe (1993) challenged the Hayes and Wheelwright model with 
their concept of a competitive dimensions life cycle, where the dividing line between 
qualifying criteria and order-winning criteria changes along the product’s phase in its 
life cycle. They state that flexibility could be achieved before low-cost and that 
flexibility could become a qualifying criterion before cost. The flexible technologies 
would allow firms to reach points closer to the bottom-left (continuous flow, low 
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 standardization) corner of the product process-matrix, providing high responsiveness 
and low-cost production simultaneously (Corbett and Wassenhove 1993, Dermott et 
al. 1997). They indicated that the Hayes and Wheelwright model lacked support for 
the responsiveness to customer needs and did not completely capture the dynamics of 
the competitive environment. Furthermore, the study of Dermott et al. (1997) 
demonstrated that the Hayes and Wheelwright model would better describe the 
industry, rather than explain relative strategic positions. They did not, however, 
provide any empirical evidence nor set criterion to define the level of flexibility and 
efficiency or define what high volume vs. low volume on the matrix is. It is assumable 
that one could also improve efficiency without moving forward along the diagonal 
within the given set. Hence, one cannot really argue exactly where on the matrix the 
products should be placed nor define what qualifies as being on the diagonal or off the 
diagonal.  
 
2.3.7 Types of innovation over product life cycle 
 
According to Tushman and Nadler (1986), in order to compete in an ever-changing 
environment, companies must adopt innovation as a way of corporate life and that 
effective innovation requires the synthesis of market needs with technological 
possibility and manufacturing capabilities. There are two kinds of innovation: product 
innovation, a change in the product it makes or in the service it provides; and process 
innovation, a change in the way a product is made or the service is provided.  
 
According to Tushman and Nadler (1986) there are predictable patterns in the amount 
and degree of innovation over the product life cycle (figure 8). In the introductory 
stage, there is a substantial amount of product innovation, leading to the emergence of 
a dominant design. In the next stage, major product variation gives way to competition 
based on price, quality, and segmentation (i.e. process innovation rather than product 
innovation). During the mature state of a product life cycle the emphasis is on 
incremental innovation, until some external shock, such as deregulation, technological 
change, or competition, triggers a new wave of major product innovation.  
 
 38
 HighLowHighHigh
Major Product
Minor Process
Minor Product
Minor Process
Major Process
Minor Product
Major Product
Minor Process
Dominant
Innovation
Types
Learning
Requirements
Emergence
Dominant Design
Growth
Mature
Product/Process 
Substitution
 
Figure 8. Types of innovation over product life cycle (adopted from Tushman and Nadler 1986) 
 
Innovation is, however, a complex and uncertain endeavour shifting over time and that 
requires the close collaboration of R&D, marketing, sales and production. Smeds 
(1994) also discussed the possible implications of “lean manufacturing” as a radical 
process innovation bringing an addition to the classical life cycle: in the maturity 
phase a new upturn in sales is created by the combination of radical process 
innovation and incremental product innovations. Lean manufacturing has changed the 
rules of competition and has caused a “post-maturity” growth phase (Smeds 1994). 
Hammer (2004) also defines operational innovativeness by achieving a capability to 
offer lower prices and better service than competitors. He makes a distinction to 
operational improvement or excellence, which, according to him, is achieving high 
performance via existing modes of operations. Courtney et al. (1997) also made a 
distinction between shaping the future and adapting to the future. Operational 
innovation means coming up with entirely new ways of filling orders, developing 
products, providing customer service, or doing any other activity that an enterprise 
performs, such as the Dell Business Model and Toyota Production System. 
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 2.4 Conclusion of theoretical constructs 
 
Chapter 2.4 concludes the learnings from the literature review. The findings are 
further elaborated in the case study.  
 
2.4.1 Manufacturing capabilities and performance 
 
The first research question asked how do manufacturing capabilities and performance 
change in different phases of business life cycle? To better understand the nature of 
the capabilities and how they are measured the first question was divided into three 
sub questions: 
 
1A. What are manufacturing capabilities? 
1B. How is manufacturing performance measured? 
1C. What is the link between manufacturing performance and business 
performance? 
 
The theoretical construct’s purpose is to ground the study in previous work and 
indicate the theoretical approach to the phenomena being studied. In order to 
understand the link between manufacturing capabilities and performance a theoretical 
framework (figure 9) was modified from the strategy process model of Leong et al. 
(1990). This predominant process model of manufacturing strategy compiled together 
the learnings from Chapter 2.1 and 2.2.  
 
Even though the capability is organisation specific, to be internally developed (Swink 
and Hegarty 1998, Makadok 2001) and may not even be easily recognized or 
categorized, the categorization is proposed in terms of competitive priorities (Kim and 
Arnold 1992), such as those presented in figure 9. 
 
Literature review on manufacturing capabilities and performance was summarized 
into a framework (figure 9) where:  
 
• Manufacturing capabilities could be categorized by competitive priorities (1A) 
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 • Manufacturing performance could be categorized by time, quality and cost 
(1B) 
• Manufacturing performance and business performance is connected (1C) 
 
This framework will define the empirical data collection in detail and help to analyze 
the competitive priorities and capabilities in the case company. 
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Figure 9. Predominant process model of manufacturing strategy (modified from Leong et al. 1990) 
 
In the model, corporate strategy and company’s value propositions determine an 
appropriate pattern of functional strategies, with feedback on capabilities provided 
throughout the process. The functional strategies, such as manufacturing strategy, 
themselves consist of the process of strategy formulation and implementation. 
Capabilities may result from strategy formulation and implementation if the strategy is 
realized. However, this model does not preclude the possibility that capabilities may 
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 also result from unplanned patterns of activities rather than a strategic plan (Mintzberg 
1978, Leong et al. 1990). In addition, the functional capabilities should, in an 
uncertain and unstable environment, drive corporate strategy (Hayes 1985). Mintzberg 
(1978) differentiated between the strategies an organisation planned or “intended” and 
the strategy it actually implemented or “realised”. Differences between these strategies 
arose over time from the loss of some “intended” strategies, which were termed 
“unrealised” and the gain of unintended or “emergent” strategies. This was not evident 
in Leong’s original framework. The actual manufacturing and business performance 
metrics, used in the case company, are validated through the case. Furthermore, how 
the capabilities and the performance actually change or do not change is investigated 
through the case study. The other functional strategies or performance measures, such 
as marketing, are not included here, even though they do affect business performance 
as well.  
 
2.4.2 Competitive advantage and strategic role of manufacturing 
 
In this Chapter the second research question, how can manufacturing provide 
competitive advantage in different phases of business life cycle, was elaborated in 
more detail. The second question was divided into two sub questions: 
 
2A. Can manufacturing provide a competitive advantage? 
2B. If so, do manufacturing capabilities providing competitive advantage 
change along the business life cycle? In other words, what is the 
sustainability of the competitive advantage in the changing business 
environment? 
 
To conclude, the literature study shows that many researchers believe that 
manufacturing can contribute to competitive advantage and positively affect business 
performance (Skinner 1969, Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Fine and Hax 1985, Clark 
1996, Hayes and Pisano 1996, Berry et al. 1999). As Berry et al. (1999) conclude, 
strategic options in marketing can be connected with strategic options in 
manufacturing and vice versa and debate should influence the market position 
decisions. The key to competitive advantage seems to lie in differentiation amongst 
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 competitors, by doing things differently (competence development, unique 
manufacturing technology, unique practices) or by doing things more efficiently 
(predicting new technologies, efficient implementation of new processes and 
practices, efficient execution and coordination) (Ketokivi and Heikkilä 2004). To 
develop a successful and sustainable strategy, alignment between an organisation’s 
internal activities and its customer’s value proposition is needed (Treacy and 
Wiersema 1993). Value is what customers are willing to pay, and superior value stems 
from offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits, or from providing 
unique benefits that more than offset a higher price.  
 
A company has competitive advantage if  
 
• Profitability (relative position) is above the industry average (Porter 1998, 
Hayes 1985) 
• Market share is high (Prahalad and Hamel 1990)  
• Value to customer is high (Porter 1998, Barney 1991) 
 
Understanding the strategic role of manufacturing requires an understanding of the 
demands of the market place, since the strategic goals can be different (Voss 1995). 
The purpose of thinking and managing strategically is to gain competitive advantage, 
implying an attempt to mobilize manufacturing capability to help gain a competitive 
edge or even significantly contributing to the competitive success of the organisation 
(Mintzberg 1978).  
 
Manufacturing has a strategic role (i.e. provides competitive advantage) if 
 
• Alignment between manufacturing capabilities and a company’s value 
proposition is high (Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Porter 1998, Treacy and 
Wiersema 1993, Voss 1995); 
• Alignment between manufacturing capabilities and corporate strategy is high 
(Hayes and Wheelwright 1984, Skinner 1985); 
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 • Capability development is proactive toward the customers, competition and 
markets (Wheelwright and Hayes 1985, Stalk 1988, Anderson et al. 1989, 
Collis 1994, Hayes and Pisano 1994, Voss 1995, Brown 1996); 
• A company is able to respond quickly (Teece and Pisano 1994, Courtney et al. 
1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000);  
• Capability development is simultaneous and cumulative (Meyer and Ferdows 
1990, Noble 1997); 
• Manufacturing provides a combination of unique resources and capabilities 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1994, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Pandza et al. 2003, 
Ketokivi and Heikkilä 2003); 
• Manufacturing is more efficient than competitors’ (Ketokivi and Heikkilä 
2003); 
• Manufacturing performances impact on business performance is high (Hayes 
and Wheelwright 1984, Swamidass and Newell 1987, Roth and Miller 1992, 
Swink and Hegarty 1998, Hill 2000).  
 
Manufacturing strategy is not just about aligning operations to current competitive 
priorities, but also about selecting and creating the operating capabilities a company 
will need in the future and to be able to create a long term advantage (Hayes and 
Pisano 1994, Teece and Pisano 1994, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Long-term success 
requires that a company distinguish itself from its competitors by offering something 
unique and valuable to customers (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Hamel and Prahalad 
1994, Hayes and Pisano 1996, Pandza et al. 2003, Ketokivi and Heikkilä 2003). 
Furthermore, some organisational capabilities can be very valuable sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage in certain industries at certain periods of time, but 
they are not generically valuable to all industries at all times (Collis 1994).  
 
Competitive advantage is sustainable if (Porter 1998, Barney 1991) 
 
• The entry of new competitors is low;  
• The threat of substitutes is low (unique or imitable offering);  
• The bargaining power of buyers is high;  
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 • The bargaining power of suppliers is low;  
• The rivalry among the existing competitors is low.  
 
Furthermore, some believe that manufacturing would provide new business 
opportunities and the link between manufacturing and corporate strategy should work 
both ways (Hayes and Wheelwright 1984). The results from this Chapter were 
evaluated empirically in the case study. 
 
2.4.3 Life cycle model and manufacturing capabilities  
 
Both research questions were related to life cycle model, since the goal is to examine 
how capabilities and competitive advantage change along the life cycle. The life cycle 
model originated from product innovation studies (Abernathy and Utterback 1975), 
but it can also be used to describe the evolution of processes and of an industry or a 
branch of industry (Porter 1980). The business life cycle is defined as the growth rate 
of the company in sales (Forrester 1964, figure 1). The main findings from the 
literature are summarized in table 2 by means of life cycle phases.  
 
The basic idea of the life cycle theory is that the product or a product type and the 
industry evolve through different stages. Each stage has its own characteristics and a 
life cycle model can hence provide a framework of expectations. Whether the life 
cycle model could actually provide a framework of expectations for the planning and 
preparing of capabilities is assessed through the case study. Furthermore, does the 
manufacturing’s strategic role change as the business moves along the life cycle 
towards the maturity and what are the implications for a company, particularly from 
the competitive advantage point of view? The ideas of Moore, linking the technology 
adoption life cycle and value propositions, are also studied through the case in order to 
understand whether a link between customer value proposition and capability 
development, in order to create competitive advantage provided by manufacturing, 
exists. 
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 Table 2. Characteristics of different business life cycle phases (Summary based on the literature 
review) 
 
Phases Introduction Growth Maturity 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Product (Hayes and 
Wheelwright 1979, Ranta 
1997 and Smeds1994, 
Comstock and Johansen) 
New paradigm, one of a 
kind 
 
 
Major product innovations 
Dominant design, few major 
products 
 
 
Minor product innovations 
Commodity and 
standardized products or 
segmentation and 
customized products 
Minor or Major Product 
Volumes (Hayes and 
Wheelwright 1979) 
Low volumes, but growing High volumes and growing 
extensively 
High volumes (can still be 
growing but decline is 
seen) 
VALUE PROPOSITIONS 
Main value propositions 
(Moore 1998, Treacy and 
Wiersema 1993) 
Product Leadership  Product Leadership+ 
Operational Excellence  
 
Operational Excellence+ 
Customer Intimacy  
COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES 
Competitive priorities 
capabilities (Hill 2000, 
Moore 1998, Hayes and 
Wheelwright 1979, 
Utterback and Abernathy 
1975, Brown 1996) 
Flexibility Delivery Price, flexibility, quality, 
delivery, services 
CAPABILITIES 
Main needed 
manufacturing 
capabilities (Hill 2000, 
Moore 1998, Hayes and 
Wheelwright 1979, 
Utterback and Abernathy 
1975, Brown 1996, Fisher 
1997) 
Ability to make rapid 
volume changes (bowling 
alley or tornado) 
 
Ability to introduce new 
products 
Ability to deliver efficiently 
(fast and on-time) 
 
Ability to deliver 
efficiently in volumes, 
ability to profit in price 
competitive markets, or 
ability to customize product 
and services to customer 
needs 
Process life cycle stage 
(Hayes and Wheelwright 
1979, Utterback and 
Abernathy 1975, Brown 
1996) 
Jumbled flow (job shop) or 
Batch (‘organic’ and 
responds easily to 
environmental change, but is 
‘inefficient’) 
Connected line flow (assembly 
line, price order winning 
criteria, designed for 
efficiency) 
Continuous flow 
(Productivity, more capital 
intense, more integrated 
process with more 
commodity type of 
products) or Flexible 
manufacturing system 
Process innovations 
(Tushman and Nadler 
1986, Smeds 1994, 
Hammer 2004) 
Minor Process Major Process Minor or Major Process 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter 3 presents the selection for research approach, research methodology, case 
selection and data used in this study.  
 
3.1 Possible research approaches 
 
3.1.1 Selecting research approach: quantitative or qualitative 
 
Research design consideration leads directly to consideration of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative methods permit the 
researcher to study selected issues, cases, or events in depth and detail; the fact that 
data collection is not constrained by predetermined categories of analysis contributes 
to the depth and detail of qualitative data (Patton 1987). Quantitative methods, on the 
other hand, use standardized measures that fit diverse various opinions and 
experiences into predetermined response categories (Patton 1987). Quantitative 
approaches are based on post-positivist knowledge claims (i.e. cause and effect 
thinking, reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and questions, use of 
measurement and observation, and the test of theories) while qualitative approaches 
are based primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e. multiple meanings of individual 
experiences, socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a 
theory or pattern). Creswell (2003) lists as alternative strategies of inquiry for 
quantitative research, experiments and surveys. For qualitative research he lists 
ethnographies, grounded theory, case studies, phenomenological research and 
narrative research. A quantitative approach fits if the problem is identifying factors 
that influence an outcome, the utility of an intervention, understanding the best 
predictors of outcomes or testing a theory. But if a concept or phenomenon needs to be 
understood because little research has been done on it, then a qualitative approach is 
appropriate (Creswell 2003). 
 
In contrast to research questions, research hypotheses are a statement of tentative 
answers to these questions and imply individual opinions and are based on individual 
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 theory and experience. According to Maxwell (2005) there really is no difference 
whether one calls the outcome of the research propositions or hypotheses. In his view 
there is no problem with formulating qualitative research hypotheses. The difficulty is 
partly a matter of terminology and partly a matter of the inappropriate application of 
quantitative standards to qualitative research hypotheses (Maxwell 2005). The 
distinctive characteristics of hypotheses or propositions in qualitative research is that 
they are grounded (Glaser & Strauss 1967) in the data and are developed and tested in 
interaction with them, rather than being prior ideas that are simply tested against the 
data (Maxwell 2005). 
 
In qualitative research grounded theory and case study traditions have similarities: as 
what is called open coding in grounded theory is similar to the categorical aggregation 
in case study research (Creswell 1998). The intent of the grounded theory is to 
generate or discover a theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Creswell 1998). In grounded 
theory the researcher attempts to derive a general, abstract theory of a process, action, 
or interaction grounded in the views of participants in a study. This process involves 
using multiple stages of data collection and the refinement and interrelationship of 
categories of information (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998). Two primary 
characteristics of this design are the constant comparison of data with emerging 
categories and theoretical sampling of different groups to maximize the similarities 
and the differences of information (Creswell 2003). The researcher uses systematic 
procedures, such as open coding and axial coding, and they represent the relationship 
among categories with a visual model. In case studies the researcher explores in depth 
a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals. The case(s) are 
limited by time and activity, and the researcher collects detailed information using a 
variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Stake 1995, 
Creswell 1998). In other words, in the case study the theory is based on the 
researcher’s summary of interpretations and claims, including the researcher’s own 
personal experience of the case, called “naturalistic generalizations” (Stake 1995), 
while in grounded theory the researcher hopes to discover a theory that is grounded in 
information obtained from participants (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
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 Another research approach could have been the action research, which aims at solving 
specific problems within a program, organisation, or community. Action research 
explicitly and purposefully becomes part of the change process by engaging the people 
in the program or organisation to solve the problems (Patton 2002). However, there 
was no particular problem to be solved and the time span used was too extensive for 
this approach.  
 
3.1.2 Designing a case study: single or multiple cases 
 
Case studies can be used for different types of research purposes such as exploration 
(uncover areas for research and theory development), theory building, theory testing 
and theory extension/refinement. Case research has consistently been one of the most 
powerful research methods in operations management, particularly in the development 
of new theory (Eisenhardt 1989, Voss 2002 et al.). Case studies use multiple sources 
of information such as observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual material.  
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) theory-building research is begun as close as possible 
to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test. Investigators 
should formulate a research problem and possibly specify some potentially important 
variables, with some reference to extant literature. However, they should avoid 
thinking about specific relationships between variables and theories as much as 
possible, especially at the outset of the process (Eisenhardt 1989, Voss et al. 2002). 
The theory building research strategy from multiple cases, as described by Eisenhardt 
(1989), was an optional research approach for this study. When multiple cases are 
chosen a within-case analysis is followed by a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989). 
In the case of multiple in-depth longitudinal cases this would require an extensive 
amount of time and access to several companies over several years. Unfortunately, this 
sets resource limitations when conducting a dissertation.  
 
On the other hand, Yin (1994) mentions that existing works may provide a rich 
theoretical framework for designing a specific case study. The use of theory, in doing 
case studies, not only is an immense aid in defining the appropriate research design 
and data collection but also becomes the main vehicle for generalizing the results of 
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 the case study. The type of analysis can be a holistic analysis of the entire case or an 
embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case (Yin 1994). According to Yin 
(1994), the single-case design is eminently justifiable under certain conditions: where 
the case represents a critical test of existing theory, where the case is a rare or unique 
event, or where the case serves a revelatory purpose. On the other hand, one may 
argue that a single case is not enough for providing reliable and generalizable data. 
However, the researcher believes that this longitudinal study will provide valuable 
insights as to theory building, since the longitudinal approach requires extended 
commitment over several years and it is not a commonly used approach in operations 
management research (Leonard-Barton 1990). Also, the chronological and 
longitudinal approach, as in this study, works best when events unfold and follow a 
process (Yin 1994). Therefore, the longitudinal case supports the idea of investigating 
different phases of life cycle. Moreover the design of qualitative study does not begin 
from a predetermined starting point or proceed through a fixed sequence of steps, but 
rather involves interconnection and interaction among the different design components 
(Maxwell 2005). A continuous assessment of how the design is actually working is 
needed during the research to make adjustments and changes in order to accomplish 
what is wanted (Maxwell 2005). 
 
3.2 Qualitative longitudinal case research methodology 
 
The research methodology chosen for this research was qualitative and based 
primarily on a single longitudinal case. As mentioned, the qualitative research 
approach is complex, involving fieldwork for prolonged periods of time, collecting 
words and pictures, analyzing this information inductively while focusing on 
participant views, and writing about the process expressively. Reducing the data into 
small categories or themes comes next, as does storing them and representing them for 
the reader in the narrative (Creswell 1998).  The methodology chosen for this study is 
suited for exploration and hypothesis generation, i.e. theory building rather than 
hypothesis testing. Theory in qualitative research provides an explanation for 
behaviour and attitudes, and it may be complete with variables, constructs, and 
hypotheses (Creswell 2003). In this study, theory is the end point and it is an inductive 
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 process of building from data to broad themes to a generalized model. The theory can 
assume the form of a narrative statement (Strauss and Corbin 1990), a visual picture, 
or series of hypotheses or propositions (Creswell and Brown 1992, Creswell 1998). 
The logic of the inductive approach used in this study is shown in figure 10 (Creswell 
2003). Additionally, as in many traditional operational research studies, literature 
review and theoretical constructs were created in the beginning of the study to help 
information gathering on the case.  
 
Generalizations, or Theories to Past 
Experiences and Literature
Researcher Looks for Broad Patterns, 
Generalizations, or Theories from Themes 
or Categories 
Researcher Analyzes Data to Form Themes 
or Categories
Researcher Asks Open-Ended Questions of 
Participants or Record Field Notes
Researcher Gathers Information (e.g. 
interviews, observations)
 
 
Figure 10. The Inductive Logic of Research in Qualitative Study (Creswell 2003) 
 
A case study consists of making a detailed description of the case and its setting. 
Creswell (1998) recommends using multiple sources of data to determine evidence for 
each phase in the evolution of the case. In categorical aggregation (Creswell 1998), 
the researcher seeks a collection of instances from the data, looking for issue-relevant 
meanings to emerge. In direct interpretation the researcher looks at a single instance 
and draws meaning from it without looking for multiple instances. The researcher also 
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 establishes patterns and looks for a correspondence between two or more categories. 
In the final step the researcher develops generalisations about the case, in terms of 
patterns, and how they compare and contrast with published literature. Since a single 
case study is subject to limits in generalizability and several potential biases, the triple 
comparative research design proposed by Barley (1990) was used to verify and 
validate the results (see figure 11).  
 
3.3 Case selection 
 
The criteria for the case in this study were to look at an industry where the high 
growth and strong industry dynamics have been experienced. In order to be able to 
analyse the life cycle through introduction, growth and maturity, the case had to be 
within a high-clockspeed industry (Fine 1998). This follows the ideas of Fine (1998) 
by speeding up the research by finding and studying the industrial fruit flies. As he 
states, some industries like telecommunication, computers, and the like, undergo 
changes rapidly, whereas others seem to advance at a more leisurely pace. The 
information and communication industry did experience rapid growth throughout the 
1990s and then phased through a slow-down at the turn of the millennium. The 
automotive industry has traditionally been the target of many operation management 
studies but for this particular research it was a too mature and slow-paced industry. 
However, the automotive electronics industry might have been interesting study 
subject. Biotechnology is one example of a set of emerging technologies that have the 
potential to contribute to economic growth, but the full economic and social impacts 
of new developments in biotechnology have yet to be realised (A Survey of the Use of 
Biotechnology in U.S. Industry 2003).  
 
The case was selected within the telecommunications industry. The case company is a 
global manufacturer of consumer electronics products, Nokia Corporation, being the 
world's largest mobile phone producer. Nokia, in its mobile phone business, was both 
rapidly growing and changing from one phase to another and therefore provided 
excellent data for a longitudinal study. Nokia’s strong market leader position further 
justified the case selection.  
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In the 1990s the Nokia Corporation underwent several major changes. It was 
transformed into a focused telecommunications company from a multi-branch firm of 
electronics, information systems, paper, rubber, mobile phones, and 
telecommunications. Until the beginning of the year 2000, the company was growing 
very fast and it gained a considerable market share. However, in the last few years the 
growth rate has decreased. Today, the telecommunications industry is moving from 
voice to more diverse technologies and services such as picture and video messaging. 
An important criterion for the case selection was that the growth shape of the company 
follows the one presented by Forrester (1964) (figure 1). Another important criterion 
for the case selection was that the manufacturing was seen as a competitive advantage 
for the company (Nokia, Kallasvuo 2003). During the manufacturing strategy 
development, the company therefore faced several questions relating to the industry 
changes and how manufacturing contributes to business performance. Furthermore, 
the company’s above average performance supports Porter’s idea of competitive 
advantage, where the fundamental basis of above-average performance in the long run 
is a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1998).  
 
The researcher has worked for the case company for over eleven years and has in-
depth knowledge of manufacturing development within the company. The case study 
research approach is inductive and utilises both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
researcher had excellent access to strategic materials and performance data over the 
years, which is not always the case for an external researcher. In this single, in-depth 
longitudinal study case research can be particularly valuable. The longer the period 
over which the phenomena are studied, the greater the opportunity to observe at first 
hand the sequential relationship of events (Voss et al. 2002). Moreover, there can be 
multiple levels of analysis within a single case study (Yin 1994, Barley 1990). In this 
particular case study it will provide an understanding of manufacturing capability 
development in three different phases of life cycle growth (diachronic view). By 
longitudinal (1993-2003) examination of the case company the changes in business 
environment can be seen from slow growth to high growth and to slow down phase 
when entering the maturity.  
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Very interesting possible parallel cases to compare against would have been, for 
example, Nokia’s direct competitors. However, access to data in such depth would 
have been practically impossible for one researcher. Therefore the parallel comparison 
cases chosen were Cisco, Dell and SonyEricsson. Cisco and Dell were selected based 
on the fact that they are representative of the electronics industry and have 
experienced the similar growth curves as Nokia. SonyEricsson was selected to 
illustrate a company within the same industry and a competitor, but clearly not 
enjoying the same level of success and competitive advantage on the market. 
Important criterion for selecting these parallel cases was that there was enough 
publicly available data for the comparison.  
 
3.4 Research design and data analysis 
 
The challenge in qualitative research can be an overwhelming corpus of descriptive 
data or, on the other hand, having insufficient data for making strong claims. 
According to Barley (1990), by utilizing a comparative research design and by 
actively attempting to systemize sustained observations, researchers increase their 
odds of accumulating a body of field notes amenable to orderly analysis (figure 11). 
He presented the triple comparative design using three distinct viewpoints called 
synchronic, diachronic and parallel. According to Barley, the synchronic, the 
diachronic, and the parallel represent three distinct axes of comparison that, when used 
in combination, allow researchers to examine explicitly the spatial and temporal 
boundaries of their claims. Synchronic analysis is particularly useful for making 
statements that generalize across members of a class of events, objects, persons, or 
activities. In contrast, diachronic analysis is crucial for explaining the etiology of the 
differences. Parallel studies allow one to generalize synchronic and diachronic 
findings across similar social settings (Barley 1990) and test whether the generality of 
particular findings from a single longitudinal case study are present in other cases 
studied (Leonard-Barton 1990).  
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 To systematize the data collection and further analysing it, a strategy (Laiho and 
Vehtari 2003) chart was created from the case based on the life-cycle curve (appendix 
D). In the strategy charting the most important topics from the internal material were 
posted on the growth curve of each year from 1993 to 2003. Also, the main topics 
found in the external materials were posted on the chart by years under the relevant 
categories. On the matrix, synchronical strategies and events were easy to compare. 
The strategy chart also proved to be very useful for collecting diachronic information. 
The life cycle curve proved to be useful as an overall framework for collecting and 
analyzing the data. The strategy chart allowed a systematic charting of the events, 
roles, and relations associated with each event (Barley 1990). Based on the strategy 
charting it was confirmed that the case company had clearly experienced three 
different life cycle phases from introduction to high growth and to maturity, following 
the S-curve describing industry growth (Forrester 1964) and interactive innovation 
(Rogers 1995). The categories for sorting the data (Barley 1990) were selected based 
on the theoretical framework and constructs created in literature study (figure 9).  
These categories were used as ‘bins’ for sorting the data for analysis. Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) described this process as conceptual ordering, where data is organized 
into discrete categories according to their properties and dimensions and then using 
description to illustrate those categories. This procedure is primarily found in 
grounded theory research (Strauss and Corbin 1990), where researchers relate 
categories and develop analytic frameworks. But, contrary to the grounded theory, 
where categories are selected based on the interview material; the initial categories for 
data analysis were selected based on the theoretical constructs created in the literature 
review: 
 
• Business environment 
• Value proposition  
• Competitive priorities  
• Capabilities  
• Manufacturing and business performance 
• Competitive advantage 
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 The written case description helped further to understand the changes over the life 
cycle, since processes are themselves composed of events with antecedents and 
consequences, and when these are understood and connected in the form of a story or 
historical narrative, an understanding of the process is often the result (Huber and Van 
de Ven 1995). Maxwell (2005) emphasises that reading and thinking about the 
interview transcripts and observation notes, writing memos, developing coding 
categories and applying these to the data, and analyzing narrative structure and 
contextual relationships are all important types of data analysis. The theoretical 
constructs presented in Chapter 2.4 will be used as the basis in each step to guide the 
data-analysis. 
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Figure 11. Triple Comparative Design (adopted from Barley 1990) 
 56
  
3.5 Data collection and reliability 
 
3.5.1 Data collection 
 
Guided by the theoretical constructs both qualitative and quantitative data were 
collected from the case company and is presented in Chapter 4 as case description (see 
also appendix D). Externally available materials were Nokia’s annual reports and 
presentations to investors, other external communication material such as reports 
created by external institutions, published articles and news. Internal material used 
included business, manufacturing and supply chain strategies, process descriptions, 
information about development plans and actually realized projects, as well as 
performance assessments and performance measure data.  
 
In addition, data was extended and confirmed by interviewing personnel responsible 
for manufacturing and demand supply network development or running the 
operations. The participants were chosen based on their ability to contribute to an 
evolving theory (Miles and Hubermann 1994, Creswell 1998). The individuals 
interviewed had a long work history within Nokia’s manufacturing environment, 
either in the factories or from global process and technology development 
organisations, or both (appendix A). All participants had experienced the phenomenon 
of the high growth over the life cycle. These unstructured interviews with open-ended 
questions were carried out in order to obtain a good understanding of the constructs 
and the events that took place. Each interview lasted 1-2 hours on average and was 
based on an interview guide sent to informants prior to the interview (appendix B). 
The topics in the interview were the manufacturing capabilities and performance in 
different phases and their relations to business environment and performance. Special 
emphasis was placed on understanding the difference between intended and realized 
capabilities. Most of the interviews were conducted together with the other researcher. 
Since case facts are open to interpretation, it is best to have at least two researchers, 
who can challenge each other’s observations (Leonard-Barton 1990). Strategy charting 
was performed together with the other researcher working on the closely related topic 
during the fall of 2003 (Laiho and Vehtari 2003). According to Eisenhardt (1989) 
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 multiple investigators have two key advantages: first, they enhance the creativity 
potential of the study, and second, the convergence of observations from multiple 
investigators enhances confidence in the findings. Each interview was recorded in 
written format. Memos were sent by email to interviewees for corrections and 
amendments. Finally, the case description from strategy charting was updated and 
validated based on the information obtained through the interviews (Laiho and Vehtari 
2003). 
 
In addition, an in-depth case study that was carried out in a case company in the fall of 
2003, studying how increased diversity of products impacted manufacturing 
operations, was utilised in this study (Appelqvist and Vehtari 2004). The case study 
results were further validated during 2004 through additional in-depth interviews and 
data analysis of delivery data. These findings were reported in an internal summary 
report and in a conference paper (Appelqvist and Vehtari 2004). These findings were 
utilised to verify the results from the strategy charting and interviews.  
 
The cases of Cisco, Dell and SonyEricsson were studied to compare and strengthen 
the findings from the main case (parallel view in figure 11). The data for the parallel 
cases was collected from publicly available sources from articles, annual reports and 
company websites. One of the interests of this study was: has the importance of 
different manufacturing capabilities changed along the life cycle? Moreover, what are 
the ways to enhance performance before the expected change and during the actual 
change to meet new challenges that are required by the business?  
 
3.5.2 Reliability of the data  
 
In this study, data collection, data analysis and theory building were closely linked. 
Multiple sources of data on the same phenomenon, such as internal archives, 
interviews, questionnaires, and observations or from publicly available records, 
increased the reliability of the data. The evidence was both qualitative and 
quantitative. By multiple data collection and study methods (triangulation) stronger 
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses are provided on the phenomenon. 
 58
 Triangulation is a powerful solution to the problem of relying too much on any single 
data source or method that thereby undermines the validity and credibility of findings 
due to the weaknesses of any single method (Patton 1987). This study utilised four 
different types of triangulation (Patton 1987): 
  
1. Data triangulation – use of variety of data sources (internal strategy and project 
materials, process descriptions, performance metrics data, annual reports, 
presentations to investors, other external communication material such as 
reports created by external institutions, published articles, cases and news); 
2. Investigator triangulation – the use of several different evaluators (two 
researchers creating the strategy chart and performing the interviews, two 
researchers studying mature phase in more detail, use of internal readers to 
validate the written case and the outcomes); 
3. Theory triangulation – the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set 
of data (strategy charting, triple comparative design); 
4. Methodological triangulation – the use of multiple methods to study a single 
problem (interviews, observations, participation and documents). 
 
 However, there are always problems with historical data. For example, participants 
may not recall important events and may be subject to bias. Similarly, what is 
described in archived data, such as minutes of meetings, may not reflect the whole 
truth, and difficult or controversial items may not be recorded (Eisenhardt 1989, Voss 
et al. 2002). Barnes (2001) also points out that not all planned strategy is realised and 
not all realised strategy is planned. The strategy may arise from a combination of the 
intended and emergent and not all managerial intentions are expressed in formal plans, 
and that those intentions may or may not be subsequently realised (Barnes 2001, 
Mintzberg and Waters 1985). As Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) cautioned “it is the 
pattern of decisions actually made that constitutes a function’s strategy, not what is 
said or written in annual reports or planning documents”.  
 
On the other hand, the researcher’s in-depth involvement with the organisation over 
the years meant having good access to gather the data required and to provide support 
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 for the research being conducted. Barnes (2001) mentions that the qualitative approach 
has its origins in anthropology, and requires deep involvement on the researcher’s part 
within the organisational setting. The attraction, according to him, lies in its ability to 
generate extensive, rich and detailed data. Of course, when the researcher has worked 
for the company for an extensive period of time, intersubjectivity can be a risk as well 
as an objective liability towards external validity. The written case description and a 
case summary table were also proofread by colleagues to verify that events and the 
findings were correctly captured. These selected colleagues had worked for several 
years with the manufacturing and demand supply chain issues in the case company.  
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4 LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY 
 
The case study focuses on understanding the manufacturing capability and 
performance changes involved with Nokia’s mobile phones manufacturing from 1992 
to the end of 2003. Focus is also on how manufacturing contributed to the overall 
business performance and to the competitive advantage of Nokia. The case description 
and analysis was guided by the strategy charting and data categorized by selected 
categories based on the literature review. In addition to manufacturing capabilities, 
demand supply network and other cross-organisational capabilities related to 
manufacturing were studied in order to capture all essential capability development 
(Eloranta et al. 2001 and Lewis 2003). Each business life cycle phase also includes a 
short description of the business environment and the main products and value 
propositions. The case analysis is presented in Chapter 4.5. 
 
4.1 Introduction of the case  
 
4.1.1 Introduction of the case company  
 
The history had already shown several cycles of technological discontinuities and 
growth periods in the electronics industry before the 1990s in Finland (Lovio 1993). 
However, this case study will focus on the changes of the Finnish based global player 
Nokia Mobile Phones from the beginning of the 1990’s to the year 2003. This 
business life cycle also started with slow growth and continued into high growth and 
continues into slower growth in 2001-2003 (figure 13). 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s Nokia has concentrated on mobile terminals and 
networks businesses. In 2003 the company comprised three business groups: Nokia 
Mobile Phones (NMP), Nokia Networks (NET), and Nokia Enterprise Solutions 
(NES). Supporting groups were Nokia Ventures Organisation (NVO), Nokia Research 
Centre (NRC) and Nokia Business Infrastructure (NBI) providing business groups 
with the processes and tools to run their businesses. In 2003, Nokia’s net sales were 
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 29.5 billion euros, with an operating profit of 5.0 billion euros (Nokia annual report 
2003).  
 
In 2004 Nokia Mobile Phones was divided into three business groups as Mobile 
Phones, Enterprise Solutions and Multimedia to better support the more divergent 
market requirements. The supporting functions in 2004 were Customer and Market 
Operations, Technology Platforms, Business Infrastructure, Operating Resource 
Sourcing, Nokia Research Centre and Nokia Ventures Organisation. Customer and 
Market Operations include Nokia's sales and marketing organisation as well as 
manufacturing, logistics and sourcing. The Networks business group continues to have 
its own dedicated sales and marketing, logistics, manufacturing and sourcing 
activities. 
 
Nokia Mobile Phones became the world’s largest phone manufacturer in the 1990s. In 
1991 Nokia was Europe’s largest manufacturer of mobile phones and the second 
largest in the world. Economically the year 1991 was the Nokia history’s worst year, 
particularly because profitable sales to the Soviet Union ended and there were 
discussions of sale to Ericsson (now SonyEricsson). However, Nokia and Europe’s 
second largest mobile phone manufacturer Technophone, were united in 1991. During 
1991-2000 the company’s number of employees doubled, net sales grew ten-fold and 
operating profit grew a hundred-fold (Häikiö 2001), (figure 14). The growth of 
Nokia’s operations has been extensive as well. In 1994 the estimation of the volume 
growth was from 7 million to 60 million by 2000 (Nokia Strategy 1994 Challenge of 
Volume Growth). The actual number of phones sold ended up being 115 million in the 
year 2000. In the year 2003 Nokia produced, in nine factories globally, half a million 
phones per day, the equivalent of seven phones per second. Each phone contained 
300-350 components, adding up to over 60 billion components total in one year. For 
the full year of 2003, Nokia volumes reached a record 179 million units, leading to an 
estimated market share slightly above 38%. Nokia Mobile Phones broadened and 
revitalised its product portfolio by launching 40 new products during 2003 with an 
emphasis on more advanced devices, CDMA technology, entry-level phones and 
market localization. The Demand Supply Network Management, including operational 
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 efficiency, has been one of the three strengths in Nokia alongside Brand and Product 
(Internal Strategy Material). 
 
4.1.2 Nokia’s mobile phone factories 
 
The mission of Nokia’s Operations and Logistics organisation is to deliver Nokia 
brand promise to customers through innovative, flexible, and efficient Demand Supply 
Network (www.nokia.com). In 1993 most of the manufacturing took place in nine 
facilities owned by Nokia, with less than 20 % of production outsourced to three-
selected global contract manufactures. By locating three plants in each of the three 
geographical regions, Nokia has ensured that manufacturing takes place close to 
customers (see figure 12). The nine factories in 2003 were globally located in Salo 
(Finland), Bochum (Germany), Komarom (Hungary), Beijing (China), Masan (Korea), 
Dongguan (China), Alliance (Texas), Reynosa (Mexico) and Manaus (Brazil).  
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Figure 12. Nine mobile phone factories in Nokia 
 
Through localized factories Nokia is able to provide its customers higher product 
variety, improve responsiveness to customer preference, and provide fast order 
fulfilment (Stanford Case 2004). However, Nokia relies on transhipment of 
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 subassemblies across regions to ensure cost efficiency and high rates of demand 
fulfilment. In this study mobile phone manufacturing facilities (e.g. factories) within 
Nokia are viewed as one manufacturing unit, i.e. performance measures are combined 
global averages.  
 
 
4.1.3 Characteristics of the growth phases 
 
The mobile phone industry was a very rapidly growing industry in the 1990s. Figure 
13 illustrates the whole mobile phone industry growth with market shares of the main 
competitors. This figure illustrates that Nokia was able to win and hold the clear 
market leader position from 1998 to 2003, while the biggest competitor Motorola was 
loosing the market share throughout 1994 to 2000.  
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Figure 13.  Industry growth by thousand of phones and market shares (Gartner 2004) 
 
The strategy charting confirmed that the company had clearly experienced three 
different life cycle phases from introduction to high growth and to maturity following 
the S-curved (Forrester 1964, Rogers 1995). The strategy chart helped create a 
baseline understanding of the environmental requirements and competitive priorities 
set for manufacturing. The charting indicated the shifting of value propositions and 
capabilities in different phases of life cycle (Moore 1998, Tracey and Wiersema 
1993). The S-shaped growth curve and growth rates were divided into three growth 
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 phases: introduction (1992-1996), growth (1997-2000) and maturity from (2001-2003) 
(figure 14).  
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Growth phase 1 Growth phase 2 Growth phase 3
Nokia 1992-1996 1997-2000 2001-2003
Compound Annual Growth Rate of Nokia sales 43 47 1
Compound Annual Growth Rate  of profit 27 66 7
Average annual growth rate of sales 57 58 3
Average annual growth rate of profit 46 116 4
Compound Annual Growth Rate of volumes 46 57 9  
Figure 14. NMP net sales, operating profit and profit of net sales in % (Nokia annual reports) 
 
Growth phase 1: Introduction 
 
 
According to Moore (1998), in the introduction phase customers are technology 
enthusiasts and visionaries looking to be first to enjoy the new paradigm. The 
paradigm shift begins with the appearance of a new category of product that 
incorporates breakthrough technology enabling unprecedented benefits. Following the 
introduction period is “the Chasm”, a time of great despair, when the early-market’s 
interest wanes but the mainstream market is still not comfortable with the immaturity 
of the solutions available (Moore 1998). In the mobile phone business GSM 
breakthrough occurred during 1994-1995 and market growth accelerated when mobile 
phones became available for big masses. This required a global infrastructure standard 
for the market to start growing rapidly. In addition, the pricing of the mobile phones 
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 needed to reach reasonable levels for the mass markets. In this phase the compound 
annual growth rate for Nokia was 43 %, which was already a high growth rate. This 
caused problems towards the end of the phase in component supply and end product 
stock management, but was solved by reorganising the logistics (Nokia annual report 
1996). 2.  
 
Growth phase 2: Growth 
 
The second growth period was characterized by even higher volume growth. Moore 
(1998) describes this as “the Tornado”, a period of mass-market adoption, when the 
general marketplace switches over to the new infrastructure paradigm. In this phase 
demand dramatically outstrips supply, and a huge backlog of customers appears. The 
significance of this period is that once customers settle on a particular vendor, they 
rarely switch. In the words of Moore (1998): “It is important to attack your 
competitors during the tornado instead of serving your customer”. Another important 
lesson is to expand distribution as fast as possible. Moore (1998) said this is the time 
to “just ship”. Once the high growth is over, markets are very price elastic. The 
transition from value-based to commodity-based pricing occurs during high growth, 
and leveraging that transition is the key to capturing market share, especially in the 
tornado’s later stages. This means pursuing the next lower price point, which puts 
emphasis on the cost structure development.  
 
The compound annual growth rate for Nokia was 47%, but the total volumes produced 
were significantly greater than in the previous phase. During 1998 Nokia won the 
market share fight against Motorola and became number one in the world (figure 13). 
The key strategic cornerstone in 1999 was to grow fast in order to achieve maximum 
economies of scale, while maintaining fast volume growth and managing the growth 
in the entire demand supply network. The slowdown of the growth was not yet visible, 
but Nokia targeted to a lean growth to be prepared for sudden changes in market 
demand.  
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 Growth phase 3: Maturity 
 
 
According to Moore (1998), the typical transition to maturity phase (Main Street) 
begins catastrophically. In this phase price erosion leads to a decline in net revenue. 
The end customer and mass customization strategies became important. On the other 
hand, the assumption is that as one reaches the top of one S-curve, one should be 
looking to transition into the bottom of the next curve.  
 
Even though the Nokia’s compound annual growth had slowed down to 1% and the 
market share started to slightly decline in 2003, Nokia did not face any dramatic 
shortfalls in revenues and profits. On the contrary, an interesting aspect is that when 
market growth saturated and started to slow down in 2000, the Nokia market share 
continued to grow until 2002. Nokia was also able to improve net sales profit by a few 
percent points.  
 
4.2 The first growth phase 1992-1996: Introduction 
 
4.2.1 Business environment 1992-1996 
 
In the beginning of 1990s Nokia’s vision was to be the end-user recognized leader in 
cellular terminals. In 1994 the challenge of volume growth was recognized and the 
anticipation of customer needs and quick response to market requirements was seen as 
vital for global players like Nokia. In mid 1990 the mobile phone business faced 
growth pains. During 1995 Nokia introduced substantial new production and 
distribution capacity, while hiring a significant number of new employees in order to 
meet the expected demand. Consequently, the business group experienced certain 
difficulties in bringing up this production and logistics capacity to optimal levels 
(Nokia annual report 1995). Nokia’s operating profit dropped, remaining however 
strongly profitable, which is highlighted by profits in percent of the net sales (figure 
14).  
 
The main challenge was caused by the market dynamics. Towards the end of the 
1990s the risk of price erosion and technological obsolescence of products and 
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 components grew. It was difficult to forecast the fast changes in demand and 
operations were not well adapted to these fast changes in the demand. Some other 
issues were caused by supplier quality and with product mix (Häikiö 2001). In 1996 
Nokia faced more rapid growth, component supply and end product stock 
management problems, but with an efficient reorganisation of logistics and new 
products the profitability had already improved by the second half of 1996 (Nokia 
annual report 1996).  
 
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) technology enabled Nokia to enter 
new markets from the beginning of the 1990s. The GSM breakthrough occurred 
during 1994-1995 and accelerated market growth when mobile phones became 
available for the population at large, mostly in Europe and Asia. In 1994 the 2100 
family was launched and became a classic. The original target was to sell 400 000 
units, but in the end a total of 20 million phones were sold. The product range also 
included data services, car phones and supporting software. In 1996 the first 
communicator (Communicator 9000) was launched and more diverse categories 
emerged, such as the Nokia 8100 family in the premium category and the Nokia 1610 
in the basic category. Already in 1990 half of the mobile phones were sold through big 
operators. Nokia’s strategy was to target end-customer requirements and create a 
demand that would drive operators to sell Nokia phones. User friendliness and design 
were the biggest selling arguments (Häikiö 2001). Stronger focus on Nokia Brand 
development started in 1991, but phones were sold under multiple brands, in the 
United States, for example, where Technophone was used until 1995. 
 
In the 1980s, in the US markets, analog AMPS dominated the market and the digital 
TDMA standard (often known as D-AMPS) offered the evolutionary path from analog 
AMPS. The growth in the US during the 1990s did not experience the same growth as 
in the European and Asian markets and resulted in delays in establishing digital 
mobile services such as CDMA and GSM.  
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 4.2.2 Capabilities 1992-1996 
 
4.2.2.1 Development of Demand Supply Network 1992-1996 
 
In the early 1990s the manufacturing and logistics organisations were functional and 
immature, lacking end-to-end process management. Growth in volumes doubled and 
tripled in 1994 – 1995 but the growth was not always well managed, being more of an 
ad hoc development (Interviews). The effort to meet the rapidly growing demand was 
great and Nokia faced several major obstacles along the way (Stanford case 2004).  
 
All five factories (Salo, Alliance, Bochum, Hong Kong and Masan) increased 
production in 1994. Flexible working arrangements in the factories had a positive 
impact on the goal to increase productivity and improve operations (Nokia annual 
Report 1994). Regional plants focused on serving regional markets and supporting 
other sales areas if necessary. The products and processes were planned to be flexible 
in order to facilitate manufacturing of different products to customer orders. In the 
sourcing area the local partner vendors were set for supplying critical parts, whereas 
global vendors were set to supply best technology/cost. In 1996 Nokia’s joint venture 
for mobile communications inaugurated the manufacturing of mobile phones and base 
stations in China (press release April 17, 1996). 
 
In 1995 rapid growth continued, but component supply, end product stock 
management and disintegrated demand supply network processes, together with an 
annual price erosion of 25%, created difficulties. Nokia was left with huge inventories 
of the wrong items in the wrong places, while simultaneously still being unable to 
deliver some products due to shortages of certain critical items. Thinner margins, 
coupled with market turbulence and an increasing number of variants, pointed to the 
need to decrease inventories, to reduce cycle times and manufacturing to order. The 
shape-up began in 1995-1996 with an efficient reorganisation of logistics and through 
the implementation of new processes in product creation, delivery process and 
management process. A global organisation was created to provide more visibility, set 
common processes across all regions and take charge of a global planning. A SAP 
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 Enterprise Resource (ERP) system was implemented across all plants (Stanford case 
2004). The logistic shape-up introduced new measures such as Inventory Days of 
Supply (DOS) and On Time Delivery (OTD).  It was only in 1996 that the Days of 
Supply improved from 154 days to 68 days (figure 15), smaller inventories released 
2.5 billion FIM (0.4 billion EUR), raw material DOS improved from 86 days to 26 
days, cash flow was 4.6 billion FIM in 1996 compared to 3.2 billion in 1995, and 
warehousing costs decreased from 200 FIM (33 EUR)/phone to 100FIM (17 
EUR)/phone (Häikiö 2001, internal metrics documents).  
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Figure 15. Improvement of inventory Days of Supply in 1996 (Nokia internal material) 
 
4.2.2.2 Development of Manufacturing Capabilities 1992-1996 
 
At the beginning of 1990, the most critical capability was to produce products when 
production technology was not a commodity (i.e. the ability to introduce new 
products), meaning that many the processes and equipment had to be developed from 
the beginning. Current production technology and process designs were mainly 
introduced through the introduction of the GSM products 2110 and 6110 during 1994-
1996 and were copied during the high growth years. Production ramp-up time was 
measured in months and the goal was to reduce it to one month (Interviews).  
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 The focus in the operation strategy was on the improvement of concurrent engineering 
(CE) processes, use of Design for Manufacturing (DFM), global manufacturing and 
sourcing. The cooperation between product creation and factories was not very 
mature, as is typical in any new type of business. CE process development work 
started in 1992 and was in place by 1994, enabling a good start for the DFM work. 
The concurrent engineering process and design for manufacturability improved the 
ability to introduce new products. Towards the end of the era good manufacturability 
of the products also helped in the shape-up and fast growth. The cooperation between 
product creation (CE) and manufacturing (DFM) was practiced along the 2100 
product family and it was at a good level prior to the final volume explosion of the 
5100 and 6100 products. Design for Manufacturing was criticised at the beginning, but 
through the 2110 product family, and particularly through the 5110/6110 products, 
benefits were clear (Interviews). In 1994, Design for Manufacturing (DFM) metrics 
were introduced including hand time, test time and component count that affected the 
efficiency of manufacturing (figures 16 and 18). The other targets were to decrease 
part count from 900 to 400 (products 5110, 6110) and less than 200 parts in 
subsequent generations 
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Figure 16. Volume / labour in Europe 1993-1999 (Nokia Internal Material) 
 71
 4.2.3 Competitive advantage in 1992-1996 
 
Throughout the first era of 1992-1996 product leadership with brand and end-user 
recognition was the most important value proposition (Nokia strategies).  
Manufacturing was not the main competitive advantage, even though continuous 
improvement was important in all three competitive priority areas (cost, time, quality). 
From the operations point of view the most important manufacturing capabilities were 
the ability to introduce new products and manufacture according to specification. 
Later on, the ability to shape-up and grow fast became important as well. Cost was not 
the most important criteria and quality mattered as and order qualifier. 
  
In 1996-1997 the strong profitability improvement in Nokia was due to further 
development and integration of logistics processes and efficient management of 
working capital. Focus, as stated in the 1997 strategy, was on reliable, responsive and 
cost effective logistics. In practice, this meant focusing on product availability, on-
time delivery, and inventory reduction. Renewal of the product range and continuous 
cost improvements also had an important contribution to profitability. The 
improvements brought results and the profitability of the company turned into high 
growth. The organisational renewal resulted in a more efficient operation and sales 
system. Nokia Mobile Phones became fundamentally better in terms of efficiency, 
which led to an increase in sales and faster improvement of profitability compared to 
its competitors (Häikiö 2001, Nokia annual Report 1997).  
 
4.3 The second phase 1997-2000: Growth  
4.3.1 Business environment 1997-2000 
 
The rapid growth period was anticipated at Nokia, but not to the extent that it did 
occur. Already by 1998 Nokia had produced a hundred million phones. In 1998 alone 
Nokia sold 40.8 million phones and became the world leader in the mobile phone 
market. Its market share grew 15 percent, from 21 to 36 percent, while Motorola’s 
dropped from 37 percent to 26 percent. The challenge of high growth highlighted the 
business environment:  
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“The high demand for our products, the excellence of operations and 
favourable market conditions with lower than anticipated price erosion 
led to an exceptional level of profitability.” (Nokia Annual report 1998) 
 
Around the strong market growth period, product availability was the main factor for 
successful business, but also meeting the demand of different customers segments 
became rather more important. At the same time Nokia further developed the value 
proposition towards the trade customers, stating that the key benefit for Nokia’s 
customers is increased revenues and profitability through product availability, high 
asset rotation, visibility and ease of doing business with Nokia. At this stage, supply 
chain management started to become a value-adding factor for Nokia. Similarly 
important were varying logistic needs of different customers in terms of location, 
frequency and timing of deliveries, product offering and product-related value-added 
services. Nokia increasingly started to offer trade customers customised products 
without a significant increase in price. The driver was increased awareness of brand 
value also among telecom operators, Nokia’s major customer group. 
 
“In 1998, we became the world’s largest supplier of mobile phones. 
During 1999, we were able to continue to strengthen our global market 
position. The mobile phone market grew by over 60% during 1999. We 
estimate that about 275 million mobile phones were sold worldwide 
during the year, compared to about 168 million in the previous year. 
Nokia’s sales volume growth exceeded that of the market with sales 
during 1999 of 78.5 million units, up 92% on the previous year’s 40.8 
million.” (Nokia Annual Report 1999) 
 
In 1999 strong growth continued with a high operating profit margin, but preparing for 
sudden changes had started at Nokia, which helped to overcome the problems in 
entering the maturity phase. The year 2000 was a complicated year for component 
demand. The mobile phone industry faced a severe component shortage in the first 
half of 2000. On the other hand, companies ended up with huge amounts of inventory 
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 at the end of the same year. One of the most important reasons for this was the 
unrealistic plan of each mobile phone vendor. Each vendor had exceeded sales of 600 
million units annually; yet actual production quantity was 410 million units annually 
(Nomura Research Institute 2001). Several reasons can account for this position, 
ranging from promising demand forecasts to a good economic situation in the United 
States. In the end, the material availability crisis led to improved cooperation with 
suppliers to ensure component availability.  
 
The mobile phone products were getting smaller, dividing into different user 
segments, and the different functionalities increased (Nokia annual report 1998). One 
of Nokia’s success criteria said to be a wide and diverse product range combined with 
efficient mass production. Nokia was a trendsetter in the design and renewal of the 
products, which was seen to be as important as production efficiency (Häikiö 2001). 
In 1998, a total of 17 new products were introduced. However, one should bear in 
mind that the implementation of new products usually started in Europe and the 
business development was slower in other markets.  
 
4.3.2 Capabilities 1997-2000 
 
4.3.2.1 Development of Demand Supply Network 1997-2000 
 
The logistics shape-up (i.e. the ability to shape up and grow fast), triggered by the 
1995 logistics crisis, led to improved operational efficiency and effective production, 
which then enabled the high growth. Simultaneous risks of price erosion, heavy 
volume growth together with obsolescence of products and components emerged. In 
1997 the key objective in global logistics process strategy was to build and operate an 
integrated supply chain. The basic principles were to ‘Plan for Capacity’ and ‘Execute 
to Order’. This meant that logistics planning captures market demand data and ensures 
that the correct production and materials capacity is implemented to meet the demand 
(figure 17). The challenges were growing product range with customization, evolving 
distribution channels and shortening product life cycles. The target was to maintain a 
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 25-35 percent net sales growth target, which led to challenges in continuing to manage 
growth and excel in operations (press release July 24, 1998).  
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Figure 17. Plans for integrated supply chain (Nokia logistics strategy 1997) 
 
Nokia decided to expand mobile phone production through major investments in 
Finland and Hungary. A new manufacturing centre was to be built in Hungary (press 
release July 27, 1998). When the factory was opened in 2000 Jorma Ollila, Nokia 
Chairman and CEO stated:  
 
“In the rapidly growing mobile phone industry, efficient and flexible 
logistics processes and manufacturing capabilities are an important 
success factor, and the significance of the new Komárom site within 
Nokia’s global logistics structure is very high. Today, in Komárom we 
are celebrating the opening of Nokia’s 10th mobile phone factory.” 
(Nokia Press release May 05, 2000) 
 
In 1998 the integration continued, with customers and suppliers, emphasising demand 
supply visibility to whole chain, integrated planning and "make to demand". A key 
strategic cornerstone in 1999 was to grow fast in order to achieve maximum 
economies of scale, but also to manage growth in the entire demand supply network. 
 75
 In addition, the implementation of SAP R3 enabled for visibility and improved 
planning, as one company also enabled process standardization and integration. At the 
same time, together with growth scenarios, there was the initiative to develop a 
readiness to change with agile and lean growth. Nokia’s target was not to build more 
factories nor increase its number of employees. Limiting the number of factories being 
built ended up being a very crucial decision. Instead, the capacity increase was 
achieved by improving design for manufacturability, improving processes, increasing 
flexible automation, outsourcing and orchestrating the demand supply network.  
 
The material availability crisis of 1999 and 2000 led to improved cooperation with 
suppliers to ensure component availability. The strategy was to have a global supply 
network and capacity with global volume planning, priority to suppliers that would be 
easier to manage and offer Nokia better component availability than its competitors. 
Cooperation with sub-contractors and outsourcing was to leverage risks, but also to 
ensure the production efficiency and quality. The outsourcing strategy was not to 
outsource the customization of final product, but strategic outsourcing 20%-25% was 
used to balance volume fluctuation in engine manufacturing. The target was high 
capacity utilization in engine manufacturing and responsive final assembly to 
customer order. The primary role of Nokia was to be the orchestrator of the demand 
supply network. At Nokia, Orchestration meant managing the entire chain and 
outsourcing selected activities to demand supply chain partners: suppliers, contract 
manufacturers, logistics service providers and channel partners. In the demand supply 
network, capabilities and resources are combined into flexible networks without the 
ownership of all activities (Nokia Term bank). The renewal of the demand supply 
network was to be achieved by eliminating non-value adding activities and re-
evaluating the ownership and partnership positions within the network. 
 
The Inventory Days of Supply (DOS) measure became important after the logistics 
crisis. Inventory Carrying Cost was formed from interest cost, obsolescence, price 
erosion of procured components and warehousing cost. The other logistics measures 
On Time Delivery (OTD) and Order Fulfilment Lead time (OFLT) increased in 
importance. Cost measures as cost per produced phones became important and the 
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 extensive growth and economies of scale helped cost reduction and efficiency 
improvement.  
 
4.3.2.2 Manufacturing Capabilities 1997-2000 
 
By 1997 Concurrent Engineering (CE) process had become a critical capability as well 
as Design for Manufacturing (DFM). The use of design for manufacturing simplified 
the production process and improved efficiency (figure 18). Design for 
Manufacturability also extended to cover the whole end-to-end demand supply 
network by introducing the Design for Demand Supply Network rules and taking a 
closer look at the number of Assembly to Order (ATO) variants and cost of variable 
parts. 
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Figure 18. Development of hand time (minutes, Nokia internal material) 
 
Integration of order fulfilment processes, begun in 1996, was the first step towards 
manufacturing to order and was mostly in place by the end of 2000 in the form of 
Assembly to Order (ATO) (figure 19). Subassemblies (engines) are built to stock in a 
process that has higher capacity utilization. The same engine can be used for a wide 
variety of final products. The more labour intensive final assembly is postponed until 
after customer orders are received, in order to allow Nokia to better address the high 
fluctuations in demand and the hundreds of sales variances per model. The ATO 
process results in high efficiency in internal operations (i.e. the ability to deliver 
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 efficiently in volumes) and saves the burden of holding finished goods inventories 
(profit in the price competitive market) (Stanford case 2004).  
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Figure 19. Nokia’s ATO manufacturing process 
 
Automation possibilities in final assembly area were looked at extensively, but finally 
it was decided that they would provide little benefit. The planned high volume and 
high automation line were found to be too expensive an investment and too inflexible 
to fulfil increasing customer requirements. The need for different, more diverse 
manufacturing capabilities was already seen in 1999; based on the more diverse 
product mix e.g. basic-mid products, more cost efficient products and more quality 
critical high-flagship products. The high utilisation of production lines was not as 
important as cost tied to working in process or into inventories. Towards the end of the 
era, volume change and product mix change became even more important, due to a 
wider product line and the need for dependable deliveries. In 1998-99 the importance 
of ramp-up capability also increased.  
 
The processes implemented in the factories were not identical, since the foremost 
priority was to meet the volumes. At the time of fast volume growth, adapting the 
operations to the new situations was continuous and changes were implemented 
quickly (interviews). The huge growth, which Nokia experienced during the late 
1990’s, did not allow enough time to ensure all the required competences in all the 
sites. Also when phones and components were getting smaller and layouts tighter, it 
introduced new challenges to repair quality. This created an opportunity for Nokia in 
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 the area of quality improvement. Manufacturing Failure Rate (MFR) and Field Failure 
Rate (FFR) became important quality measures. 
 
4.3.3 Competitive advantage in 1997-2000 
 
Throughout the second era of 1997-2000, operational excellence with superior product 
availability and efficient manufacturing process were the important value propositions 
(strategy materials) along with product leadership. Customer intimacy also began to be 
a significant concern and focus shifted from end-users to trade customers. Nokia’s 
mobile phone business was very profitable and had a price advance based on its huge 
volume. Nokia was strong both in high-end and low-end models. In particular, the 
main models that supported Nokia’s enormous growth were the 5100 series and the 
6100 series (Nomura Research Institute 2001). Competitive advantage was provided 
by the ability to deliver efficiently and by the ability to slow down. The ability to 
profit in a price competitive market also became important when reaching the maturity 
phase.  
 
During this time, the capability to grow and meet the demand requirements was 
important from the manufacturing point of view:  
 
“The operations helped to meet the challenging delivery requirements 
through superior demand supply network, volume flexibility capability 
and scalable production that others did not have. Nokia was able to stop 
the growth on time and not having a huge amount of extra inventory. 
Since during the fast growth demand exceeds offering, the winner is 
whoever can deliver and increase capacity fast enough and improve the 
efficiency. The companies that are not prepared to high growth will 
suffer … Nokia succeeded in translating strong brand, product offering, 
industry-leading execution and operational efficiency into highly 
profitable results.“ (Nomura Research Institute 2001)  
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 This would not have been possible without the operational innovation that took place 
in the years 1996 and 1997. Continuous improvement was important in all three 
competitive priorities, but in this phase continuous improvement was also achieved 
through high volume growth providing economies of scale. Nokia was able to produce 
and deliver products better than anyone else leading into close to 40% of market share 
and high profitability. The interviews further strongly emphasised that without the 
fundamental logistics shape-up and the improvements through systematic work on 
Design for Manufacturing (DFM), which had already started in the previous era, there 
would not have been any gains.  
 
Upon reaching the highest growth rate in the end of the 1990s, it was clearly stated in 
the manufacturing strategies that Nokia should not build more factories in the near 
future. Everyone should be prepared for sudden changes (i.e. the ability to slow 
down). The specific strategic statement was “No More People”. If growth were to 
continue it should be handled through improved efficiency, not by increasing 
workforce. Furthermore, the products were excellent in their manufacturability as 
compared to their competitors. This strategy proved to be an excellent one that 
assisted the transition from high growth into industry slow-down and into the maturity 
phase. A flat, networked organisation combined with speed and flexibility in decision 
making that are characteristics of the “Nokia way” also aided the transition. Nokia’s 
managers emphasised the importance of understanding the market and turning 
foresight into correct action at the right time (Interviews and Masalin 2003).  
 
4.4 The third phase 2001-2003: Maturity 
  
4.4.1 Business environment 2001-2003 
 
The year 2001 was characterized by intense competition, extreme volatility and a 
weakened global economy. The mobile handset marketplace faced the first downturn 
in unit sales since it began, particularly in the GSM world, as sales declined from 
407.9 m (2000) to 385 m (2001) units (ARC 2003). There was, however, solid growth 
and a return to stability in the industry as the year progressed. This was driven mainly 
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 by the worldwide rollout of an array of compelling products with new technologies 
(such as handsets with colour screens, camera phones, MMS-capability, polyphonic 
ring tones, etc), which helped to speed up the increasingly important replacement 
market. Until 2000, the handset industry operated with virtually no inventory build-up, 
but inventory build-up was a problem for the industry in 2000. It had an impact on the 
2001 market by forcing slow growth as operators cleared old stock (ARC 2003).  
  
Even in this environment, Nokia achieved significant market share gains maintaining 
excellent profitability in the mobile phone business. Nokia increased its full-year 
market share in mobile phones for the fourth consecutive year, reaching approximately 
37% — almost twice the 19% achieved in 1997 (Nokia annual report 2001). In fact, 
Nokia grew faster than the market, as illustrated in figure 13. However, in June 2001 
Nokia saw a slower market growth affecting second quarter results. In 2002 there were 
further gains in the mobile phone market share, which raised both sequentially and 
year on year to over 38%. The economic conditions in the latter part of the year 
continued to be hard, but Nokia’s profitability outlook remained very strong, 
reflecting the company’s execution and operational efficiencies and strong product 
mix (Nokia annual report 2002). While the world economy had an inevitable impact 
on Nokia’s top line growth, the overall profitability and market position were 
excellent and Nokia ended the year with the highest ever net cash position of EUR 8.8 
billion. Mobile Phones saw a record sales volume of 46 million units in the fourth 
quarter. Nokia also shipped a record number of 33 new mobile phone products for the 
full year (Nokia annual report 2002). 
 
At the beginning of 2000, the business environment was shaping up due to a maturing 
industry, growth slow-down, horizontalization, extreme volatility and uncertainty. The 
business was not just about competing with other manufacturers, but handset 
manufacturers still wanted to make profits after the initial handset sale. According to 
Gartner this will have complex implications for enterprises, mobile operators and 
consumers (Gartner research 2002). Mobile phone manufacturers were looking for 
both new sales channels and products that would generate income, even if the 
networks could not roll out new technology on time. They particularly needed annuity 
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 revenue —money made from follow-on sales of products and services to a customer 
who had already bought a handset. The industry had become more mature, resulting in 
stiffer competition and shrinking profit margins. This change in the market 
environment forced mobile phone manufacturers to shift their focus from growth to 
financial performance and to adopt a more targeted approach towards customers 
(Stanford Case 2004). During the last quarter of 2003, Nokia sold 55.3 million phones, 
which was 20% more than in 2002. All this was done during the major restructuring of 
operations. Total volume for 2003 was 180 million, 18% more than in 2002. Sales 
revenues also increased 4% year-on-year in the fourth quarter.  
 
Mobile phones used to be about talking – anytime, anywhere. Now they are devices 
used for sending and receiving data as well. Market segmentation by lifestyle has also 
been a growing feature of Nokia’s product range since the late 1990s to the beginning 
of 2000. By producing handsets designed specifically for particular market segments, 
with associated applications, functionality and brand value, Nokia was enticing 
subscribers to upgrade their handsets or move onto data-enabled next generation 
networks. Operators, as well as handset manufacturers, were increasingly expected to 
provide combinations of these additional services as a means of differentiating their 
products. It is important to note that with the increased complexity of devices, and the 
desire for added functionality and features, comes an increased Bill of Materials 
(BOM). The importance of the software was increasing in addition to the number of 
ramp-up’s and variants through customization requirements. Lot sizes continued to 
become smaller and lead times shorter. The uncertainty of demand continued to grow, 
especially in new product concepts. Design was a key parameter in the mobile handset 
market as vendors strove to make their devices easier to use and more appealing to the 
eye. In Europe, the mono-block form has been the most popular, being the cheapest 
design style to produce, and consists of a single unit. In Asia Pacific the clamshell 
design has been the most popular, where the screen and keypad are located on separate 
blocks that fold on top of each other. This allows for a larger screen and protection 
from breakage. The trend of miniaturisation seen in mobile handsets is set to continue. 
Components have become smaller and increasingly integrated, although the rate at 
which they are miniaturising has relented. In Europe, 90% of handset transit is via an 
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 operator-controlled warehouse while most devices in China and India, for example, 
transit via independent distributors and operators who have little control over the 
process (ARC 2003, Nokia annual reports). What is interesting is that by 2003 Nokia 
was no longer seen as the trendsetter of the industry. Their basic design had not 
changed since the end of 1997, while customers were expecting and coveting more 
clamshell-type products (Nomura Research Institute 2001).  
 
In November 2001, Nokia launched a total of nine new products: six mobile phones, 
including Nokia’s first imaging phone, and three models targeted specifically for Asia 
Pacific, the fastest growing market, and three Bluetooth accessories. Product range 
became wider than before, spanning from low cost basic phones to wireless 
multimedia devices. It was Nokia’s strategic intent to create ‘Total Product Offering’ 
running from terminals and accessories through to applications and services, hence an 
emphasis on appropriate applications (ARC 2003). In 2002 Nokia Mobile Phones was 
divided into business units focusing on different market segments with different 
business models. The main focus became to drive for profitable growth and focusing 
on different market segments through different business models (Nokia annual report). 
For the full year 2003 Nokia launched more than 35 new products, for a total of 80 
products in production. The range of Nokia devices in 2003 are presented in appendix 
C. At the top of the extensive product range there is an enormous amount of customer 
variants. For example, let us take the 3510i variants: two assemblies to order engines, 
one hundred and sixty custom transceivers, and two hundred and sixty sales package 
variants (see figure 20).  
 
2 Assembly to Order Engines
• 1 for Asian markets
• 1 for European markets
160 Custom Transceivers 260 Sales Package Variants
NOKIA 3510 VARIATION
 
Figure 20. An example of product variation (Nokia, Kallasvuo 2003) 
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4.4.2 Capabilities 2001-2003 
 
4.4.2.1 Development of Demand Supply Network 2001-2003 
 
Changes in manufacturing trends and the handset vendors’ pursuit of reducing costs 
have meant a massive shift in the preferred regions for global production and capacity 
management. This means an increasing trend to move mobile phone manufacturing 
plants away from higher cost regions to new facilities in areas with cheaper labour and 
lower costs of production, such as China, Korea, and South America. Manufacturers 
are now leaner, more efficient and far more aware of costs, both in production and 
marketing. Return on investment is paramount and the average unit selling price is 
becoming the key performance indicator for the industry (ARC 2003). ARC survey of 
2003 showed that manufacturing costs are expected to fall dramatically over the next 
five years, for both high-end and low-end handsets alike.  
 
The strengths in 2000 were seen as scalable, efficient, and with global volume 
manufacturing network having strong support from suppliers and the industry’s best 
inventory rotation (figure 25). This was, however, average compared to world-class 
(see figure 28). The same principles from the end of the 1990’s still applied: plan for 
capacity, execute to order, end-to-end integration, information visibility and replace 
inventories with information. The key business drivers for 2003 were once again 
increasing number of products and variants, smaller lot sizes, shorter lead times and 
cost pressure in the end-to-end chain. Even more emphasis was seen on Total Product 
Offering (TPO) and intensifying competition through higher quality and customer 
satisfaction and collaborative planning with channel collaborations offering (i.e. the 
ability to customise products and sources to customer needs). To avoid diluting 
Nokia’s efficiencies in manufacturing and sourcing, the operations and logistics group 
were kept as common to all new business units.  
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 Strong development was also implemented on the sourcing side where there was 
strong pressure for material cost reduction through strategic partnerships and limited 
number of suppliers (figure 21).  
 
Material Purchases
Sales Volume
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Figure 21. Material purchases (Nokia, Kallasvuo 2003) 
 
While until 2001 the demand-supply network activities focused mainly on upstream 
integration with suppliers, in 2002 the focus shifted downstream, into the market. The 
target included improvement in on-time delivery and reduced order fulfilment lead 
time for Nokia, and increased planning accuracy and lower inventory levels for the 
customers (Stanford case 2004).  
 
4.4.2.2 Manufacturing Capabilities 2001-2003 
 
At the beginning of 2000, the core areas in manufacturing development were the 
enhancement of manufacturing practices towards leaner manufacturing, better 
manufacturing integration to Demand Supply Network, and achieving generic capacity 
and ramp-up capabilities.  
 
Development of flexible and modular manufacturing concepts was seen as important 
towards the fast adaptation to the new business requirements. Instead of Design for 
Manufacturing more emphasis was placed on Design for Demand Supply Network 
and logistics capability. There was no major improvement in DFM metrics or in 
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 efficiency mainly due to the increasing complexity of the transceivers. Therefore, 
volume growth created a need for increased capacity. In addition, there were some 
indications that strong DFM rules were limiting the innovative designs and form 
factors required by the markets.  
 
In process design assembly-to-order (ATO) had become the critical capability to fulfil 
customer requirements and an increased number of product changes (i.e. the ability to 
customise products and sources to customer needs). ATO capability was 
systematically mentioned as one of the strongest enablers for increased flexibility.  
Even more flexibility was required from existing old production equipment but no 
new major investment in production technology was necessary. Ramp-up target for a 
new product was seven days or less, in best cases only 2-3 days. Improved test times 
were better than the competitors’, providing a competitive advantage. The 
harmonisation of processes and network of uniform manufacturing technology 
creating generic capacity became important.  
 
The manufacturing costs per phone metric became more critical since the high cost 
pressure continued, but it was not the primary driver in all business models. The 
slowdown of the growth also triggered development of new business models looking 
for growth opportunities and led to a more divergent product portfolio (the ability to 
support new businesses). Cost was extremely important but not for all business 
models. There were products in different phases of life cycles with different business 
models. For example, the N-Gage gaming device was in the early market and not so 
cost constrained, while low category basic mobile phones in main street business were 
very cost driven. The average price for Nokia had fallen from 152 euros in 2002 to 
130-133 euros in 2003. However, due to efficiency improvements, in 2003 Nokia still 
profited made a profit of 20-25% no each phone sold (Helsingin Sanomat 10.09.2003). 
In achieving better quality, the Manufacturing Failure Rate (MFR) and the Field 
Failure Rate (FFR) measures became even more important, since low yields create 
more rework, scrap, lost sales opportunity and high warranty costs. 
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 In the case study by Appelqvist and Vehtari (2003) the effects of new divergent 
manufacturing requirements were discussed in the scope of how to maintain 
operational efficiency. The current assembly-to-order (ATO) manufacturing concept is 
optimized for high-volume production of products in many variants, but with a small 
difference between different products and different variants. More diversified product 
portfolios are expected to require changes in manufacturing (i.e. the ability to support 
new businesses). The challenge lies in how to distinguish oneself from the competition 
and meet customer requirements, while at the same time achieving a clear cost benefit, 
i.e. providing value at the lowest cost. Customers enjoy low prices, but they also 
demand choice, even at the lower end of the market (Interviews).  
 
”Altogether, we were manufacturing four products at the time we moved 
to the new Salo Factory at the end of 1994. Now we operate on up to 
twenty products and their numerous variants simultaneously. Earlier the 
markets took what we had to offer, and everything was sold. Now we 
produce what our customers want,” Nokia manager explains. Fulfilling 
the customers’ needs is the key.” (OL Newsletter, Nokia) 
 
4.4.3 Competitive advantage in 2001-2003 
 
In the third era of 2001-2003 customer intimacy increased in significance to become 
the most important value proposition. Operational excellence still remained strong and 
providing value at the lowest cost possible became even more important than in the 
previous phase (the ability to profit in price competitive markets). Product leadership 
also remained strong in the form of design and product renewal. The readiness for 
sudden changes and lean processes helped the company slow down in 2001, since if a 
whole supply chain cannot be slowed down at the right time, all phases will build up 
with inventory. The key points were whole demand supply network orchestration, 
networking and speed.  
 
The economies of scale were also seen to create a competitive advantage in Demand 
Supply Network. The strategic focus areas were: fast adaptation to trade customer and 
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 consumer needs, global capacity management and manufacturing flexibility and 
scalability to business needs. Manufacturing flexibility and scalability were achieved 
through strategic outsourcing and a flexible workforce. According to Nokia’s top 
management manufacturing, logistics and sourcing is one of Nokia’s competitive 
advantages: Kallasvuo (2003) said cost leadership comes from design for 
manufacturability, sourcing, cost efficient in-house manufacturing and effective sales 
and distribution providing cost benefit of 25 % compared to competitors, while the 
interviews emphasised that Design for demand-supply network is the foundation for 
industry leading profits. Regarding in-house manufacturing one of the interviewed 
respondents said “this production machine cannot be built in the short term nor be 
easily outsourced because we would then lose the efficient production and especially 
good cooperation between product creation and production”. These comments were 
also supported by an AMR research report that names the top 25 companies 
embracing supply chain best practices and technologies - Nokia scored second best in 
the world (Reilly, K. (2004) AMR Research Supply Chain Top 25). 
 
According to Nokia Strategy 2004, the business drivers that manufacturing and 
demand supply network directly impacts are quality, customer satisfaction and cost 
pressure. Strong impact was also felt in the diverse product range with various 
business models, an increasing number of customer variants, smaller lot sizes and 
shorter lead times. However, during this period there was inefficiency in meeting all 
diverse customer requirements, although there was a strong focus in improving the 
customization capabilities (Nokia ATO meeting in Beijing 2003.) 
 
4.5 Synchronic and diachronic case analysis 
 
The synchronic and diachronic case analysis was based on the triple comparative 
design adapted from Barley (1990) (figure 11). A synchronic analysis is particularly 
useful for making statements about capability development and comparing how 
capabilities are developed within each phase of the life cycle. In each phase relevant 
capabilities and measures were identified according to the theoretical framework 
literature review explained in Chapter 2.4 (figure 9). The use of a clearly defined 
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 theoretical framework helped understand the changes in strategy and competitive 
priorities along the business life cycle, as well as how competitive priorities are linked 
to capabilities and performance. This improved the likelihood of an accurate and 
reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close fit to the data. Diachronic analysis helped 
to understand the capability and competitive advantage development over different life 
cycle phases and the chronological order of the events. Parallel analysis with 
comparison cases is explained in Chapter 5.  
 
4.5.1 Manufacturing capabilities  
 
The first research question was how do manufacturing capabilities and performance 
change in different phases of business life cycle? The case confirmed the assumptions 
made in the theoretical framework that manufacturing capabilities can be grouped by 
competitive priorities (price, flexibility, delivery, quality and service) and 
manufacturing performance can be grouped by time, quality and cost. On the other 
hand, capabilities are somewhat difficult to categorize, since they affect several 
competitive priorities at the same time and develop cumulatively. The summary of the 
main findings in each phase is presented in table 3. This table was built based on the 
case description, interviews and the strategy charting created during the case study (a 
more detailed table can be found in appendix D). The table was then compared to the 
summary table (table 2), based on the literature review. During the case analysis, the 
transition phases in particular, emerged as important phenomenon from introduction to 
growth and from growth to maturity.  
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 Table 3. Summary of the Nokia case (based on case description, interviews and strategy charting) 
Business Life cycle 
Phases 
Introduction 1992-1996  Growth 1997-2000 Maturity 2001-2003 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Product  
 
New paradigm –dominant 
design (hand portable GSM 
phones) 
Major product innovations 
Customization, Product 
segmentation  
 
Minor product innovations 
Different market segments with 
different business models  
 
Minor and major product 
innovations 
Volumes Low volume, but high growth High volume and high growth High volume, but slower 
growth 
VALUE PROPOSITIONS 
Value propositions Product Leadership 
(Technology leverage and 
integration, brand and end user 
recognition, product 
innovations) 
Operational Excellence 
(Superior product availability, 
efficient process, economies of 
scale, focus on supplier 
management) 
Product Leadership (Design and 
renewal of products) 
Customer intimacy (Focus on 
trade customer needs starts) 
Customer Intimacy (Total 
Product Offering, segments and 
tailored offering) 
Operational Excellence 
(Extreme cost – providing value 
at the lowest cost, able to 
differentiate) 
Product Leadership 
(Design still important) 
COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES 
Competitive 
priorities 
Flexibility Delivery, price, flexibility, 
quality 
 
Increased demand in price, 
flexibility, quality and delivery, 
additional services 
CAPABILITIES 
Main Mfg and DSN 
capabilities  
Ability to introduce new 
products -> Ability to shape up 
and grow fast 
 
 
Ability to delivery efficiently -> 
Ability to meet sudden changes, 
to slow down and ability to 
profit in price competitive 
markets 
 
Ability to profit in price 
competitive market -> Ability 
to support new businesses 
 
 
Mfg Process life 
cycle stage 
Disconnected line flow (batch) 
to connected line flow 
(assembly line) 
Assembly to Order partly 
implemented in factories 
globally 
Assembly to Order  
Innovations Major process innovations 
(Operational Innovation) 
Minor process innovations , 
focus in implementation 
(Continuous Improvement) 
Minor process innovations in 
manufacturing, some in DSN 
level (e.g. iHUB, clusters) 
(Continuous Improvement), 
Major process innovations still 
missing, but need identified 
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 Value propositions and competitive priorities 
 
 
Each phase had a main value proposition. In the introduction phase it was product 
leadership, in the growth phase it was the operational efficiency, and in the maturity 
phase it was customer intimacy. There were also supporting value propositions, 
particularly in the growth and maturity phases. In the maturity phase, the product 
range only became more diverse in the search for revenue growth. It seemed to agree 
more with Kaplan and Norton’s theory (2000) in that the other two were important as 
supporting value propositions (table 3 and figure 22) and not so much with Moore’s 
statement saying that two of the three value propositions were important in different 
stages.  
 
Competitive priorities in the first era (introduction) were mostly in the area of 
flexibility (e.g. the ability to introduce new products and increase volume) (Kim and 
Arnold 1992, Utterback and Abernathy 1975) (figure 23). Continuous improvement in 
other areas was important as well, but was not the major order-winning criteria. In the 
second era (growth), delivery and price were the main competitive priorities and 
therefore the new measures such as Days of Supply (DOS) and On Time Delivery 
(OTD) became important. The importance of flexibility grew (e.g. the ability to make 
rapid product mix changes and to offer wider product line together with high growing 
volumes) (Kim and Arnold 1992), but so did the ability to slow down, even more so. 
In the third era (maturity), in addition to previous competitive priorities, service 
increased in importance through the ability to customise products and services to 
customer needs (Kim and Arnold 1992). Price with cost and efficiency measures were 
even more important because of cost pressure from the mature markets. Quality 
seemed to always be more of an order qualifier than an order winner criterion, 
however continuous improvement was needed along the life cycle (interviews). 
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 • Increased demand on Price, 
Flexibility, Quality and Delivery
• Additional Services
• Price, Flexibility, Quality, Delivery• FlexibilityCompetitive priorities
• Customer Intimacy (Total Product 
Offering)
• Operational Excellence (Extreme
cost - providing value at the lowest
cost, Able to differentiate)
• Product Leadership ( Design still
important)
• Operational Excellence (Superior
product availability, Efficient
process, Economies of scale)
• Product Leadership (Design and 
renewal of products)
• Customer intimacy (Focus on trade
customer needs starts)
• Product Leadership (Technology
leverage and integration, Brand and 
end user recognition)
Value proposition
MaturityGrowthIntroductionBusiness Lifecycle
Phases
Each phase had main value proposition
Competitive priorities were cumulative
• need for flexibility, price, delivery and service increased in each phase
• also need for quality increased but more in the role of order qualifier
 
Figure 22. Value proposition and evolvement of competitive priorities in life cycle 
 
Capability development and transition phases 
 
 
The demand supply network and manufacturing capabilities developed over time 
before they fully started to contribute as value adding capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf 
2003) (see figure 23). However, in such a fast paced industry, a development period of 
five to ten years, as suggested by Hayes (1985), Hayes and Pisano (1994), Schroeder 
and Flynn (2001), is simply not feasible. The main capabilities found in each phase fit 
well under a certain topic. In the introduction phase the main capability topic was the 
ability to introduce new products, in the growth phase the main capability topic was 
the ability to deliver efficiently, and in the maturity phase it was extremely price 
driven, but capabilities also turned towards a greater ability to support new businesses 
and customer intimacy.  
 
A major new finding was the significance of the transition phases (figure 24). The 
finding was that capabilities development began in the previous phase before 
transferring to the next phase. It was interesting to see how the capabilities had already 
shifted during the phases, as shown in summary table 3. The first major process shape-
up began before the first transition period and eased the transition into high growth. 
The preparation of sudden changes and simplifying processes (lean processes) also 
occurred before the slow down actually took place. In the maturity phase there were 
no radical changes in processes, rather the change consisted more of incremental 
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 process improvements, as required by product diversification and segmentation. 
However, there were indications for a need of radical process improvement in order to 
keep up the market share or market share growth, or even entering the new S-curve, 
and to support new products and services. It is important, in developing the 
capabilities,   to understand that in their introduction and development phases they 
contribute as order winners. In their maturity phase, when competitors have the ability 
to catch up, capabilities change more into order qualifiers. Stalk (1988) emphasised: 
the competitive advantage is a constantly moving target and the most successful ones 
know how to keep moving and always stay on the cutting edge. Continuous 
improvement was mentioned, important in all phases, but its importance increased 
towards the maturity phase when cost pressure was more intense (figure 23). One 
should also note that the capability to introduce new products is quite different in the 
introduction phase than in the maturity phase. The introduction phase is more of a “job 
shop” work phase that forgives mistakes, while the maturity phase has huge volumes 
and a wide product range with very short life cycles.  
 
Continuous improvement was important in all phases, but its importance increased significantly 
towards maturity.
Capability A
Capability D
The new introduced
capabilities helped
through transition phases. 
Capability B
Capabilities provided 
biggest value and 
competitive advantage 
in the more mature phase. 
Capability C
Capabilities turned into 
order qualifiers, when 
competitors were able to 
catch up. 
Business Life Cycle
Capability Life Cycles
 
Figure 23. Capability life cycles and the their relationship to business life cycle 
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The main capabilities built over the years were either cross-functional or across 
companies. Figure 23 also indicates that the capabilities were built cumulatively and 
simultaneously, as suggested by Ferdow and Meyer 1990 and Roth and Miller 1992. 
In addition, they affected more than one area of competitive priorities (price, 
flexibility, delivery, quality and service). For example, design for manufacturing 
(DFM) and modular product structure were not just capabilities within the 
manufacturing function, but required capabilities built both in manufacturing and 
product creation. Integration of processes was a cross-functional exercise and 
extended over the demand supply processes and not just within manufacturing. The 
integration of processes and shape-up that took place in 1995-1997 could be 
categorized as operational innovation (Hammer 2004) (figure 24). A good example of 
capabilities across the companies was the improvement in sourcing process to ensure 
the availability of the components (interviews).  
 
 Manufacturing process life cycle stages and innovations 
 
 
The manufacturing process did not follow the classical stages of Hayes and 
Wheelwright’s (1979) model from one end to another (see figure 24). In the process 
development there was slight shifting from batch flow to connected flow when 
moving from the introduction phase to the maturity phase. The product in this case 
was a mobile phone, which evolved through a new paradigm to a dominant design. 
When the mobile phone products moved towards maturity, they started to have more 
customer specific variants and market segmentation. So the closer they reach the 
maturity phase, the greater the number of product types and variants only grew, as 
well as different services for customers. This required flexibility from the 
manufacturing system. Already in 1920, Sloan, the then-CEO of GM (General 
Motors), challenged Henry Ford with the idea that given alternatives, consumers 
would not prefer a uniform product. In Nokia the processes were planned to be 
flexible so as to facilitate the manufacturing of different products to customer orders 
already from the beginning of the introduction phase. Low price was not the main 
sales argument, but it was an important order qualifier. 
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 Even with many products and many variants, the differences between the products and 
variants were quite small, such as colour and software variants, during the growth 
phase. The product structure consisted of a common body (engine) along with 
interchangeable variable components (Salvador et al., 2002). These mainstream 
products were well supported with the assembly to order process and never reached 
the lower right hand corner in the product-process matrix (Appelqvist and Vehtari 
2004). However, there were indications that the setup was not ideal in the future for 
more complicated products based on new technologies or lowest cost, or more simple 
products. Making these products ATO-compatible has the danger of restricting 
innovativeness and design options, as was seen in the case company to a certain 
extent. The emerging, more diverse product groups would require different 
capabilities from each other and new ways of manufacturing, indicating a need for 
operational innovation (Appelqvist and Vehtari 2004). Furthermore, customisation of 
products was becoming more complicated and was assumed to require major process 
changes, figure 24.  
 
Minor and major product 
innovations
Minor process innovations
(Continuous improvement), Major 
process innovations still missing, 
butt need identified
• Minor product innovations
• Minor process innovations
(Continuos improvement)
• Major product innovations
• Major process innovations
(Operational innovation)
Innovations
Different market segments with 
different business models
Minor and major product 
innovations
Customization, Product 
segmentation
Minor product innovations
New paradigm – dominant design 
(handportable GSM phones)
Major product innovations
Product
Assembly to OrderAssembly to Order partlyDisconnected line flow (batch) to 
connected line flow (assembly line)
Process lifecycle stages
MaturityGrowthIntroductionBusiness Lifecycle
Phases
Need for customization increases
(Assembly to Order, Customization to Order)
Operational
Innovation
Operational
Innovation
Prepare for Changes
(Leanness, Strategic
Flexibility)
 
Figure 24. Product and process development 
 
As predicted, the manufacturing technology did not follow the life cycle model and 
did not show major changes over the period of 1993-2003. There was an initial 
introduction of new technologies during the product introduction, but over the years 
only incremental technology improvements occurred in manufacturing equipments. Of 
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 course, updating process equipment to newer versions improved process performance, 
but this was more of a steady, continuous improvement rather than a sudden change. 
The production technology development continues, since new products are introduced 
with new technologies. At Nokia, new product technologies and new production 
technologies are developed jointly. Nokia had plans for high volume automation but 
never realized them, since the flexibility of semi-automation and manual workforce 
proved to be more important in an environment where new products are constantly 
introduced with a high number of customer specific variants (Appelqvist and Vehtari 
2004). 
 
Innovations followed what Tushman and Nadler (1986) indicated: first, there is a 
substantial amount of product innovation that leads to the emergence of a dominant 
design. In the next stage, major product variation gives way to competition based on 
price, quality, and segmentation (i.e. process innovation rather than product 
innovation) (figure 24). Innovation is also a complex and uncertain endeavour, which 
shifts over time and requires the close collaboration of R&D, marketing, sales and 
production. 
 
4.5.2 Manufacturing and business performance 
 
There was evidence that manufacturing performance and business performance is 
connected, as indicated by the theoretical framework. The capabilities’ greatest impact 
on performance occurred during the ‘growth’ phase (see table 4).  
 
Most of the main performance measures in use today were introduced during the 
shape-up project in 1996. The performance metrics clearly show improvement in all 
areas (cost, time and quality) and were linked to business performance improvement. 
However, the direct link between individual competitive priorities and particular 
objectives was difficult to establish, since a higher emphasis on quality objectives 
does not necessary mean less emphasis on cost reduction (Kim and Arnold 1996). 
There was also no simple cause-effect relationship between single improvement 
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 programs (Meyer and Ferdows 1990) (table 4). Since the figures are weighted 
averages of regional figures, each individual factory may have behaved differently.  
 
The greatest improvements took place in the cost metrics of Days of Supply (DOS) 
and cost per phone. The deep cost performance improvement curves slowed down 
when volume growth slowed down. This was partly because, during the growth phase, 
economies of scale were achieved through volume growth and sufficient volume 
allowed costs to go down rapidly and then decline.  
 
“The massive production volume, well over 500,000 phones per 
workday, helped Nokia to enjoy economies of scale and substantial 
research and development (R&D) resources.” (Mawston 2003) 
 
This is in line with the Ketokivi and Heikkilä theory (2003), namely, that at the 
manufacturing level it is difficult to affect to scales benefits, since they are more 
company-level decision or environment-driven issues. But it can also be said that the 
largest gains occurred at the beginning of the introduction of new capabilities, such as 
better supply chain management and introduction of processes. Compared to the 
wireless OEM competitors, Nokia’s inventory days of supply were an industry 
benchmark (figure 25).  
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Figure 25. Inventory Days of Supply compared to competitors (quarterly reports) 
 
The time metrics On Time Delivery (OTD) indicated that the greatest improvements 
occurred in 1999-2001 when the slowdown had already started. At this point, the 
demand and delivery capacity began to be balanced, following a period of very high 
growth. During the high growth period customers were also used to supply shortages, 
but during the slowdown and faced with more severe competition this was no longer 
an acceptable situation.  
 
There were no common flexibility metrics available across factories or in the company 
operation and logistics scorecards, even though this was important from a competitive 
priority point of view. This confirmed the assumption made in the literature review 
that flexibility could be measured through cost and time (Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
Customers were also more interested in when they would obtain the product and the 
cost of the product rather than in internal flexibility measures. For example, mix 
flexibility was usually mentioned in that factories needed to have generic production 
lines for all products, but not as a specific measure of how many products per line. 
This was due to short product life cycles and frequent introduction of new products.  
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 As reported in the interviews and contained in internal documents, quality was valued 
in all stages of the life cycle but more as an order qualifier than as an order winner. 
According to the interviews, Nokia’s mindset was more on volume output and not 
primarily on quality. However there was continuous improvement in quality 
performance during the second and third phases. Unfortunately, detailed metrics of 
quality improvements for comparison from the first era and second were not available 
and are therefore excluded from table 4. In the maturity phase customers are 
requesting better quality and service. In this phase it is difficult to keep up with 
improvements in the metrics on account of the frequent new product introductions. It 
was seen that frequent ramp-ups with too immature products affected performance 
metrics. 
 
Table 4. Summary of main performance metrics 
Business Life cycle Phases 1996 1997-2000 2001-2003 
   Cost Metrics 
Total Inventory Days Of Supply 
(DOS)  
160->70 60->40 30-> 
Manufacturing cost per phone (€) 20 10 5 
Inventory carrying cost per phone 31.7 n/a 1.83 
Time Metrics 
On time delivery (OTD) to 1st 
confirm (% improved) 
n/a +10 % n/a 
On time delivery (OTD) to customer 
request (% improved) 
+25 % +20 % + 15 % 
 
 
The business performance measures show an improvement over the years and Nokia 
has been a strongly profitable company over the years, as previously discussed (table 
5). White (1996) proposes that the most direct relationships between manufacturing 
capabilities and business performance are through decreased cost and, consequently, 
higher profitability. This was highlighted by the case findings as well. The sales and 
the volume growth rate were high in both the introduction and growth phases, but not 
until the growth phase with large volumes, did it became a real challenge to increase 
these volumes (table 5). There were also some differences among sales areas and 
individual factories. 
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 Table 5. Summary of main business metrics 
 
Business Life cycle Phases 1992-1996 1997-2000 2001-2003 
Net sales (MEUR) ~600->3600 ~4650->21900 ~23200->23600 
Market share ~21% ~21->36% ~35->38% 
Profits (MEUR) 74->240 645->4879 4521->5483.00 
Volumes (Mpcs) ~2->40 ~40->130 ~140->180 
 
4.5.3 Competitive advantage  
 
The second research question was how manufacturing can provide a competitive 
advantage in different phases of business life cycle, and do those capabilities change 
along the life cycle? The case study confirmed that the company had experienced 
competitive advantage and manufacturing had contributed to the competitive 
advantage, as indicated in the theoretical framework. The check lists created in 
Chapter 2.4.2 enabled us to check whether or not the case company had actually 
experienced competitive advantage, what the role of manufacturing proving 
competitive advantage was and how sustainable it was.  
 
Manufacturing had a big impact from the competitive advantage point of view in the 
transition period (operational innovation), from introduction to growth by enabling 
cost efficient high growth. The second great impact was during the transition from 
growth to maturity (ready for sudden changes, lean and control), when it was essential 
to slow down the whole demand supply chain. The next transition had already started 
and it seemed that manufacturing and demand supply network would have a strong 
role (operational innovation) there as well as provide capabilities for new types of 
products and customer services, in search for the revenue growth.  
 
However, it was not manufacturing alone, but rather how integrated processes aligned 
with value proposition of the company. As the value propositions shifted their order of 
importance as well as competitive priorities, so did the need for new capabilities to 
provide competitive advantage. When competitors started catching up, on 
manufacturability and cost efficiency, for example, a stronger need for customisation 
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 and services emerged. Consequently, the internal strategy documents, the interviews 
and the external analysis highlight the importance of a three-dimensional competitive 
advantage, being Brand – Design – and efficient Demand Supply Network.  
 
“The design of the phone (3650) is very clean with considerable 
attention to ease of manufacture.  We believe that Nokia's attention to 
design and manufacturing detail is a key to its ability to maintain market 
leading handset-operating margins above 20%. We also note Nokia's 
fast follower strategy and exceptional brand identity.  When this is 
combined with the company's design methodology, we believe it leaves 
Nokia in a unique position of offering high end features at mass market 
price points without endangering margin.” (CIBC World Markets, 
Equity Research, Nokia Corporation Nokia 3650 Handset Analysis, 
February 28, 2003) 
 
“Nokia was a trendsetter in the design and renewal of the products, 
which was seen as important as production efficiency.” (Häikiö 2001) 
 
Nokia’s competitive advantage 
 
The company’s profitability was above the industry average. The company also 
achieved the market leader position during the high growth period, and value towards 
the customer was high. However, it is worth mentioning that a company can have 
great market share without profitability, but in this case both market share and long-
term profitability were achieved (see table 5). 
 
Strategic role of manufacturing 
 
Nokia’s demand supply network and manufacturing structure had evolved from 
functional to the integrated process enabling good capacity utilization in the engine 
manufacturing and responsive final assembly to a customer order. Furthermore, the 
role of DFM (the ability to introduce new products and ability to profit in price 
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 competitive market) and modular product structure that enabled the assembly to order 
process (ability to deliver efficiently) were of key importance.  
 
The alignment of manufacturing capabilities and the company’s value proposition and 
corporate strategy was high. The capability development was proactive, particularly in 
the introduction and growth phases. In the introduction phase, manufacturing had a 
role in the ability to manufacture new products, and in the growth phase it was the 
ability to deliver efficiently. However, in the maturity phase, Nokia also suffered from 
a loss of product and design leadership, particularly on the North American markets. 
Nokia’s design leader position was lost in approximately 2000, when competitors 
were able to produce innovative product designs. It was mentioned that strong 
standardization of the manufacturing process and design for manufacturing rules were 
preventing the implementation of new innovative designs. So, in the maturity phase 
there could have been a more proactive role in manufacturing capability development. 
The company was also able to respond quickly during the transition phases and 
capability development was cumulative and simultaneous. There is evidence that 
Nokia was a leader in bringing in new capabilities prior to its competitors, design for 
manufacturing (DFM) capability is one such example (Interviews, Ericsson Case).  
 
Manufacturing highly impacted business performance with a higher level of internal 
and external collaboration and through a modular product, by reducing its 
manufacturing costs and inventory levels while improving operational efficiencies 
across its supply chain, thus also benefiting its customers and suppliers (Stanford case 
2004). The competitive advantage created by the demand supply network can be 
highlighted by the following: ten days of inventories equals to 1 % in profit and that 
inventory carrying cost has decreased 94 % from 1995 to 2003 (Nokia). Therefore, 
inventory management has had a significant impact on the end result. Profitability 
with material costs account for 80% of the total cost of goods sold, and any 
improvement in inventory management and purchasing cost has also had a significant 
impact on the end result (Stanford case 2004).  
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 According to the Stanford case (2004), keeping production mainly in-house and using 
outsourcing only to balance volume fluctuations, has allowed Nokia to retain control 
of key operations and minimize the risk of loosing key secrets, skills, or technology. 
Even though growth slowed down, the break for growth was done at the correct time; 
preparation for sudden changes, such as slowdown, had already started in 1999 
(strategy material and interviews). The collaborative initiatives have also provided 
value to Nokia’s business partners (interviews). Nokia’s firm control of the key 
operations and collaborative initiatives were different from the case illustrated by 
Cisco during the industry downturn.  
 
Sustainability of competitive advantage  
 
The analysis shows that sustainability of the competitive advantage is low, which is an 
indication of the high clockspeed and instability of the industry. This confirms that 
sustainability of competitive advantage is highly dependent on the business 
environment in which the company operates. The entry of new competitors was high 
during the first phase, less during the high growth phase, but increased again during 
the maturity phase. The threat of substitutes was not very high during the growth 
phases but increased during the maturity phase. The bargaining power of the company 
improved while volumes grew. Competition in this highly volatile environment was 
high throughout all the phases, although the company’s size enabled it to overshadow 
smaller competitors in the market and ensured the economies of scale.  
 
4.5.4 Life cycle model for capability development 
 
The research questions to be answered were how do manufacturing capabilities and 
performance change in different phases of business life cycle, and how can 
manufacturing provide a competitive advantage in the different phases of business life 
cycle. As it was defined earlier, a theory denotes a set of constructs that are 
systematically interrelated through statements of relationships to form a theoretical 
framework that explains some relevant phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The 
case confirmed that requirements (i.e. competitive priorities) for manufacturing 
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 capabilities change along the business life cycle and therefore, it can be used as tool to 
predict needed change in capability development (table 6). 
 
Manufacturing can provide a competitive advantage if alignment between the 
manufacturing capabilities, the corporate strategy and the customer’s value 
proposition is high and the capabilities development is proactive, which results in 
manufacturing performance’s high impact on business performance. A company has a 
competitive advantage if profitability (relative position) is above the industry average 
and its market share and value to customer is high. The sustainability of competitive 
advantage can be improved by preventing the entry of new competitors, reducing the 
threat of substitutes, improving the bargaining power of buyers, lowering the 
bargaining power of suppliers and reducing rivalry among existing competitors. 
 
Changing capabilities 
 
Capabilities that provide competitive advantage change in the different phases of life 
cycle and, moreover, manufacturing needs to follow the requirements set by value 
propositions in order to provide a competitive advantage. The main value propositions 
seem to follow the order from product leadership to operational excellence and then 
towards customer intimacy. However, the competitive priorities were cumulative and 
the requirements towards the maturity phase were increasing (table 6).  
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 Table 6. Life cycle model for capability development 
Ability to profit 
in price 
competitive 
market 
Ability to 
customize
products and 
services to 
customer
needs
”Continuous
Improvement”
Increased 
demand on 
price, 
flexibility, 
quality and 
delivery, 
Additional 
services
Customer
intimacy
Maturity
Ability to support
new businesses
”Operational
innovation”
Increased demand 
on price, 
flexibility, quality 
and delivery, 
Additional 
services
Customer
intimacy
Transition phase 3 
(from maturity to 
growth)
Price, flexibilityDelivery, price, 
flexibility, 
quality
DeliveryFlexibilityMain 
competitive
priorities
Ability to sudden
changes, to slow
down
”Strategic 
Flexibility”
Ability to 
deliver
efficiently in 
volumes
”Continuous
Improvement”
Ability to shape
up and grow fast
”Operational
innovation”
Ability to 
introduce new 
products
”Continuous
Improvement”
Main 
capabilities
Operational
excellence
Operational
excellence
Product 
leadership
Product 
leadership
Main value
proposition
Transition phase 2 
(from growth to 
maturity)
GrowthTransition phase 1 
(from
introduction to 
growth)
IntroductionBusiness 
lifecycle phases
 
 
Transition phases 
 
One of the main findings of the case study was that not only do the different life cycle 
phases matter, but even more critical to the company’s success is the management of 
transition phases (table 6). In the transition phase it was critical to adapt the changes in 
the business proactively. Being proactive required that the needed capabilities already 
existed at least in their introduction phase. Capability development needs to be 
initiated in the previous phase in order for it to assist the company through the 
transition period successfully and provide a competitive advantage in the next phase. 
The capability will become more of an order qualifier than an order winner when it 
reaches maturity in its own life cycle and competition catches up.  
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 Operational innovation, strategic flexibility and continuous improvement 
 
New constructs, operational innovation, strategic flexibility and continuous 
improvement became very relevant for the study throughout the research process. The 
model indicates that operational innovation (Hammer 2004) is needed prior to entering 
transition phases from introduction to growth, while continuous operational 
improvement is needed along all the life cycle phases in order to keep up with the 
competition. There were indications that the new operational innovation would be 
required to enter into a new growth period provided by new diverse business 
requirements. The transition from growth to maturity gives the company an advantage 
if it is strategically prepared for change and has strategic flexibility. Being prepared 
for sudden changes also translated into lean growth and organisation at the end of the 
growth period, as well as targeting the next lower price point (Moore 1998).  
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 5 PARALLEL CASES 
 
Three comparison cases are presented here to compare the findings from the Nokia 
case. The case of Cisco will highlight the importance of being prepared for sudden 
changes in transition from growth to maturity. The case of Dell will highlight the 
importance of manufacturing supporting the business model and the leanness of the 
organisation. The case of SonyEricsson will highlight the importance of proactive 
capability development.  Chapter 5.4 presents the summary and the findings that were 
used to update the life cycle model in Chapter 5.5.  
 
5.1 Cisco 
 
5.1.1 Introduction of Cisco 
 
Cisco Systems, Inc. is the worldwide leader in Internet networking. Cisco Internet 
Protocol (IP)-based networking solutions are the foundation of the Internet and most 
corporate, education, and government networks around the world. Cisco provides a 
broad line of solutions for transporting data, voice, and video within buildings, across 
campuses, and around the world. Cisco was founded in 1984 by a group of computer 
scientists from Stanford University. Since the company's inception, Cisco engineers 
have been prominent in advancing the development of IP—the basic language for 
communicating over the Internet and in private networks. These technologies include 
advanced routing and switching, data, voice, and video over IP, optical networking, 
wireless, storage networking, security, broadband, and content networking (Nokia 
Annual Report 2001). Similarly to Nokia, Cisco highlighted in the mid-1990s the 
technological leadership of its products and worldwide brand awareness (Nokia 
Annual report 1997). In addition to technology and product leadership, Cisco is 
mentioned as an innovator in how business is conducted. Cisco was among the first 
companies to use the Internet to communicate with suppliers and customers, automate 
work flows among trading partners, and to use solutions such as remote product 
testing, which allowed suppliers to deliver quality results with minimal manual input. 
Cisco has outsourced the manufacturing of most of its networking products, but works 
closely with contract manufacturers to select the right locations to support its needs. 
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 Cisco highlighted its development of a virtual supply chain with limitless capacity and 
its ability to provide extraordinarily high reliability to its customers (Cisco annual 
reports 2000 and 2001). This emphasises that Cisco considers its management 
strategic, even though manufacturing is outsourced. 
 
“By implementing its own virtual supply chain, Cisco reduced inventory 
levels by 45 percent over the past six years and decreased the time to 
market for its products by as much as 12 weeks. “Virtual 
manufacturing” saves Cisco upward of $175 million in annual operating 
costs. Cisco will also provide networking products in a quick-start kit for 
suppliers to give component makers immediate and secure access to the 
site.” (Cisco’s Annual report 2004) 
 
On the other hand, figure 26 illustrates the inventory days of supply benchmark in 
infrastructure OEMS, where Cisco is higher in days of supply than Nokia.  
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Figure 26. Cisco's inventory Days of Supply compared to Nokia (quarterly reports) 
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 5.1.2 Growth of Cisco 
 
Cisco’s net sales and net income over the years from 1994 to 2001 shows a high 
growth rate similar to Nokia’s during the period of 1996-2000, figure 27. By the end 
of 2000, the telecommunications infrastructure experienced a severe downturn, when 
customer orders began to dry up and Cisco neglected to turn off its supply chain. 
When compared to Nokia, Cisco experienced a huge drop in net income and recorded 
losses during 2001. Luckily, Cisco’s virtual networking and outsourcing of 
manufacturing was able to recover quickly and resumed gaining profits again from 
2002 onwards.  
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Growth phase 1 Growth phase 2 Growth phase 3
Cisco 1993-1994 1995-2000 2001-2003
Compound Annual Growth Rate of sales 12 43 0
Compound Annual Growth Rate of profit 30 32 86
Average annual growth rate of sales 25 66 5
Average annual growth rate of profit 70 43 66  
Figure 27. Cisco's net sales and net income (Cisco’s annual reports) 
 
The Harvard Business Review (2004) analysed why Cisco was forced to write off 
$2.25 billion in inventory. There were several factors at play, but the main culprit was 
the misalignment of Cisco’s interests with those of its contract manufacturers. The 
contractors accumulated a large amount of inventory for months without factoring in 
the demand for Cisco’s products. Even with the US economy slowdown, contractors 
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 continued to produce and store inventory at the same pace. Finally, Cisco found it 
could not use most of the inventory of raw materials because demand had fallen 
sharply. The company had to sell the raw materials off as scrap (Harvard Business 
Review 2004).   
 
Cisco ended up with a mountain of subassembly boards and semiconductors it did not 
need due to its supply chain partners’ behaviour over the previous 18 months. Cisco 
does not own production facilities, so it passes orders to contracted manufacturers.  
These contractors had stockpiled semi-finished products because demand for Cisco’s 
products usually exceeded supply. They had an incentive to build buffer stocks since 
Cisco rewarded them when they delivered supplies quickly (Narayanan and Raman 
2004). Many contractors also boosted their profit margins by buying large volumes 
from component suppliers at prices lower than that Cisco had negotiated. Since the 
contractors and component makers had everything to gain and nothing to lose by 
building up excess inventory, they worked overtime to do so without worrying about 
Cisco’s real needs. When demand declined in the first half of the fiscal year 2000, 
Cisco found that it could not cut off supplies quickly. Moreover, it was not clear what 
Cisco had asked its suppliers to produce and what the contractors had manufactured in 
anticipation of Cisco’s orders. Many contractors maintained that Cisco had implicitly 
assured them it would buy everything they could produce. Since Cisco hadn’t 
stipulated the responsibilities and the accountability of its contractors and component 
suppliers, much of the excess inventory ended up in its warehouses. The supply chain 
imploded because Cisco’s partners acted in ways that were not in the best interests of 
the whole supply chain (Narayanan and Raman 2004). Cisco was blind sighted to the 
possibility that demand might not continue and was not able to scale down as quickly 
as expected. Apparently Cisco had outsourced manufacturing of its essential 
components without a full understanding of the changes required in their business 
model (Lakenan et al. 2001). What they lacked was the ability to react quickly to 
sudden changes in the business environment. Cross-company problems were more 
difficult to detect and incentives were not well aligned (Narayanan and Raman 2004).   
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 In 2001 Cisco emphasised moving forward with more focus on customers’ needs, 
market-share gains and growth opportunities in emerging markets as well as profit 
contribution. As examples of two new growth markets Cisco mentions the IP 
telephony and security markets (Cisco annual Report 2001, 2004). Cisco saw that its 
customers’ needs changed hence it must move beyond reactive maintenance services 
and more toward advanced services, such as network optimization (Rossman 2004). 
 
5.1.3 Cisco’s capabilities 
 
In the introduction phase the ability to introduce new products and technologies was 
also Cisco’s main focus. In the early 1990s, the problem Cisco faced in its supply 
chain was scaling up manufacturing operations in times of massive technology and 
market change. The market was growing very rapidly and Cisco wanted to move to a 
Build to Order model for customers and developed its virtual factory network. Cisco’s 
supply chain initiatives allowed the company to scale manufacturing operations cost 
effectively while constantly raising its levels of quality. The Internet and networked 
applications allowed customers and employees easy access to self-service, users to 
configure (price and route) and submit electronic orders directly to Cisco 
(www.oit.umd.edu, www.cisco.com). In the transition phase from high growth to slow 
down Cisco missed the ability to face sudden changes, but fortunately it was able to 
recover quickly (table 7). 
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Table 7. Cisco main capabilities in different life cycle phases 
Business life 
cycle phases 
Introduction Transition phase 
1 (from 
introduction to 
growth) 
Growth Transition phase 2 
(from growth to 
maturity) 
Maturity Transition phase 
3 (from maturity 
to growth) 
Main value 
proposition 
Product / 
Technology 
leadership 
Product / 
Technology 
leadership 
Operational 
excellence 
Operational 
excellence 
Customer 
Intimacy 
--- 
Main 
competitive 
priorities 
Flexibility Delivery, 
Flexibility 
Delivery, 
price, 
flexibility, 
quality  
--- Delivery, 
price, 
flexibility, 
quality, 
additional 
services 
--- 
Main 
capabilities 
Ability to 
introduce 
new 
products 
and 
technologies 
Ability to grow 
fast, ability to 
configure 
products to order 
Ability to 
deliver 
efficiently 
(virtual 
factory) 
 
Missed ability to 
face sudden 
changes, to slow 
down 
Ability to 
recover 
fast, ability 
to offer 
more 
advanced 
services 
---- 
 
 
5.2 Dell 
5.2.1 Introduction of Dell 
 
Michael Dell founded Dell in 1984 on the simple concept of selling computer systems 
directly to customers. According to Dell, they could best understand customer needs 
and efficiently provide the most effective computing solutions to meet those needs. 
Revenue totalled $49.2 billion and the company employed approximately 55 000 team 
members around the globe in 2005. Dell’s product line includes desktop computers, 
notebook computers, network servers, workstations, and storage products 
(www.dell.com). 
 
The company manufactures its computer systems in six locations: Austin, Texas; 
Nashville, Tennessee, Eldorado do Sul, Brazil (Americas); Limerick, Ireland (Europe, 
Middle East and Africa); Penang, Malaysia (Asia Pacific and Japan) and Xiamen, 
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 China (China). Dell sells its products and services worldwide. Dell has Sales Offices 
in over 40 countries, distributors in 190 countries and 46,000 employees worldwide.  
 
Much of Dell’s good financial performance is said be attributed to its successful 
implementation of this direct-sales model (Kapuscinski et al. 2004). Dell’s direct 
model enables the company to excel at demand management. The process of selling 
directly to customers and building product to order creates opportunities for true real-
time collaboration and synchronization between manufacturing and sales. By being in 
direct contact with the market, Dell can quickly identify changes in customer demand. 
Synchronization (along with the recent shift to a seven-day-a-week operation) then 
allows Dell to respond faster to customer demand than its competitors can. 
Additionally, internal collaboration allows for highly accurate forecasts (Fugate and 
Mentzer 2004).  
 
The ability to adapt quickly to changes in demands is crucial to a good demand 
management (Fugate and Mentzer 2004). Dell is well known for having a unique 
corporate culture that complements its aggressive approach to innovations and new 
ideas. In fact, the company has what has been billed as a “maniacal approach towards 
execution”. The ability to remain flexible is a critical skill for fitting into this culture. 
According to Fugate and Mentzer (2004), the Dell management team’s speed of 
execution is a result of the team members’ flexibility and ability to make fast 
decisions. In the Harvard Business Review interview (Magretta 1998), Michael Dell 
also mentions that: 
  
“… Looking for value shifts is probably the most important dimension of 
leadership… “ 
 
Other more traditional PC manufacturers have been locked into their more traditional 
channel and distribution strategies and are unable to transform. The five tenets of the 
Dell model are (www.dell.com): Most efficient path to the customer, single point of 
accountability, build-to-order, low-cost leader and standard-based technology. 
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 Figure 28 shows the superiority of Dell’s Inventory Days of Supply when 
benchmarked against competitors and Nokia. Dell’s operating expense ratio to sales is 
less than 10 percent whereas most of the competitors' is over 20 percent (Dell 2002). 
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Figure 28. Dell’s inventory Days of Supply compared to Nokia and HP (quarterly reports) 
 
5.2.2 Growth of Dell 
 
Similarly to Nokia and Cisco, Dell has clearly experienced three different life cycle 
phases from introduction to high growth and to maturity, but has also increased its net 
sales well into the maturity phase (see figure 29 for Dell’s sales and profit growth in 
years 1992-2004). The figures for the years 1984-1992 were not significant for the 
analysis of this growth. Despite the 2002 “hiccup”, Dell’s business life cycle does not 
show any signs of slowing down nor does it indicate the slow growth typical in a 
saturated market. However, the overall market has profit margins of 10 percent and 
computers are considered as commodity products, which is typical in the maturity 
phase.  
 
 114
 Dell
-5000.00
0.00
5000.00
10000.00
15000.00
20000.00
25000.00
30000.00
35000.00
40000.00
45000.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
Net sales (MUSD)
Net income (MEUR)
Profit of netsales (%)
 
 
Growth phase 1 Growth phase 2 Growth phase 3
Dell 1993-1995 1996-2001 2002-2004
Compound Annual Growth Rate of sales 20 43 10
Compound Annual Growth Rater of profit 14 59 16
Average annual growth rate of sales 22 45 9
Average annual growth rate of profit 23 77 11  
Figure 29. Dell growth phases (www.dell.com) 
 
First growth phase 1984-1996 
 
When Michael Dell founded the Dell Computer Corporation in 1984, he had a simple 
business idea of selling directly to customers and building products to order. This 
direct business model gave Dell Computer Corporation a substantial cost advantage 
(Magretta 1998). As a small start-up Dell couldn't afford to create every piece of the 
value chain, but focused on where it was able to add value. Dell also talks about 
virtual integration and blurring the traditional boundaries and roles in the value chain 
(Magretta 1998). 
 
In 1990 the manufacturing centre in Limerick, Ireland, opened to serve the European, 
Middle Eastern and African markets. In 1993 Dell joined the ranks of the top-five 
computer system makers worldwide (www.dell.com). However, in 1993 Dell 
Computer Corporation also reported a stunning setback in its notebook-computer 
operations and an unexpected drop of more than 48 percent in its first-quarter profits 
(Hayes 1993). One of the business mistakes Dell made was entering the retail channel 
in the early 1990s. They took products into computer superstores, because they saw 
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 this as a hybrid of the traditional computer store and Dell’s direct model. However, 
this move was incredibly confusing for the organisation. Although retail appeared to 
be a way to obtain incremental revenue, it turned out to be unprofitable. Michael Dell 
said: “We evaluated the decision, agreed that it was a bad idea, and closed down those 
operations. We learned from that and moved on” (www.dell.com). 
 
In 1994, Dell was still a struggling second-tier PC maker. Like other PC makers, Dell 
ordered its components in advance and carried a large amount of component 
inventory. If its forecasts were wrong, Dell would experience major write-downs. 
Then Dell began to implement a new business model. Its operations had always 
featured a build-to-order process with direct sales to customers, but Dell took a series 
of ingenious steps to eliminate its inventories. The results were spectacular. Over a 
four-year period, Dell's revenues grew from $2 billion to $16 billion, a 50 percent 
annual growth rate. Earnings per share were increased by 62 percent per year. Dell's 
stock price increased over 17,000 percent in a little over eight years (Byrnes 2003). 
 
Second growth phase 1996-2001 
 
In his article Byrnes (2003) explains how the new Dell business model developed over 
a period of time. Profitability management, coordinating a company's day-to-day 
activities through careful forethought and excellent management were at the core of 
Dell's transformation in this critical period. Dell created a tightly aligned business 
model that enabled it to manage away the need for its component inventories. Not 
only was capital not needed, the change also generated enormous amounts of cash that 
Dell used to fuel its growth. Dell also led the commercial migration to the Internet, 
launching www.dell.com in 1994 and adding e-commerce capability in 1996. The 
following year, Dell became the first company to record $1 million in daily online 
sales. Today, Dell operates one of the highest volume Internet commerce sites in the 
world (www.dell.com).  
 
The new business model was phased in, with component inventory dropping from 
seventy days to thirty to forty days, then to twenty days, then to nearly zero. At the 
same time, the sales force was trained to “sell what you have.” As the new 
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 profitability management system emerged and proved viable, Dell moved aggressively 
to refine it and to bring the other functional activities into tight alignment. (Byrnes 
2003). Dell used the freed-up cash to fuel its growth, chiefly in major corporate 
accounts. In order to win this business from the resellers, Dell had to convince the 
accounts that its products were of comparable quality, and that it could meet the 
necessary service and the delivery requirements. It was widely thought that Dell's 
build-to-order model could not meet delivery requirements of major accounts. Once 
Dell demonstrated that it could build to specific customer orders and meet delivery 
and quality requirements, growth followed. This dynamic enabled Dell to catapult to 
first-tier status. (Byrnes 2003). 
 
In 1997 Dell shipped its 10-millionth computer system. In 1998, Dell's return on 
invested capital was 217 percent, and the company had $1.8 billion in cash (Byrnes 
2003). That same year the company expanded manufacturing facilities in the Americas 
and Europe, and opened a production and customer centre in Xiamen, China. In 1999 
Dell opened a second major U.S. location in Nashville, Tennessee (www.dell.com).  
 
According to Byrnes (2003), as inventory dropped, lead time performance improved. 
The reason was that Dell was not simply carrying component inventory against 
forecasted sales, but rather was aligning inventory and sales, managing profitability on 
a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. Secondly, as inventory disappeared, the company's 
returns grew disproportionately. Not only did Dell avoid carrying costs and obsolete 
stock, but it was also saving enormous amounts of money on purchasing components 
because the component prices were dropping 3 percent per month (Byrnes 2003). 
 
Third growth phase 2001-2004 
 
In 2001, for the first time, Dell ranked number one in global market share 
(www.dell.com). Even at the desktop computer level (which most people would 
consider a commodity), Dell actually has quite a profitable business in the 
manufacturing of such commodity products, because of being the low-cost provider 
(www.dell.com). 
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 Though the computer hardware industry was once booming, in recent years the 
industry has experienced a decrease in profits. Much of this is due to the downturn in 
the economy and decreased consumer confidence and spending. The decrease in 
profits also mirrors the consumer’s decreased need to upgrade. The technology 
provided by computers is not growing at the rate tit once was, which means that 
consumers can continue to use older computers to meet their needs. In 2005 “Dell’s 
efforts remain focused on four strategic initiatives: driving global growth, attaining 
product leadership, continuously improving the customer experience and enhancing 
Dell’s winning culture” (www.dell.com). 
 
Based on the Michael Dell interviews over the last 10 years, we see that Dell’s 
business has become much broader, growing from PCs to mobility products to servers, 
storage, and services that are used in the IT world. As the prices of computing systems 
continue to decrease, there are emerging markets around the world that will be able to 
afford technology that they once couldn’t. China and India are both fast growing 
markets for Dell and overall, there is enormous market potential over the next five to 
ten years (Michael Dell Remarks, Round Rock, Texas, in February 2005). The 
differentiation in products is not tremendously significant from one to another. “There 
are bigger differences in the business model and service levels, and in the profit Dell is 
able to generate”, Michael Dell remarked in 2005. 
 
“I believe the most important factor has been our business model. The 
way we provide our products and services to our customers is radically 
different from competitors. We’ve been able to expand that across a 
broadening array of products and services and geographies – while 
continuing to deliver superior value to customers. This has allowed us to 
grow and return healthy profits to our shareholders at the same time.” 
(Michael Dell Remarks, Round Rock, Texas, February 2005) 
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5.2.3 Dell’s capabilities 
 
It is said that Dell’s success comes from continuous innovation and improvement of 
its direct marketing formula, as well as the use of the Internet and build-to-order 
manufacturing (Maglitta 1997). Build-to-order means that Dell does not maintain 
months of aging or expensive inventory. They provide customers with exactly what 
they want in their computer systems through easy custom configuration and ordering.  
As a result, they are able to provide customers with good pricing and the latest 
technology for those features they really desire. Each assembled computer receives 
customer address at the end of the assembly line. Customer fulfilment is 2 – 5 days 
from customer order placement with more than 50% of these orders being placed in 
the Web (www.dell.com). Since the introduction phase, Dells’ targets were efficient 
delivery, build-to-order, and low cost, based on standard-based technology. This was 
different from the more product and technology leadership approach of Nokia and 
Cisco in the introduction phase. It seemed that Dell’s main value proposition was 
customer intimacy throughout all phases. But operational excellence was as important 
in supporting the business model and in the growth phase. In the competitive priorities 
(delivery, flexibility, price) there also seemed to be no significant shifts. But a shape-
up of the business model and the build-to-order model was required in order to 
achieve high growth and profitability (table 8). The Dell case also highlights the 
importance of the ability to make fast decisions. In their search for new growth Dell 
highlighted the importance of low cost and ability to support emerging markets and 
different service levels.  
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Table 8.  Dell main capabilities in different life cycle phases 
Business life 
cycle phases 
Introduction Transition phase 
1 (from 
introduction to 
growth) 
Growth Transition phase 2 
(from growth to 
maturity) 
Maturity Transition phase 
3 (from 
maturity to 
growth) 
Main value 
proposition 
Customer 
intimacy 
Customer 
intimacy & 
Operational 
excellence 
Customer 
intimacy & 
Operational 
excellence 
Customer intimacy Customer 
intimacy 
Customer 
intimacy 
Main 
competitive 
priorities 
Flexibility Delivery, 
flexibility, price 
Delivery, 
price, 
flexibility 
Not known Delivery, 
flexibility, 
price 
Delivery, 
flexibility, price 
services 
Main 
capabilities 
Ability to 
build to 
order 
Ability to shape-
up and grow fast 
(Dell Model) 
Ability to 
deliver 
efficiently 
configurable 
products,  
Ability to 
profit in 
price 
competitive 
market 
Speed of 
execution, ability 
to make fast 
decisions 
Ability to 
deliver 
efficiently 
configurable 
products 
 
Ability to 
profit in 
price 
competitive 
market  
Ability to 
support new 
emerging 
markets (low  
cost) and 
different service 
levels  
 
 
5.3 SonyEricsson 
 
In their article, Comstock et al. (2004) discussed the flexibility and speed of 
Ericsson’s operation (later combined to SonyEricsson). In the early 1990s Ericsson 
was one of the leaders in the mobile telephone market, based largely on its ability to 
design and produce some of the most technologically advanced mobile phones in the 
world (see figure 13). Nokia soon became the market world leader and in 2000 
Ericsson had dropped to the world’s fourth largest provider of mobile handsets, with a 
10% share of the overall market (Ericsson 2000). Nokia had, at the time, introduced a 
popular series of customized mobile telephones at the entry-level market segment. 
Ericsson decided to react with a similar product. The new telephone achieved only 
limited success in the marketplace, with sales far below expectations. One likely 
 120
 contributing factor to the new mobile phone’s poor market reception was its long-
delayed introduction on the market; in fact, while new to the Ericsson’s product line, 
the user-changeable covers concept had been introduced by its primary competitor, 
Nokia, approximately two years earlier (Comstock and Johansen 2001, Comstock et 
al. 2004).  
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Figure 30. Ericsson Consumer Product’s net sales and operating income 1998-2000 
(www.ericsson.com) 
 
From 1998 to 2000 Ericsson’s net sales grew from 45.2 billion SEK to 56.3 billion 
SEK (figure 30). The sales growth was 21 percent in 2000. Nevertheless, the operating 
income turned into losses in 2000. From 1998 to 2000, the amount of its employees 
increased by approximately 19 percent. At Nokia, the amount of growth in personnel 
between 1998 and 2000 was 50 percent, but sales growth was an enormous 66 percent. 
In comparison, Nokia’s sale was 0.8 MEUR/person, whereas Ericsson’s sale was 0.37 
MEUR/person (at the then current exchange rate) in 2000. Consequently, from 2001 
onwards, the Ericsson mobile phone business was integrated with Sony, forming a unit 
called SonyEricsson. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the level of automation in the company’s mobile phone final 
assembly in high labour cost countries, such as Sweden and the United States, had 
peaked. At these locations, nearly all of the final assembly and testing processes, with 
the exception of the packing, were automated (Comstock et al. 2004). In countries 
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 with lower labour costs the final assembly process remained largely manual. During 
2001 the company decided to outsource its complete manufacturing function, which 
signalled a trend backwards to manual assembly. With an external assembler, it is 
expected that the manufacturing of mobile phones will shift towards low-wage 
countries, where final assembly is primarily a manual process. This was different from 
Nokia’s strategy, where production flexibility was seen as more important than the 
cost savings generated from an automated assembly (interviews). At Nokia, even in 
high wage countries such as Finland, United States and Germany manufacturing was 
kept in-house and was done mainly manually in order to achieve the needed 
flexibility.  
 
5.4 Summary of parallel case analysis and findings 
  
The cases of Cisco and Dell similarly followed the Nokia case and supported the 
viability of the life cycle model for capability development, presented in Chapter 4 
(table 6). The case of SonyEricsson also supports the findings of how important it is to 
proactively develop capabilities. All cases demonstrated a shifting in value 
propositions and capabilities along the business life cycle. In the cases of Cisco and 
Dell exact competitive priorities and capabilities with development starting times 
were, of course, difficult to estimate, since there was no access to internal strategy 
documents or internal performance measures. But some shifting in competitive 
priorities and capabilities could be estimated based on the existing literature and the 
company web sites. Also, in the cases of Cisco and Dell, there was no access to future 
strategic goals and plans, which made it difficult to validate the transition phase from 
maturity to new growth. In the case of SonyEricsson only a snap shot of one phase 
was investigated.  
 
The value propositions clearly shifted in the case of Nokia and Cisco from product 
leadership, through operational excellence towards customer intimacy. Dell’s main 
value propositions were, since the beginning, customer intimacy combined with 
operational excellence, although some shifting was seen over the business life cycle 
towards more intimacy and the need for more diversified services. Nokia and Cisco 
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 presented more clearly the need for shifting capabilities than did Dell. This supports 
the idea that when value proposition changes the capabilities need to be aligned 
accordingly. In Dell’s case the ability to introduce a new business model was the main 
capability in the introduction phase rather than the ability to introduce new products. 
In the growth phase the capabilities were the ability to grow fast and deliver efficiently 
in high volumes. Therefore, Dell demonstrated that even though the value proposition 
did not clearly change along the business life cycle the need for capabilities to shift 
was needed.  
 
In the introduction phase both Nokia and Cisco needed the ability to deliver new types 
of products and technologies, while Dell relied more on the existing standard 
technologies. All three cases needed the ability to shape up and grow fast in order to 
enter the high growth phase. For example, the transformation of Dell’s business model 
had already started prior to the high growth period, similarly to Nokia’s process 
innovation. In the growth phase, all three companies needed the ability to deliver 
efficiently, but also to maintain the flexibility to achieve configurable products. Cisco 
and Dell relied on an Internet-based configuration and served better customer specific 
configurations, while Nokia concentrated more on self-created variants. Nokia did not 
start until well into the maturity phase to create real configuration capabilities. Nokia 
and Dell excelled at managing sudden changes, while Cisco failed in slowing down. 
Both Nokia and Dell also emphasised the importance of supplier collaboration, 
already in the growth phase. In the maturity phase, all three companies saw tighter 
cost requirements together with increased service and configuration needs. Dell 
differed from Nokia in that product differentiation as such was not seen in the maturity 
phase, even though the products range widened. However, Dell similarly saw new 
emerging markets and service level differences. Therefore, the flexibility and need to 
serve different businesses in the manufacturing increased. The case of SonyEricsson 
highlights how important the proactive cross-functional capability development is, 
particularly when entering the high growth possibility.  
 
In the process development both Nokia and Dell relied on in-house assembly to order 
process and with a more cell-type of production. Cisco, on the other hand, did not 
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 have in-house manufacturing, but considered managing the entire supply chain as 
strategic. SonyEricsson outsourced manufacturing when their mobile phone business 
was already in trouble.  
 
Dell’s profit of net sales in the maturity phase was 10 percent, while Cisco was able to 
achieve 20 percent and Nokia over 20 percent. However, in the computer industry, a 
10 percent profit is a great achievement. Compound annual growth rates for sales were 
over 40 percent in all three companies. Nokia had the largest revenue growth in 
growth phase 2. Even though Cisco suffered one bad year with big profit losses, it was 
clearly able to recover best in the growth phase with a compound annual growth rate 
of 85 percent.  
 
5.5 Modified life cycle model for capability development 
 
Chapter 4.5.4 presented initial ideas for the life cycle model for capability 
development based on the Nokia case. The conclusion was that requirement (i.e. 
competitive priorities) for manufacturing capabilities change along the business life 
cycle and therefore can be used as a tool to predict needed change in capability 
development (table 6). Table 9 presents the modified model for capability 
development based on the additional cases presented in Chapter 5. The main change in 
the table is that while value propositions do not necessarily change significantly, the 
needed capabilities will shift regardless of whether value proposition changes or not. 
Of course, manufacturing needs to be well aligned to the company’s main value 
proposition, but its position on the life cycle will also set requirements for the 
capabilities. There can also be two equally important value propositions, as in the case 
of Dell. Additionally, the cases confirmed that competitive priorities and capabilities 
are cumulative and that requirements towards the maturity phase are ever increasing, 
particularly for low cost and customer service. Both Cisco and Dell highlighted the 
stronger need for configurability already in the growth phase. Moreover, the cases 
confirmed that management of the transition phases is critical to the company’s 
success. The capability development needs to be started in a previous phase in order 
for it to provide a competitive advantage and be of assistance during the transition 
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 period. The additional cases also confirmed the need for operational innovation or 
industry shaping to ensure growth and continuous improvement between the transition 
phases, as well as the need for strategic flexibility prior to maturity. 
 
Table 9. Updated life cycle model for capability development 
Ability to profit 
in price 
competitive 
market
Increased ability 
to customize
products and 
services to 
customer needs
”Continuous
Improvement”
Increasing 
demand on price, 
flexibility, quality 
and delivery, 
Additional 
services
Maturity
Ability to support
new businesses
and new growth
”Operational
Innovation”
Increasing 
demand on price, 
flexibility, quality 
and delivery, 
Additional 
services
Transition phase 3 
(from maturity to 
growth)
Price, flexibilityDelivery, price, 
flexibility, 
quality
DeliveryFlexibilityMain 
competitive
priorities
Ability to sudden
changes, to slow
down
Ability to profit in 
price competitive
market
”Strategic
Flexibility”
Ability to 
deliver
efficiently and 
Ability to 
configure to 
order in high
volumes
”Continuous
Improvement”
Ability to shape
up and grow fast
”Operational
Innovation”
Ability to 
introduce new 
products or new 
business models
”Continuous
Improvement”
Main 
capabilities
Main value
proposition
Transition phase 2 
(from growth to 
maturity)
GrowthTransition phase 1 
(from
introduction to 
growth)
IntroductionBusiness 
lifecycle phases
Product Leadership Operational Excellence Customer Intimacy
or
Value propositions shifts only slightly
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6 ENFOLDING LITERATURE 
 
The summary of the main case findings on manufacturing capabilities, performance 
and competitive advantage, together with a proposal for life cycle model, were 
presented in Chapter 4.5.4. The modified life cycle model for capability development 
was presented in Chapter 5.5 based on the parallel case findings. Chapter 6 enfolds 
how the existing literature on the manufacturing capability development, the 
manufacturing’s strategic role in providing a competitive advantage and the life cycle 
model supports the findings from the case studies. Other relevant constructs 
(operational innovation, strategic flexibility and continuous improvement) that 
emerged during the case study are also discussed in more detail. An essential feature 
of theory building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses with 
the extant literature (Eisenhardt 1989), whether the literature supports the case 
findings or not.  
 
6.1 Manufacturing capabilities and performance 
 
The Nokia case supported that capabilities were somewhat difficult to categorise and 
affected several competitive priorities at the same time (price, flexibility, delivery, 
quality and service). This is consistent with the theories of Wheelwright and Bowen 
(1996) and Pandza (2003), noting that capabilities are also unique to each company, 
and may not even be easily recognised and categorised. As suggested in the literature, 
companies are more likely to address multiple manufacturing capabilities 
simultaneously, which supports the rationale behind the cumulative model (Noble 
1997, Meyer and Ferdows 1990, Roth and Miller 1992).  Furthermore, as Mills and 
Platts (2002) proposed, the architecture exist in reflecting the collection of individual 
services, routines, and competences into higher-level competences, which at the 
highest level are recognized by customers as offering particular levels of performance 
on competitive factors.  
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 However, the Nokia case confirmed that capabilities can be grouped by competitive 
priorities (Kim and Arnold 1992) and performance measures by cost, time and quality 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996). Surely many other categorization methods will work as 
well, but it is important to identify the order winning criteria and know the qualifying 
criteria as well (Hill 1983). Manufacturing’s competitive role is to specify these 
priorities and pursue them through consistent structural and infrastructural decisions 
(Wheelwright 1984 and Kim and Arnold 1992). The case also complied with Kaplan 
and Norton’s theory (1996) that virtually all value propositions incorporated into 
measures related to time, quality and price. As previously stated, a direct link between 
individual competitive priorities and particular objectives may be difficult to establish, 
since greater emphasis on quality objectives does not necessarily mean less emphasis 
on cost reduction (Kim and Arnold 1996). Quality seemed to always be more of an 
order qualifier than an order winner criterion, although continuous improvement was 
needed along the life cycle. There was also no simple cause-effect relationship 
between single improvement programs and manufacturing performance, and some 
action programs became effective only after a fairly long transition period (Meyer and 
Ferdows 1990).  
 
Since the value propositions shifted in their order of importance as well as competitive 
priorities, so did the need for new capabilities to provide competitive advantage. When 
competitors started to catch up on e.g. on manufacturability and cost efficiency, for 
example, a stronger need for customisation and services emerged. The more mature 
capabilities still supported the company as order qualifiers when new capabilities 
emerged more as new order winners (Hill 2000). The capabilities aligned with the 
main value proposition seemed to provide the greatest competitive advantage, while 
capabilities supporting the other two value propositions seemed to further help the 
business performance. This was in alignment with Kaplan and Norton’s (2000) ideas 
of strategic internal business processes. The case of SonyEricsson highlighted the 
importance of early introduction of new products and capabilities and the 
consequences of responding later to competitor offerings. It also highlighted the need 
for manufacturing to have flexibility to support the emerging needs of markets.  
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 The link between manufacturing and business strategy lead to improved business 
performance (Gupta and Lonial 1998), especially through improved Days of Supply 
(DOS) and cost per phone. However, in Nokia’s case, the deep cost performance 
improvement curves slowed down when volume growth slowed down. This is in line 
with the recent studies of Ketokivi and Heikkilä (2003) that at the manufacturing level 
it is difficult to affect to scales benefits, since they are more of a company level 
decision or environment-driven issues. Nokia’s market share when entering the 
maturity phase was 35 %, while its next biggest competitor, Motorola, had a market 
share of only 15 %. The benefit of economies of scale was of tremendous advantage to 
the market leader. Moore (1998) named the market winner as the “gorilla” and 
indicated that the market leader position won in the tornado phase (growth) would 
remain also during the main street phase (maturity). Additionally, the Nokia case 
highlighted that modular product design also contributes to economies of scale. 
Economies of scale are gained in materials usage by creating a range of modular 
systems, which, when combined, make a larger volume, from which customers can 
choose (Brown 1996). This contributed as a cost advantage but also in providing 
leanness to the organisation, which became important during the transition into the 
maturity phase. 
 
6.2 Competitive advantage and strategic role of manufacturing 
 
Following the initial work of Skinner (1969), many agree that the strategic choices in 
manufacturing need to be competitive, enabling manufacturing to do certain things 
better than competitors (Clark 1996, Fine and Hax 1985, Hayes and Pisano 1996, 
Berry et al. 1999) and more so if properly operated and achieving strong performance 
outcomes (Wheelwright and Hayes 1985, Hayes and Wheelwright 1984). The cases 
validated that operations can have a significant impact on the bottom line, such as 
through superior demand supply network, inventory management or product 
manufacturability. In the Nokia case, manufacturing had the biggest impact from the 
competitive advantage point of view in the transition period from introduction to 
growth by enabling cost efficient high growth. The second big impact was during the 
transition from growth to maturity (ready for sudden changes) when it was essential to 
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 slow down the whole demand supply chain. This was well emphasised when the cases 
of Nokia and Cisco were compared and it was shown how the companies handled the 
industry slowdown in 2001. These findings are not found in current literature to this 
extent; however Moore (1989) indicated that the role of manufacturing should change 
in different phases of the life cycle.  
 
The case findings are consistent with the idea (Porter 1998, Hayes 1985, Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990, Barney 1991) that a company has competitive advantage if it is 
profitable, has a high market share and its value to customer is high. A company with 
a small market share may, however, have a competitive advantage by serving niche 
markets and have a relatively high market share compared to the competitors in that 
particular market area. The cases also proved that in the high-speed environment 
described by Fine (1998) competitive advantage is not very sustainable (Porter 1998, 
Barney 1991) since the market situation changes and competitors are willing to catch 
up. As Stalk (1988) emphasised, the competitive advantage is a constantly moving 
target, and the best competitors, the most successful ones, know how to keep moving 
and always stay on the cutting edge.  
 
The purpose of thinking and managing strategically is to gain competitive advantage, 
implying an attempt to mobilize manufacturing capability to help to gain a competitive 
edge or even significantly contribute to the competitive success of the organisation 
(Mintzberg 1978). In the cases of Nokia, Dell and Cisco the alignment between 
capabilities and company value position was high, thus supporting the ideas of Hayes 
and Wheelwright (1984), Porter (1998), Treacy and Wiersema (1993) and Voss 
(1995).  
 
Furthermore, the strategic choices are needed because manufacturing has a limited 
amount of resources for implementing the required manufacturing capabilities for 
competitive advantage. Also, according to Brown (1996), process choice is a major 
strategic decision; no amount of reactive, tactical measures can hope to compensate 
for inappropriate investment in the wrong processes, which do not match the market 
requirements in which the firm is competing. It was suggested that in a high-
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 clockspeed environment, the flexibility of generic manufacturing resources outweighs 
task similarity benefit of dedicated resources (Appelqvist and Vehtari 2004). The 
challenge is how to differentiate from competitors and meet customer requirements, 
while at the same time achieving a clear cost benefit, (i.e. providing value at the 
lowest cost) (Porter 1980). The case companies faced significant challenges in making 
the comprehensive system-wide transition to customer responsiveness. The attitude 
should be that winners will be those that build products according to customer needs 
and in deference to the customers themselves. Both Nokia and Cisco primarily 
focused on product technologies and product leadership, but now emphasise the 
importance of customer intimacy and service offerings in their strategies 
(www.nokia.com and www.cisco.com).  
 
6.3 Life cycle model for capability development 
 
The case improved the understanding of market value propositions and competitive 
priorities when preparing for transition from one phase to the next. This was in 
alignment with the literature that the life cycle model can be used to describe the 
evolution of processes, and an industry or branch of industry (Porter 1980). The life 
cycle model emphasises the idea of value propositions and competitive priorities 
shifting as a product matures. However, not all individual products will go through 
every phase of the business life cycle and the length of the time will vary for products 
to stay in a particular point of the life cycle (Brown 1996). Furthermore, not all 
businesses will necessarily have shifting value propositions. But the case indicated 
that in order to provide competitive advantage, capabilities must shift along the 
business life cycle. The life cycle model can be used to predict the need for process 
innovations, for example. 
 
The Nokia and Cisco cases confirmed that different phases of life cycle have different 
main value propositions and the manufacturing strategy should be aligned with the 
company’s value proposition to the customer (Moore 1998, Tracey and Wiersema 
1993). In the introduction phase the main value proposition was product leadership, in 
the growth phase it was operational efficiency, and in the maturity phase it was 
customer intimacy. There were also supporting value propositions, particularly in the 
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 growth and the maturity phases. This is consistent with Kaplan and Norton’s (2000) 
saying that companies must excel in one process that will have the maximum impact 
on its customer value proposition, while the other two are supportive. Moore’s idea 
(1998) that the value propositions will experience major changes along the life cycle 
was not supported in the Dell case. Dell’s focus was not in product creation or new 
technology development but in providing direct delivery and adding value to customer 
starting in the introduction phase. However, Dell seemed to have in its growth phase 
two equally important value propositions: customer intimacy and operational 
excellence. This was somewhat indicated by Moore’s assertion (1998) that there could 
be two equally important value propositions while Kaplan and Norton proposed that 
only one is to be excelled at.  
 
The competitive priorities shifted in all cases, even if the value propositions did not 
change as significantly. As Treacy and Wiersema (1993) stated, manufacturing needs 
to be well aligned to the company’s main value proposition, but its position on the life 
cycle will also set requirements for the capabilities. The cases illustrated that in the 
introduction phase competitive priorities were mainly in the area of flexibility (e.g. the 
ability to introduce new products or business models and increase volume) (Utterback 
and Abernathy 1975). In the growth phase, improving cost and delivery times were the 
main competitive priorities along with flexibility. In this rapidly growing industry 
growth ensures that firms can improve results just by keeping up with the industry 
(Porter 1980). In the maturity phase, in addition to the previous competitive priorities, 
service increased in importance through its ability to customise products and services 
to customer needs (Kim and Arnold 1992). Cost and efficiency measures were even 
more important because of increasing cost pressure from the mature markets. D’Aveni 
(1994) described it as “hyper competition”, where demands for flexibility, delivery 
speed and innovation are ever increasing. The findings in the maturity phase also 
comply with the conclusions of Ranta (1997) and Smeds (1994), in that evolution in 
the first phase of the product (or industry) seems to obey the classical life cycle model, 
but after reaching the maturity phase both market and product innovations lead to 
market segmentation and product diversification, which in turn leads to a highly 
dynamic interactive system. As an example they mentioned the implications of “lean 
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 manufacturing” as the radical process innovation, bringing an additional element to 
the classical life cycle. On the other hand, Tushman and Nadler (1986) discussed 
process innovation discontinuity over the product life cycle as occurring only in the 
growth phase and not in the case of a mature industry evolving again through a 
process innovation. It is also worth noticing that the cases demonstrated that market 
segmentation, product diversification and especially the need for configured products 
had already begun in the transition phase from the introduction phase to the growth 
phase. This is consistent with the findings of Pantzar and Ainamo (2004). In their 
recent study, Pantzar and Ainamo (2004) compared the breakthroughs of General 
Motors and Nokia in the “mass-class market” (Sloan 1983) and identified three 
common dimensions: segmenting a market on the verge of a breakthrough, well-timed 
introduction of new technological advances, and brand-management skills in sensing, 
interpreting and representing changes in market circumstances and the broader 
business environment.  
 
The successful transition from one phase to another also requires proactive capability 
development or quick response to market changes (Wheelwright and Hayes 1985, 
Stalk 1988, Anderson et al. 1989, Collis 1994, Hayes and Pisano 1994, Voss 1995, 
Brown 1996, Teece and Pisano 1994, Courtney et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000). The cases supported the capability development having a life cycle of its own 
as well as recognizable stages, such as growth, maturity, and decline (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2003). Along their evolutionary paths, capabilities may support a sequence of 
products or multiple products simultaneously (Helfat and Raubitschek 2000) and it 
takes capabilities years to develop and pass from the introduction to the maturity 
phase. This is consistent with the Hayes and Upton statement (1998) that such 
capabilities take a long time to develop, and can “come together” quite suddenly, 
giving a company its competitive power. According to Pandza et al. (2003), 
capabilities are characterized as unique and idiosyncratic processes that emerge from 
unique and path dependent histories of individual firms, for example the Dell Model.  
 
Previously, the capabilities development were started in previous phases and prior to 
transition times (e.g. from introduction to growth or from growth to maturity). This 
 132
 was not so evident in the literature review, but was a major finding from the case 
studies. Although Pandza (2003) indicated that capability development is initiated by 
change in the life cycle, it may already be too late for successful companies to react. 
Moore (1998) defined the transition phases as going from the “chasm” into “entering 
the tornado” and then, in maturity phase, seeking for new growth opportunities in 
mature markets. However, Moore missed the importance of the second transition 
phase from high growth to maturity. It is important to understand that in the 
introduction and development phase of developing capabilities, they contribute as 
order winners, when their competitors have an ability to catch up (in the maturity 
phase) capabilities change into order qualifiers (Hill 2000). It can be said that the 
greatest wins occur in the beginning or middle phase of capability development when 
competitors lack the same capabilities. 
 
As predicted, the manufacturing technology did not follow the life cycle model. In the 
introduction phase of new type of products building up new non-existing production 
technologies and equipment is a key. The study of Boyer et al. (1996) indicates that 
technology itself is not linked with improved performance. Companies that are 
currently investing in the technologies may not see significant returns on their 
investment for several years. Even if the impact of advanced manufacturing 
technologies on performance is small (Kotha and Swamidass1998), it may create new 
business opportunities. From the company point of view, production technology did 
not become mature, nor did it become more capital intensive. This complies with the 
findings of Ranta (1997) that there is a continuous need to develop and change 
production technology; therefore companies cannot follow the life cycle theory 
concerning production technology. According to Laugen et al. (2005), high performers 
implement programmes directed towards updating process equipment, process focus, 
pull production and equipment productivity. Moreover, according to Baines et al. 
(1993), an organisation can build upon an existing technology, tailoring the equipment 
to produce better and cheaper products faster, and then a distinct contribution to 
competitiveness starts to emerge. The Nokia case supports the importance of pull 
production through implementation of ATO-process and overall productivity 
improvements. Updating process equipment was also supported but not so much as a 
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 competitive priority as a continuous improvement. Focused processes were not seen to 
be at all important in the company, since the mix flexibility was given priority and the 
processes supported all products. Towards the end of the maturity period the 
discussion on focused processes emerged due to more diverse business needs. 
Therefore, it is crucial to understand and achieve the balance between focus and 
diversification. This would indicate that process equipment updating and productivity 
improvements are more continuous improvements and are necessary as such, but 
implementing process focus and pull-production are more operational innovations.  
 
Similarly, manufacturing processes did not follow the classical stages of the Hayes 
and Wheelwright model from one end to another. The study of Dermott et al. (1997) 
showed that the Hayes and Wheelwright model would better describe the industry 
rather than explain the relative strategic positions of a company. According to Hayes 
and Wheelwright (1979), the process evolution typically begins with highly flexible, 
but not very cost-efficient process and moves towards highly integrated, high volume 
production lines. The flexibility of semi-automation and manual workforce proved to 
be important in the environment where new products were introduced constantly with 
high amounts of customer specific variants. The flexibility of more manual processes 
contributed in a generic capacity, serving a wider variety of products. De Meyer and 
Pycke (1996) also conclude that neither price competition nor fast product 
introduction seem to rely on automation. The human factor (training, teamwork, and 
empowerment) is replacing the trend towards automation. The case of SonyEricsson 
supported this in that they had lost flexibility when automating their production 
facilities. 
 
6.4 Operational innovation, strategic flexibility and continuous improvement 
 
Hammer (2004) defined operational innovativeness as achieving a capability to offer 
lower prices and better service than competitors. He distinguishes this from 
operational improvement or excellence, which, according to him, is achieving high 
performance via existing modes of operations. Tushman and Nadler (1986) used a 
similar term to mean process innovation over a product life cycle. Operational 
 134
 innovation or shaping the industry means coming up with entirely new ways of filling 
orders, developing products, providing customer service, or doing any other activity 
that an enterprise performs, for example, the Dell Business Model, Toyota Production 
System and Zara. As Courtney (2001) puts it, when a company faces a very high level 
of uncertainty about the variables it can influence, shaping makes the most sense.  
 
The ability of manufacturing companies to adapt is referred to as the strategic 
flexibility of a company (Beach et al. 2000). Furthermore, an effective strategy should 
steer companies toward where an industry is heading, not where it is today (Huyett 
and Viguerie 2005). If organisations wish to respond rapidly, there is a need for 
increased operational flexibility. In the transition phases change can be fast and even if 
expected, not entirely predictable. In these situations manufacturing could also play a 
contributor role as defined by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984). With strategic 
flexibility, manufacturing is able to significantly contribute to the competitive 
advantage, particularly in a rapidly changing business situation. Operations will 
manage unpredictability, when products must be made in various volumes and 
configurations. Berry et al. (1999) also concluded that strategic options in marketing 
can be connected with strategic options in manufacturing and vice versa and that 
debate should influence market position decisions. Moderately diversified companies 
not only outperform more diversified ones but also perform at least as well as, if not 
better than, more focused companies (Harper and Vigurie 2002). Adapting is 
preferable when key sources of value creation are relatively stable or beyond the 
company’s control. 
 
Courtney et al. (1997) also devised a strategic posture for shaping the future and 
adapting to the future. According to Brown and Hagel (2005) very few companies 
create significant shareholder value through breakthrough product innovations; most 
economic wealth comes from more modest changes that accumulate over time. 
Process innovations may be even more important for building a competitive advantage 
and generating wealth. In the studied cases, operational innovation seemed to play the 
largest role when transferring from introduction to growth. Operational innovation 
when entering the growth phase could be, therefore, also labelled as shaping the 
 135
 future, while readiness for change could be labelled as adapting to the future or 
strategic flexibility. Tushman and Nadler (1986) supported the idea that first there is a 
substantial amount of product innovation that leads to the emergence of a dominant 
design. In the next stage, major product variation gives way to competition based on 
price, quality, and segmentation (i.e. a process innovation rather than product 
innovation). Since new products often require different distribution channels and 
suppliers from those servicing older products, a company should consider developing 
competencies that survive technological revolutions, such as flexible manufacturing 
capabilities or strong distribution channels. An organisation may find at least some 
help in coping with the high uncertainties imposed by the environment by increasing 
manufacturing flexibility and by maintaining or ensuring the role of manufacturing 
managers in strategic decision making (Swamidass and Newell 1987).  
 
According to Voss (1995), the continuous improvement of best practices in all areas of 
the organisation will lead to superior performance capability, and hence, to increased 
competitiveness. This does not take into account that best practices may not be best 
for all companies. The potential influence of factors such as type of industry, company 
size, processes and products is not considered, nor is the fact that practices, even the 
best ones, may become obsolete in the course of time, although in their study Laugen 
et al. (2005) did not find indications that the type of industry would affect the selection 
of best practices. 
 
6.5 Dynamics of development and competitive advantage 
 
Why was Nokia able to win and hold the clear market leader position from 1998 to 
2003, while its biggest competitor Motorola was losing the market share throughout 
the 1994 to 2000 period? What did Nokia do right, compared to Motorola, in the very 
difficult management situation of having to implement drastic changes on all fronts? 
Why was Ericsson, having the advantage of technologically advanced products, not 
winning market share? Why was Nokia able to retain control of key operations during 
the industry downturn? Or why does Dell have such a profitable business making 
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 commodity products? These are some of the interesting questions that emerged during 
the case studies.  
 
In fast changing industries, where an individual product life cycle lasts only a few 
months or a few years and is frequently replaced by newer versions, one business life 
cycle contains several individual product, technology and process life cycles. These 
products share certain common technologies and functions (e.g. hand portable mobile 
phones), and share common capabilities that are needed to produce them. Yet, at the 
same time product, process and management technologies evolve forming a series of 
superimposed life cycles. Many of the capabilities are also not just within 
manufacturing, but are cross-functional or cross-organisational, which leads to a rather 
complex model of a company’s development as a result of a number of interacting 
forces triggering and supporting or conflicting with each other. Companies need to be 
able to concurrently coordinate the development of products, manufacturing and 
supply chain. This is in line with Fine’s idea of three-dimensional concurrent 
engineering. The Nokia case further highlighted the importance of multi-dimensional 
competitive advantage of Brand – Design – and efficient Demand Supply Network.  
 
6.5.1 Product and process development 
 
Product and process innovations are complex and uncertain endeavours, which shift 
over time and require the close collaboration of R&D, marketing, sales and 
production. First, in order for the electronic business to enter a period of mass-market 
adoption (tornado), a new infrastructure paradigm is needed (Moore 1998). In the 
mobile phone business the GSM breakthrough occurred during 1994-1995 
accelerating market growth, when mobile phones became available for big masses. 
This required a global infrastructure standard for the market to start growing rapidly. 
For examples Nokia was highly involved in the GSM standardization work and 
development of new technologies. However, technological advance does not 
guarantee the win, as in case of Ericsson. They had the ability to design and produce 
some of the most technologically advanced mobile phones, but overlooked the fact 
that user friendliness and design were the biggest selling arguments. At same time, 
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 Nokia introduced a popular series of customized mobile telephones at the entry-level 
market segment and became the recognized trendsetter in design and renewal of 
products, which was seen as being of equal importance as production efficiency 
(Häikiö 2001). Renewal of the product range and continuous cost improvements by 
using less numerous or cheaper components also significantly contribute to 
profitability. Production technology development, as well as product technology 
development, contributes to the overall success of companies: at first when production 
technology is not a commodity, and then later by achieving better performance and 
cost savings over time. It is necessary to develop new product technologies and new 
production technologies jointly (Ranta 1997), since the development of component 
technology has an impact to the cost performance of the mobile phones through 
decreased component and manufacturing costs, for example. In mature markets 
companies are expected to provide combinations of additional services as a means of 
differentiating the products. However, it is important to note that increased complexity 
in devices and the desire for added functionality, and features often increases the Bill 
of Materials (BOM).  
 
6.5.2 Internally and externally coordinated development 
 
In capability development the key points are the whole demand supply network 
orchestration, networking and speed. In a period of mass-market adaptation demand 
dramatically outweighs supply, resulting in a huge backlog of customers. The 
significance of this period is that once customers settle on a particular vendor, they 
rarely switch (Moore 1998). An important lesson to apply is to expand distribution as 
fast as possible. The key is to grow fast in order to achieve maximum economies of 
scale, while maintaining fast volume growth and managing growth in the entire 
demand supply network. Nokia’s mobile phone business was very profitable and had a 
price advantage based on its huge volume, while Dell’s direct model enabled the 
company to excel at demand management and cost efficiency. Synchronisation and 
direct contact with the market allows Dell to respond more quickly to customer 
demands than its competitors. Additionally, internal collaboration allows for highly 
accurate forecasts (Fugate and Mentzer 2004). Cisco’s supply chain, however, 
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 imploded because its partners acted in ways that were not in the best interests of the 
whole supply chain, the cross-company problems were more difficult to detect, and 
incentives were not well aligned (Narayanan and Raman 2004). If the whole supply 
chain cannot be slowed down at the right time, all phases will build up with inventory.  
 
As previously discussed, manufacturing can significantly impact  business 
performance by means of a higher level of internal and external collaboration and 
through a modular product and process, thereby reducing manufacturing costs and 
inventory levels while at the same time improving operational efficiencies across its 
supply chain. This benefits its customers as well as its suppliers (Stanford case 2004). 
The whole organisation needs to renew in order to achieve more efficient operations 
and sales systems, thereby leading to increased sales and faster improvement of 
profitability compared to competitors (Häikiö 2001). Successful capability 
development requires cross-functional development in product creation, delivery and 
management processes. Common process development will provide more visibility 
and improved planning. At Nokia, orchestration meant managing the entire chain and 
outsourcing selected activities to demand supply chain partners: suppliers, contract 
manufacturers, logistics service providers and channel partners. At Dell, the process of 
selling directly to customers and building product to order creates opportunities for 
true real-time collaboration and synchronization between manufacturing and sales. 
Nokia’s demand supply network and manufacturing structure evolved from functional 
to the integrated process enabling good capacity utilization in the engine 
manufacturing and responsive final assembly to a customer order. The role of DFM 
(the ability to introduce new products and the ability to profit in a price competitive 
market) and the modular product structure that enabled the assembly to order process 
(the ability to deliver efficiently) were important as well. The postponement strategy 
has become mandatory in many companies in light of the current levels of market 
globalisation, increasing demand for product variety and customization, rapid 
technological innovation, shortening product life cycles and intense competition 
(Yang et al. 2004). 
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 Therefore, manufacturing capabilities alone do not provide competitive advantage, 
since the competitive advantage ultimately stems from customer responsiveness and 
manufacturing is only a part of the order-to-delivery process (Holweg and Pil 2004), 
but rather, it is how integrated processes are aligned with the value proposition of the 
company. Hence, in the wider perspective, it is not enough to look at only internal 
manufacturing capabilities but also at cross-functional capabilities, such as Design for 
Manufacturing or supplier cooperation, in Nokia’s case. In order to manage and 
develop these capabilities cross-functional and delivery network wide development 
are required and many authors do discuss the management of the entire demand-
supply network and innovating business concurrently (Fine 1998, Eloranta et al. 2001, 
Appelqvist 2005). Companies should also periodically study their supply chains, 
because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business 
conditions may alter the alignment of incentives, as illustrated by the Cisco case 
(Narayanan and Raman 2004). But how to actually manage the complex systems and 
entire networks is not so clear. It should also be noted that operational innovation may 
be difficult to achieve in an on-going organisation, since this has a greater bureaucratic 
momentum (Mintzberg 1978). Moore (1998) even warned of the risks of major 
innovative changes during the high growth (tornado) phase. Well-established 
companies can often succeed in changing one dimension of their business model, but 
simultaneously changing multiple dimensions inevitably leads to conflicting 
constraints (Beinhocker 2006). When implementing the direct sales model, Dell 
enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than the established players, making it easier for 
it to create a new business model than it was for the incumbents to adapt theirs. 
According to Beinhocker (2006), one of the solutions is to reduce hierarchy in a 
company.  
 
The overall ‘fitness’ or ‘leanness’ of the organisation helps during periods of sudden 
changes, such as entering from high growth to slow down, as in case of Nokia and 
Dell. By building lower-cost positions earlier and more radically than seems necessary 
is almost always a beneficial move. Moreover, a healthy cost structure provides the 
headroom needed to cut prices or to invest in innovative products and business 
models, should the market require them (Huyett and Viguerie 2005). This is achieved 
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 mainly through continuous improvements, but is not always enough for achieving a 
competitive advantage. Nokia also emphasised the importance of understanding the 
market and turning foresight into correct action at the right time (Masalin 2003). 
According to Fugate and Mentzer (2004), the Dell management team’s speed of 
execution is a result of the team members’ flexibility and ability to make fast 
decisions.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSSION  
Chapter 7 concludes the main findings of the study. The theoretical contribution and 
practical utility of the study are assessed and the quality of the research is evaluated 
against the criteria set based on the selected research methodology. The implications 
of the study are discussed and issues for further research are proposed.  
 
7.1 Contribution of the study  
 
7.1.1 Answering the research questions 
 
This study was motivated by better understanding the relationship between 
manufacturing capability development and life cycle theories and whether the life 
cycle model could be used for predicting future development needs of manufacturing 
capabilities. The questions how do manufacturing capabilities and performance 
contribute to business performance, and will certain competitive advantage be 
sufficient if a business situation changes rapidly, have inspired this research.  
 
The research questions of this study were formulated as follows:  
 
1. How do manufacturing capabilities and performance changes in different 
phases of business life cycle? 
2. How can manufacturing provide a competitive advantage in different phases of 
business life cycle? 
 
The research questions were divided into sub-questions to understand the relevant 
body of knowledge and the initial constructs were set as: manufacturing capabilities 
and performance, competitive advantage and life cycle. The initial constructs were 
studied through the literature review and forming a basic understanding of the life 
cycle theories and capability development. The theories indicated that the capabilities 
would need to be changed in different phases of the life cycle in order to improve 
performance and provide a competitive advantage. The theoretical framework and 
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 constructs were created and categories selected to guide the case analysis. The case 
studies further validated the findings from the literature further and provided 
additional insight as to how the capabilities actually evolve in different phases of life 
cycle and how manufacturing can provide a competitive advantage.  
 
One of the main findings from the Nokia case was that not only did the different life 
cycle phases matter, but even more critical to the success of the company is the 
management of transition phases. This was also supported by the Dell and Cisco 
cases. New constructs, operational innovation, strategic flexibility and continuous 
improvement became very relevant for the study along the research process. The 
concept of value proposition was introduced in the literature review in order to 
understand how to align the manufacturing and business strategies. As predicted 
Hayes and Wheelwright’s (1979) a product-process matrix would better describe the 
industry, rather than explain the relative strategic positions of a company. 
 
The main contribution of this study is to the operations management theory in the area 
of capability development. The findings provide a practical understanding on how 
capabilities need to change along the business life cycle. As previously mentioned, 
generating theories about phenomena, rather than just generating a set of findings is 
important to the development of a field of knowledge (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The 
novelty of this research lies in providing extensive insight into the changing needs of 
business situations and how companies should adapt or shape their capabilities. The 
study also provided new findings on the need for operational innovation (shaping), 
especially prior to the growth phase. Capability development also needs to be initiated 
in the previous phase in order to achieve a competitive advantage over competitors. 
The study further validated the need for strategic flexibility (adapting) of the company 
(Beach et al. 2000). Distinct from Hayes and Wheelwright’s (1979) findings, this 
study focused more on  the overall manufacturing and demand supply network 
capabilities and links with manufacturing performance and its competitive advantage 
rather than just on the process set-up. The study also indicated that the main value 
proposition of the company does not necessarily change, as has been proposed by 
Moore (1998), but there can be more than one main value proposition.  
 143
  
The theoretical contribution of this research and main findings are as follows:  
  
• Capabilities providing a competitive advantage change in different phases of 
business life cycle;  
• Capabilities follow their own life cycles, but they are often initiated by the 
change in the business life cycle; 
• Continuous operational improvement is needed in all life cycle phases; 
• Operational innovation and ability to shape the future is needed prior to 
entering the growth phase; 
• Strategic flexibility, ability to adapt and leanness of the organisation is needed 
prior to entering the maturity phase; 
•  Operational innovation and strategic flexibility are main contributors to 
competitive advantage.  
 
As Hayes and Pisano (1994) stated: “By expanding the range of the manufacturing 
capabilities, they increase their strategic options” and therefore create strategic 
flexibility. Also, according to Beach et al. (2000), change is now a permanent feature 
of the business environment and companies that can adapt to the new environments 
are likely to gain a significant competitive advantage. 
 
7.1.2 Manufacturing capabilities and performance 
 
The manufacturing capabilities were categorized in the case study by the competitive 
priorities of price, quality, delivery, flexibility and service, as proposed by Kim and 
Arnold 1992. For clarity the performance metrics were categorized under cost, time 
and quality, as proposed by Kaplan and Norton (1996). Flexibility was seen as a 
manufacturing capability and not as a performance metric, since it can be seen as 
referring to a means to an end (Hayes 1985). As expected, the direct links between 
individual competitive priorities and particular objectives were difficult to establish 
(Kim and Arnold 1996), since capabilities were somewhat difficult to categorize and 
affected several competitive priorities at the same time (price, flexibility, delivery, 
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 quality and service). Furthermore, the market leader can achieve huge benefits with 
economies of scale, but the results clearly demonstrated that manufacturing 
contributes to improved business performance especially through improved Days of 
Supply (DOS) and decreased cost.  
 
7.1.3 Competitive advantage and strategic role of manufacturing 
 
The cases validated that operations can have a significant impact on the end result, 
through superior demand supply network, inventory management or product 
manufacturability, for example, and provide a competitive advantage. In particular, 
manufacturing was seen to have a great impact in the transition periods (operational 
innovation and readiness for change). Therefore, the ability to shape the future and 
strategic flexibility are main contributors to competitive advantage. Also, as value 
propositions shifted their order of importance as well as competitive priorities, so did 
the need for new capabilities to provide competitive advantage (see table 9). When 
competitors started catching up, on levels of manufacturability and cost efficiency, for 
example, a stronger need for customisation and services emerged. The more mature 
capabilities still supported the company as important order qualifiers while new 
capabilities emerged more as new order winners (Hill 2000). The company has a 
competitive advantage if profitability (relative position) is above the industry average 
and its market share and value to customer is high. Manufacturing can provide a 
competitive advantage in different phases of the life cycle if alignment between 
manufacturing capabilities, corporate strategy and customer’s value proposition is 
high and capabilities development is proactive, which results in the manufacturing 
performance’s high impact on business performance. On the other hand, the analyses 
show that sustainability of the competitive advantage is low when industry has high 
clockspeed. The sustainability of the competitive advantage is improved by preventing 
the entry of new competitors, reducing the threat of substitutes, improving the 
bargaining power of buyers, lowering the bargaining power of suppliers and reducing 
rivalry among existing competitors.  
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 7.1.4 Life cycle model for capability development  
 
The research confirmed that requirements (i.e. competitive priorities) for 
manufacturing capabilities change along the business life cycle and it therefore can be 
used as a tool to predict the needed change in capability development (figure 31). The 
value propositions do not necessarily change along the business life cycle. The 
manufacturing strategy should not be aligned just with company’s value proposition to 
customer (Moore 1998, Tracey and Wiersema 1993), but also according to the 
company’s position on the life cycle.  
 
Capabilities follow their own life cycles, but if reacting to change in the business life 
cycle, the development starts too late for achieving a competitive advantage. In the 
introduction and development phase, capabilities provide the greatest value before 
competitors are able to catch up. Successful capabilities development is initiated in the 
previous phase. Capabilities are developed either through continuous improvement or 
through operational innovation. A whole supply chain may need to be reconfigured 
and, in doing so, greater responsibility might be placed across the entire demand-
supply chain (Brown and Bessant 2003, Eloranta et al. 2001).  
 
In the transition phases it is critical to proactively adapt or shape the business. Being 
proactive requires that needed capabilities already exist at least in their introduction 
phase. Continuous improvement is essential in all phases of the business life cycle, but 
provides value through improved efficiency and not as much as a competitive 
advantage over competitors. The life cycle model in figure 31 summarizes the findings 
of each phase including transition phases. Manufacturing has great impact from the 
competitive advantage point of view in the transition phase, from introduction to 
growth, by enabling cost efficient high growth (operational innovation) and by 
shaping the future. The second major impact occurs during the transition from growth 
to maturity (readiness for sudden changes, leanness and control) when it is essential to 
slow down and control the whole demand supply chain and adapt to the change 
(Hammer 2004, Courtney et al. 1997). Being prepared for sudden changes equals 
having lean growth and organisation at the end of the growth period and also targeting 
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 the next lower price point (Moore 1998). In the transition phase, when entering the 
high growth or maturity phases, the manufacturing can also achieve a contributor role 
(Hayes and Wheelwright 1984). The next transition will emerge in the maturity phase 
when new types of products or services are introduced. Manufacturing will have a 
strong shaper role (operational innovation) there as well, by providing capabilities for 
new types of products and customer services in the search for new revenue growth. 
Strategic flexibility in manufacturing significantly contributes to competitive 
advantage, particularly in a rapidly changing business situation.  
 
Co
nt
in
uo
us
 
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
Continuous 
Improvemen
t
Operational Innovation
?Ne
tS
al
es
Introduction Growth Maturity
Strategic Flexibility and 
Leanness of Organization
Transition
phase
Operational Innovation
Transition
phase
Transition
phase
 
Figure 31. The business life cycle model for capability development 
 
 
7.2 Managerial implications and relevance of the study 
 
The business life cycle model was proposed for understanding the dynamics of 
competitive priorities and capabilities when preparing to transform from one phase to 
the next. As shown in figure 31 and table 9, capabilities providing competitive 
advantage change in different phases of life cycle and manufacturing must follow the 
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 requirements set by value propositions and life cycle in order to provide a competitive 
advantage. 
 
Since the practical utility of this research was to provide a better understanding of 
business dynamics and provide tools for formulating a manufacturing strategy, the 
business life cycle model provided a tool to predict future capability needs. However, 
capabilities follow their own life cycles but are initiated by change in the business life 
cycle. The model also gives operations managers a better understanding of the 
strategic role of manufacturing and can therefore assist in strategy formulation. The 
model could also be used to formulate future needs - a strategy charting of previous 
activities to understand and learn from past behaviours would be a useful tool that can 
be applied to the model. 
 
However, the business life cycle model does not guarantee winning, but rather 
provides a framework for thinking about strategic interactions. Using the life cycle 
model has limitations, as with any theoretical construct. It is important to keep in mind 
that no single framework can ever address all situations equally well. Another of the 
model’s limitation is the assumption that a product’s life cycle is equivalent to a 
business life cycle. While the two generally move in the same direction, they do not 
necessarily move at the same rate or to the same extent. This is particularly true when 
a market splits into price categories, and the products and customers of each major 
price segment follow separate product life cycles. In such a situation the low-end price 
segment may move very quickly to the final stage of the product life cycle, whereas 
the higher price segments may never move beyond the middle stages (Hayes and 
Wheelwright 198). Anyway it is valuable to scope the current position within an 
industry’s existing structure and then move with speed and agility to recognize and 
capture new opportunities when market changes (adapting to the future). But more so, 
as Courtney (2001) mentioned, influencing (shaping the future) the outcome of crucial 
and currently uncertain elements of an industry’s structure is especially important in 
extremely uncertain environments. Therefore the proposed capability model offers a 
discipline for thinking systematically about uncertainty.  
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 7.3 Validity and reliability  
 
Tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, 
generalizability, and theoretical level of theory building from a case study research. As 
mentioned earlier, an in-depth case study of an individual company in a specific 
business environment can lack external validity. When conducting an in-depth 
longitudinal research study there are practical constraints in terms of time and 
resources, but it will provide valuable insight over a long period of time. The longer 
the period over which phenomena are studied, the greater the opportunity to observe at 
first hand the sequential relationships of events (Voss 2002). External validity was 
strengthened through a comparative research design (Barley 1990), existing literature, 
and by searching external knowledge of similar parallel cases, such as the Cisco, Dell 
and SonyEricsson cases. Internal validity is the extent to which we can establish a 
causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions; 
as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin 1994). Internal validity was further 
enhanced by examining a multi-level analysis (synchronic and diachronic) within a 
single case study (Yin 1994). The different life cycle and transition phases were 
analysed as the cross-cases to understand if there were similar or dissimilar patterns in 
each phase. The use of multiple data analysis methods were planned and used in order 
to answer the research questions and address the threats to validity (Maxwell 2005).  
 
The construct validity was improved by using multiple sources of evidence, multiple 
data collection methods, and both quantitative and qualitative data. The validity was 
further increased through interviews that confirmed the findings extracted from 
written documentation and external analysis of the company. The strategy charting 
and most of the interviews were done in collaboration with another internal researcher. 
An external researcher was involved in the single in-depth case study in 2003 and 
2004. Several discussions with both these researchers helped validate the constructs 
and enhance the creativity of this research. According to Eisenhardt (1989), multiple 
investigators also enhance confidence in the findings. The findings from the initial 
constructs and case study where validated by further enfolding the existing literature.  
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 The reliability is the extent to which a study’s operations can be repeated (Voss et al. 
2002). The reliability of the research was increased through documenting the research 
process (see appendix D) and demonstrating that the study can be repeated with the 
same results. Reliability was also increased through discussions and cross checking 
with others working within or with the case company. The conclusions developed in 
this research are proposed to be generally applicable to rapidly growing and phased 
industries, such as the electronics industry (Fine 1998). The hypotheses presented may 
not be applicable in the case of bulk or process type of environment, or when certain 
cultural preferences or government sanctions change the competitive environment 
(such as the Chinese practice of giving preference to a local phone manufacturer). 
 
The limitations of this study included being able to use only one longitudinal case 
company, due to the nature of the study, and also the impossibility of obtaining in-
depth access to competing companies or industries. The researcher was a full-time 
employee in the case company’s manufacturing and logistics organisation, which 
provided excellent access to the relevant data, as well as internal support for the 
research being conducted (Barnes 2001). However, when a researcher has worked for 
a company for over ten years, intersubjectivity can be a risk as well as an objective 
liability towards external validity.  
 
7.4 Future research 
 
The main finding from this research was that the business life cycle model can be used 
as a tool to predict future capability needs. The model can work as a starting-point to 
look at where the company is and what might lie ahead, as well as a guide for 
capability development, but, as discussed in Chapter 6, what is not so clear is how to 
actually manage the complex systems and entire networks. This would clearly require 
further investigations. Furthermore, the significance of the transition phases in 
capability development was a new and significant finding. However, the model needs 
more extensive evidence and requires future research. As mentioned, it would be 
interesting for future studies to conduct in-depth cross-case comparisons, investigation 
whether certain types of capabilities emerge in each phase in different types of growth 
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 industries. It would also be valuable to study other industries to attempt to find support 
for the findings of this research. The findings can then be validated and generalised if 
others have similar findings in a different context. The result is often a theory with 
stronger internal validity, wider generalizability, and a higher conceptual level 
(Eisenhardt 1998). It would be particularly interesting to see how the model would 
work in a slower clockspeed industry. Also, under which conditions and in which 
industry environments would the model be applicable? Further research could cover 
how manufacturing capabilities and performance could be enhanced to match business 
changes proactively. Interesting questions for future research would include:  
 
• How should capability development be done in a complex, multi-
dimensional environment?  
• How much should one proactively invest in capabilities?  
• What are the indicators in the life cycle that indicate imminent 
change?  
• What is the degree of focus with limited resources and what is 
the degree of strategic flexibility that companies are able to 
create in an ever-changing environment?  
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All of the informants had several years of experience working for Nokia and most of 
them through the whole time of 1992-2003. Examples of informants work titles 
throughout the years 1992-2003 are presented below. 
 
List of informants work titles over the years: 
 
Interview 1: technology area manager, director technology, platforms operations and 
logistics 
Interview 2: operations program manager, site manager, senior manager operations 
Interview 3: production manager, plant manager, director operations, logistics and 
sourcing 
Interview 4: production manager, factory manager, director operations and logistics 
Interview 5: production manager, logistics manager, director of supply solutions 
Interview 6: operations project manager, director of operations and logistics 
Interview 7: factory manager, vice president of operations, logistics and sourcing  
Interview 8: logistics change integrator, senior advisor
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Interview guide 
 
The purpose of this interview is to understand the dynamics involved with 
manufacturing / DSN capabilities and how capability requirements have changed in 
different business situations and how they have affected business performance. The 
time line for the study is 1992-2003. 
 
0.00
5000.00
10000.00
15000.00
20000.00
25000.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
 
NMP net sales and operating profit 
1. General Information about the Interviewee 
1.1. Interviewee’s position in the company today? 
1.2. What were the interviewee’s previous positions in the company?  
2. Business environment 
2.1. What were the characteristics of the business environment in different years 
from 1992 to 2003 (growth, profitability, competition) 
3. Performance 
3.1. What performance metrics were used to measure manufacturing process 
performance? 
3.2. Was there any evidence that operations and DSN performance affect business 
performance? 
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3.3. Did operations and DSN help meet the corporate objectives? 
3.4. Has the importance of operational excellence changed during the different 
times from 1992 to 2003? Were there changes in the order of importance of 
the performance measures compared to previous years? 
4. Capabilities 
4.1. Which were the most relevant capabilities at different times? Which were the 
capabilities / components actually built? Examples: 
Prize 
 
Price 
 
 
Ability to profit in price competitive market (Low price) 
Flexibility 
 
Design change 
New products 
Volume change 
Mix change 
Broad line 
 
 
Ability to make rapid changes in design (Design change) 
Ability to introduce new products quickly (MPI) 
Ability to make rapid volume changes (Volume change) 
Ability to make rapid product mix changes (Mix change) 
Ability to offer a broad product line (Broad line) 
Quality 
 
Conformance 
Performance 
Reliable 
products 
 
 
Ability to offer consistently low defect rates (Conformance quality) 
Ability to provide high performance products or product amenities 
(Performance quality) 
Ability to provide reliable/durable products (Reliable/durable) 
Delivery 
 
Fast delivery 
On-time 
delivery 
 
 
Ability to provide fast deliveries (Fast delivery) 
Ability to make dependable delivery promises (On-time delivery) 
Services 
After-sales 
services 
Support 
Distribute 
Customize 
 
Ability to provide effective after-sales services 
Ability to provide product support effectively 
Ability to make product easily available 
Ability to customise product and services to customer needs 
4.2. Were there any ‘disruptive’ points that capabilities were required to change 
radically? What were these points and when?   
4.3. How did the planned capabilities vs. implemented capabilities compare? 
4.4. Were there changes in the order of importance of the implemented capabilities 
compared to previous years? 
5. Value proposition 
6. How was the operations and DSN aligned to value propositions
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Nokia Mobile Phones product range 2003 
 
• 2000 series - Entry level, low-end handsets aimed at developing markets, e.g. 
2100 
• 3000 series – mid-range of handsets, particularly targeted at mass and youth 
markets, chat, ring tone composer, profiles and screen saver via SMS, Xpress-
on changeable covers, e.g. 3330, but now includes MMS, cameras and 
Symbian OS with launch of 3650 
• 5000 series – application specific devices, with appropriate form factor, e.g. 
5510 
• 6000 series – high-end handsets, with a broad array of multi-role functionality. 
Long operating times, data capabilities, large memory, phone book and 
calendar functions. Cameras, Java, WAP and Bluetooth capabilities on some 
models, e.g. 6310, with enhanced data capabilities, e.g. GPRS, and tri-band. 
Launch of first WCDMA handset in this series, the 6650.  
• 7000 series – mix of fashion and professional consumer range. Colour screens, 
MMS and cameras feature heavily, e.g. 7650. 
• 8000 series – fashion range, designed to be regarded as “status symbols” in a 
primarily adult and professional user market. Compact and elegant form 
factors with an emphasis on low physical impact and high aesthetic appeal. 
GPRS, multimode GSM for intercontinental roaming and WAP functionality, 
e.g. 8910. 
• 9000 series – High-end products for mobile professionals and business users 
that support a variety of enabling technologies and wireless connectivity 
features. Email, word processing, presentation viewer, spreadsheets, 
multimedia, WAP and internet functionality, e.g. 9210 communicators.  
 
Source: ARC (2003), www.nokia.com. 
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Strategy charting: Data collected from strategies, annual reports, interviews and 
articles arranged by life cycle phases.  
 
1) New paradigm - dominant design 
(handportable GSM phones)
Data Source Data Source Data Source
1) End user recognized leader in cellular 
terminals
Strategy 1993, 
Annual reports
3) Rapid growth expected, but not to the 
extend it took place
Annual report 
1998
3) Intense competition, extreme volatility, 
weakened global economy
Annual report 
2001, ARC 
2001
1) The technology leverage and 
integration
Strategy 1993 3) Product availability was the main factor 
for successful business
Interviews #6, 
7
1) Diverge range of products, complexity 
of products
ARC 2001, 
annual 
reports, 
interview #3
2) GSM breakthrough 1994-1995 Häikiö 2001, 
Annual reports
1) Growing product range with 
customization, evolving distribution 
channels
Press release 
July 24, 1998
3) Nokia achieved significant market share Annual report 
2001
3) The challenge of volume growth 
(volumes doupled, tripled, lot of new 
resources)
Strategy 1994, 
1995, 
interview #4, 
#3
2) DCT3 products set the standard for 
manufacturability but also provided 
variants to customers
Interviews #7, 
8,6
3) Extreme volatility and uncertainty with 
complex implications for enterprises
Annual report 
2002, Gartner 
Research 
2002
1) Focus on recognition of brand (Europe's 
largest mobile phone manufacturer and 
world's second largest)
Strategy 1994 3) Business challenge continued strong 
growth and high operating profit margin
Strategy 1999 1) Nokia Mobile Phones was divided into 
business units focusing on different 
market segments with different business 
models. The main focus became to drive 
for profitable growth and focusing different 
market segments with different business 
models. 
Annual report 
2003
3) Growth pains, difficulties in bringing up 
the production and logistics capacity
Häikiö 2001, 
Annual report 
1995
1) Business units focusing different market 
segments with different business models
Strategy 
challenges 
2002
2) By producing handsets designed 
specifically for particular market segments, 
with associated applications, functionality 
and brand value, Nokia was looking 
subscribers to upgrade their handsets or 
move onto data-enabled next generations’ 
networks. 
Annual report 
2002
3) Low volumes, but high growth 3) High volumes and high growth 3) High volumes, slower growth
DATA DETAILS BASED ON SOURCE MATERIALS
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
1) Different market segments with different business 
models
2) Minor and major product innovations
Introduction 1992-1996 Growth 1997-2000 Maturity 2001-2003
2) Major product innovations
1) Customization, Product segmentation
2) Minor product innovations
SUMMARY
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Data Source Data Source Data Source
1) "Manufacture according to the 
specification, technology challenges and 
technology capabilities in place" "Product 
specific competition and good products"
Interviews #7, 
#6, #5, #3
3) Focus towards the trade customers Annual report 
1999
1) The industry had become more mature, 
resulting in stiffer competition and 
shrinking profit margins. This change in 
market environment forced the mobile-
phone manufacturers to shift their focus 
from growth to financial performance and 
to adopt more targeted approach towards 
customers.
Stanford Case 
2004
1) Issues with supplier quality and product 
mix
Häikiö 2001 1) Nokia became fundamentally better in 
efficiency, which lead to increase in sales 
and faster improvement of profitability 
compared to competitors
Häikiö 2001, 
Annual report 
1997
3) Nokia no longer was seen as the 
trendsetter in the industry. The basic 
design had not changed from the end of 
1997, while customers were expecting 
more clamshell type of products 
Nomura 
Research 
Institute 2001
1) "The cost was not the most important 
criteria and the quality was an order 
qualifier"
Interview #3 2) Nokia was trend setter in the design 
and renewal of the products, which was 
seen as important as production efficiency
Häikiö 2001 3) It was Nokia’s strategic intent to create 
‘Total Product Offering’ running from 
terminals and accessories through to 
applications and services, hence an 
emphasis on appropriate applications.
ARC
1) "Poor yields were allowed in some 
extent" 
Interview #2 1) "Nokia’ cellular phone business was 
very profitable and had price advance 
based on its huge volume. Nokia was 
strong both in high-end and low-end 
models. Especially, the main models that 
support Nokia’s big growth were 5100 
series and 6100 series."
 Nomura 
Research 
Institute 2001
2) Improve efficiency and master demand-
supply network
Key strategy 
and focus 
areas 2000
1) End user recognized leader in cellular 
terminals and technology leverage 
integration
Strategy 1993, 
Annual reports
1&3) Success criteria: customer 
satisfaction, operating profit, RONA, DOS, 
component count, cost
OLS strategy 
1997
2) Effective and scalable manufacturing, 
fast adaptation to new business 
requirements
Strategy 2000
1) "No clear manufacruring benefit shown 
and volumes small"
Interview #6 2) Product range explosion and end user 
segmentation
Strategy 
challenges 
1997
3) Nokia dominates with brand awareness, 
perceptions of style and quality
Market 
strategy 2000
1) "Production volumes were able to 
increase faster than competitors, in 2000 
fast slow down and no extra capacity" 
"Also very good ramp-up capability" "No 
major quality problems do to the 
manufacturing"
#6 2&1) Success criteria: availability, best 
service, on-line relationship, asset 
rotation, scalability, cost
Strategy 2000
Nokia was leader in each phase on what it 
focused on 
Interview #6 1&3) Sales of complimentary products and 
services
Strategy 2002
VALUE PROPOSITIONS
DATA DETAILS BASED ON SOURCE MATERIALS 
1) Operational Excellence  (Superior product availability, 
efficient process, economies of scale, focus on supplier 
management)
2) Product Leadership  (Design and renewal of products)
3) Customer intimacy  (Focus on trade customer needs 
1) Customer Intimacy  ((Total Product Offering, segments 
and tailored offering)
2) Operational Excellence  (Extreme cost – providing 
value at the lowest cost, able to differentiate)
3) Product Leadership (Design still important)
Introduction 1992-1996 Growth 1997-2000 Maturity 2001-2003
SUMMARY
1) Product Leadership (Technology leverage and 
integration, brand and end user recognition, product 
innovations)
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Data Source Data Source Data Source
1) Flexible processes Annual report 
1994, 
interviews 
#1 3
3&4) More cost efficiency, quality critical Strategy 1999 5) It was Nokia’s strategic intent to create 
‘Total Product Offering’ 
ARC
1) Concurrent engineering and DFM Strategy 1994 2) Important was ramp-up speed, DFM 
and DFDS metrics, ATO variants, cost of 
variable parts
Interview #6 1) Important was manufacturing cost Interview #6
1) New product families begin Strategy 1994, 
annual reports
1&4) Cost reduction and efficiency 
improvement
Interviews #9, 
#6, strategies
1,2,3,4,5) The key business drivers for 
2003 were once again increasing number 
of products and variants, smaller lot sizes 
and short lead times and cost pressure in 
the end-to-end chain. Even more 
emphasize was seen on Total Product 
Offering (TPO) and intensifying 
competition with quality and customer 
satisfaction and collaborative planning 
with channel collaborations offering. 
Strategy 2003, 
interviews #9
Quality, efficiency problems Interview #4 1) Market driven logistic chain, 
manufacturing to real market demand, 
integrated, cross functional processes end-
to-end
OLS strategy 
intent 97
4) “We see clear positive (=declining) 
trend during the whole year 2003 in 
inventories measured by Days of Supply 
(DOS) and we are not far from our 
challenging target. On Time Delivery 
(OTD), the most important customer 
satisfaction measure has not progressed 
as expected reflecting the extremely heavy 
load. Let’s not, however, forget that 
customer satisfaction is vital for our future 
success” 
Internal Global 
Operations, 
Logistics and 
Sourcing 
newsletter, 
October 2003, 
Nokia.
4) "10 Days of DOS equals to 1% profit" Interview #9 1,2,3,4,5) The business drivers that 
manufacturing and demand supply 
network directly impacts are quality, 
customer satisfaction and cost pressure. 
Also strong impact is to the diverse 
product range with various business 
models, increasing number of customer 
variants, smaller lot sizes and shorter lead 
times.
Nokia 
Strategy 
Sharing 2004
1&4) "Significant improvement in working 
capital, inventory carrying cost that 
effected profitability"
Interview #8 4) The target included improvement in on-
time delivery and reduced order fulfillment 
lead-time for Nokia, and increased 
planning accuracy and lower inventory 
levels for the customers.
Stanford case 
2004
1,3,4)"Product, Process and supply chain 
all needed to be in good shape"
Interview #8 1&3) Key business drivers quality and 
drive for profitable growth
Strategy 2002
1)"Era of growth, volume, capacity" Interview#6 4) Deliver Nokia Brand promise: perfect 
demand fulfillment of superior products, 
creating and orchestrating the most 
efficient demand supply network in the 
world
Strategy 2001
1) ARC survey 2003 showed that 
manufacturing costs are expected to fall 
dramatically over the next five years, for 
both high-end and low-end handsets alike. 
ARC
1) "Era of cost control, cost cutting" Interview #6
1) "Nokia achieved a level that nobody 
would have believed, 25% operating 
margin"
Interview #5
2&3) "ATO brought clear competitive 
advantage"
Interview #4
2) "The CA has been the fast reaction 
speed, small order sizes and number of 
variants. But we not clearly the best in the 
market as in phase 2"
Interview #9
DATA DETAILS BASED ON SOURCE MATERIALS 
SUMMARY
Maturity 2001-2003
1) Flexibility 1) Delivery, 2) flexibility, 3) quality, 4) price Increased demand on 1) price, 2) flexibility, 3) quality and 
4) delivery, 5) additional services
COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES
Introduction 1992-1996 Growth 1997-2000
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Data Source Data Source Data Source
2) Important was yield and DFM metrics Interview #6, 
#1
2) "In 1997 clear understanding of 
manufacturing to order"
Interview #9 2, 4) Manufacturing cost of netsales 
improved by 4 %
Interview #9
2) Functional and immature organization, 
no end-to-end process management
Häikiö 2001, 
strategy 
materials, , 
interviews #9, 
#5
1) Logistics shape-up: to build and operate 
an integrated supply chain. The basic 
principles were to 'Plan for Capacity' and 
Execute to Order'
Strategy 1997 1) Contributor by creating new business 
opportunities
Strategic 
intent 
manufacturing 
strategy 2000
1) "Production more like preproduction, 
and like fighting the war to get  products 
done"
Interview #3 3) Continuous improvements also had an 
important contribution to profitability
Interview #3 1, 4) The importance of design for 
manufacturing (DFM), verified 
manufacturing technologies and 
development of flexible and modular 
manufacturing concepts were seen 
important towards the fast adaptation to 
new business requirements. 
Strategies and 
interviews #1, 
#6
1) Adhoc development Interviews #7, 
#5, #3
1) CE and DFM had become critical 
capability, resulting in modular product 
platforms for better manufacturability
Interviews, 
handtime 
measure
3) In process design assembly-to-order 
(ATO) had become the critical capability to 
fulfill customer requirements and 
increased number of product changes. 
(mass customization)
Interview #2, 
#1
1) "Lot practicings getting new products 
done, new business to everyone""Not very 
mature cooperation between factories and 
Interview #1 1) "DCT3 products where already good in 
manufacturability and helped to get 
volumes up"
#7 1) New diverse manufacturing 
requirements
Appelqvist 
and Vehtari 
2003
1) "In the beginning it was most important 
to built the production capability, build 
against the specification""To get products 
manufactured when production technology 
was not commodity"
Interview #2, 1 3&4) Preparing for sudden changes, 
Readiness for change with agile and lean 
growth
Strategy 1999 1, 4) Flexibility requirements just grew in 
maturity phase
Interview #2
3) The effort to meet the rapidly growing 
demand, several major obstacles along 
the way
Stanford case 
2004
3) "Factory investments were in control in 
1999, even some losses because of 
limited capacity" "it was important decision 
to limit the number of factories and find the 
growth from efficiency"
Interview #9, 
#3
1) ”Altogether, we were manufacturing four 
products at the time we moved to new 
Salo Factory in end 1994. Now we operate 
on up to twenty products and their 
numerous variants simultaneously. Earlier 
the markets took what we had to offer, and 
everything was sold. Now we produce 
what our customers want,” Nokia manager 
explains. Fulfilling the customers’ needs is 
the key.” 
OL 
Newsletter, 
Nokia
1) Flexible working arrangements to 
increase productivity
Annual report 
1994
1&4) Grow fast in order to achieve 
maximum economies of scale, but 
manage the growth = Supply chain 
management
Strategy 1999 2) The readiness for sudden changes and 
lean processes helped the company to 
slowdown 2001
Interviews #3
1) Product and processes were planned to 
be flexible to facilitate manufacturing of 
different products
Interviews, 
Annual report 
1994
1) Cooperation with suppliers to ensure 
the component availability  (supplier 
relationship management)
Strategy 1999 
and 2000
2) The cost leadership comes from design 
for manufacturability, sourcing, cost 
efficient in-house manufacturing and 
effective sales and distribution providing 
cost benefit of 25 % compared to 
competitors.
Kallasvuo 
2003
3) Focus in operations was CE processes, 
DFM and global manufacturing
Strategies 
1994, 1995, 
interview #1
2) The ATO process resulted in high 
efficiency in internal operations and saves 
the burden of holding finished goods 
inventories
Stanford case 
2004, 
interviews
2, 4)  Design for demand-supply network 
is the foundation for industry leading 
profits.
Pertti 
Korhonen 
(2003) 
3) Clear benefits for manufacturing 
through DFM
Interviews #1 3) The strong profitability improvement in 
Nokia was due to further development and 
integration of logistics processes and 
efficient management of working capital
Häikiö 2001 2, 4) “this production machine cannot be 
built in short term and be outsourced 
easily because we would then loose the 
efficient production and specially good 
cooperation between product creation and 
production”. 
Interview #1
3) The shape up started 1995-1996 Häikiö 2001, 
strategy 
materials 
1995-1996
3) The automation possibilities were 
looked at extensively, but not realized
Interviews #4, 
#1, strategy 
materials
2) Nokia was scored as second best in the 
world 
Reilly, K. 
(2004) AMR 
Research 
Supply Chain 
Top 25
Introduction 1992-1996 Growth 1997-2000 Maturity 2001-2003
1) Ability to introduce new products -> Ability to shape up 
and grow fast
1) Ability to delivery efficiently -> Ability to sudden 
changes, to slow down
1) Ability to support new businesses
SUMMARY
2) Ability to profit in price competitive market 2) Disconnected line flow (batch) to connected line flow 
(layouts, interviews, internal documents)
2) Assembly to order partly implemented in factories 
globally (layouts, interviews, internal documents)
CAPABILITIES
DATA DETAILS BASED ON SOURCE MATERIALS 
3) Major process innovations (operational innovation) 3) Minor process innovations (Continuous Improvement)
4) Minor process innovations (Continuous improvement), 
Major process innovations still missing, but need 
identified
3) Assembly to Order
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1) Challenges rapid growth, component 
supply and end product stock 
management problems
Strategy 1996 1) “The high demand for our products, the 
excellence of operations and favorable 
market conditions with lower than 
anticipated price erosion led to an 
exceptional level of profitability” 
Jorma Ollilla, 
Annual report 
1998
1) “A Paradigm shift is required improved 
customization capability”.
ATO meeting 
in Beijing 
12.12.03:
3) I"mprovement needs where seen few 
years before the volumes exploided"
Interview #7 4) "No more people" the people in NMP 
factories will not grow
Strategy 1999 1) The need for more diverse 
manufacturing capabilities
Interviews, 
strategy 2000
3) With reorganization of logistics and new 
products the profitability improved on the 
second half of 1996
Annual report 
1996
4) "It was good that Nokia knew how to 
slow down"
Interview #8 1) Effective and scalable manufacturing, 
DFM, verified manufacturing technologies, 
fast adaptation: new manufacturing 
concepts and modular production process
Manufacturing 
strategy 2000
1)"Most critical to produce products when 
production technology was not commodity, 
meaning that lot of processes and 
equipment had to be developed from the 
beginning" 
Interview #1 1) “In the rapidly growing mobile phone 
industry, efficient and flexible logistics 
processes and manufacturing capabilities 
are an important success factor, and the 
significance of the new Komárom site 
within Nokia’s global logistics structure is 
very high. Today in Komárom we are 
celebrating the opening of Nokia’s 10th 
bil h f t ”
Nokia Press 
release May 
05, 2000
2, 4) Harmonization of global 
manufacturing processes, Efficiency 
improvement (High capacity utilization in 
engine manufacturing and responsive final 
assembly to customer order, scalable, 
efficient and global volume manufacturing)
Manufacturing 
strategy 2002 
and 2003, 
Appelqvist 
and Vehtari 
2003
1) "Current production technology and 
process designs were mainly introduced 
through introduction of GSM products 
2110 and 6110 during 1994-1996" 
Interview#7, 
#2
1) "Scale benefits as enabler in 
component sourcing"
Interview #8 2, 4) Upstream integration  with suppliers 
continues
Sourcing 
strategy 2003, 
interviews #9, 
#1
1) Ability to adapt to local needs in 
manufacturing distribution and channel 
relationships (local factories), building up 
the delivery capacity
Strategy 1994 1) "Without fundamental logistics shape-
up and the improvements through 
systematic work on Design for 
Manufacturing (DFM), which had started 
already in the previous era, there would 
have not been any wins."
Interview #1 2) "Cost/phone more important than 
previously phones/head"
Interviews #5, 
#3, #1
"Hick up in 1995/1996 woke up to the 
logistics improvement need" "If only cost 
cutting had been done, Nokia could not 
have won Motorola"
Interviews #8, 
#3
2) Integrated final assembly and packing 
improved the leadtime from 10 days to 24 
hours
Interview #8 1) "Better customer focus and visibility 
needed, integration to customers and new 
business models"
Interviews #9, 
#7
3) "The biggest decisions were made in 
1996/1997 for shape-up"
Interview #9 1) Integration with customers and 
suppliers, demand supply visibility to 
whole chain, integrated planning and 
make to demand, capacity increase
Strategy 98 
targets
1&3) "If no improvement in manufacturing 
we would have ended up with tens of 
factories"
Interview #7
1) "Network of uniform manufacturing and 
generic capacity enabled volume changes 
and product mix changes"
Interview #6
1) "Global supply network and capacity 
plant to plant deliveries"
Interview #5
1) "After logistics hick-up there was 
sourcing hick-up that initiated the sourcing 
shape up"
Interview #7, 
#1
1) "Ramp-up capability improved 
significantly"
Interviews #6, 
4, 2
1) "It was just running after capacity, cost 
efficiency was not so important as getting 
deliveries out"
Interview #4
3) "High growth hide lot of the problems as 
well, even high performance seen from the 
outside"
Interview #2
1) Outsoucing mainly submodules, which 
helped to simplify the manufacturing 
process" "Nokia did not outsource so 
much because did not want to loose the 
control" "Outsourcing was strategical 20-
25%"
Interviews 
#1,#9, #3
"The improvement of logistics released 
money for the company"
Interview #7, 2
1) “The operations helped to meet the 
challenging delivery requirements through 
superior demand supply network, volume 
flexibility capability and scalable 
production that others did not have. Nokia 
was able to stop the growth on time and 
not having huge amount of extra inventory. 
Since during the fast growth demand 
exceeds offering, the winner is who can 
deliver and increase capacity fast enough 
and improve the efficiency. The 
companies that are not prepared to high 
growth will suffer … Nokia succeeded in 
translating strong brand, product offering, 
industry-leading execution and operational 
efficiency into highly profitable results “ 
Nomura 
Research 
Institute 2001
 
 
 
 172
